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This thesis explores whether sensorimotor enactivism can be extended to flavour and 
smell perception. Sensorimotor enactivism claims that perceptual experience is 
constituted by skilful bodily engagement with the world. This engagement is said to be 
imbued with an implicit understanding of sensorimotor contingencies — law-like relations 
holding between bodily activity and sensory changes. The sensorimotor approach is 
intended as a non-visuocentric theory of perception, purporting to offer an account of all 
varieties of perceptual experience. However, until now there has been no sustained 
research into the application of sensorimotor enactivism to flavour and smell. Moreover, 
some researchers have argued that these senses are problem cases for the theory, and 
that facts about flavour and smell serve to refute the approach. This thesis responds to 
such worries and addresses the gap in the literature. It argues that sensorimotor 
enactivism can be extended to flavour and smell and offers a positive account of how we 
should think about our perceptual experiences through these modalities. 
Flavour and smell, it will be argued, do not allow immediate perceptual access to ordinary 
physical objects like roses and tomatoes. But rather, they give us immediate access to 
odours and flavours. In order to understand what our perceptual access to such entities 
consists in, this thesis draws upon tools from Gestalt psychology. Gestalt psychology 
allows for a modality-neutral way of thinking about perceptual organisation and helps us 
to arrive at a useful notion of ‘perceptual objecthood’. The entities we perceive through 
         5 
 
flavour and smell are much more diffuse than the ordinary three-dimensional objects that 
we perceive through sight, and the phenomenology of these kinds of perception seem 
particularly difficult to articulate. I argue that flavour and smell are still akin to other 
senses like vision in that they allow us to perceive the world as segregated into discrete 
perceptual objects, which exhibit figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies. 
An understanding of perceptual organisation and objecthood allows for a more refined 
sensorimotor approach and will help us to arrive at solutions to further philosophical 
queries, such as whether flavour and smell are multisensory, and what the role of memory 




Philosophy of perception has, for the most part, focused its attention on vision. However, 
if we shift our focus to other senses like taste and smell, philosophical queries about 
perception might have to be answered differently. This thesis explores the application of 
a theory of perception, known as ‘sensorimotor enactivism’, to these lesser-explored 
senses. It argues that sensorimotor enactivism can be usefully extended to flavour and 
smell and offers an account of how we should think about these forms of perception. 
Sensorimotor enactivism’s big claim is that perception is a kind of action. More specifically, 
it says that perception is an active process of skilfully exploring the environment. The 
skilful aspect of this exploration is said to consist in a kind of attunement to how our own 
body movements can induce different sensations. For example, we are attuned to the way 
that moving our eyes to the left brings about different sensations than moving them to 
the right. Without this kind of understanding of how our bodily activities can bring about 
sensory changes, our experiences would be extremely confusing. The world would appear 
to shift whenever we moved our eyes. Instead, we experience a stable and coherent world 
despite such dramatic sensory changes. The sensorimotor approach says that our 
perceptual experiences are the way they are because of our attunement to the myriad of 
different ways our bodies can perceptually interact with the world.  
The sensorimotor approach, however, might not seem plausible when applied to flavour 
and smell. Some philosophers argue that these senses are uninformative in comparison 
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to sight. For example, the sense of smell may appear to only allow for the experience of 
vague, fragrant properties in our immediate surroundings, whereas vision allows us to 
experience objects at a distance, arrayed before us in space. Moreover, while 
sensorimotor enactivism takes perception to be an active process, some philosophers 
deny that this can be said of flavour and smell. Tasting salt on our tongues or experiencing 
the overwhelming smell of a passer-by’s aftershave may appear not to involve active 
exploration of the environment. Researchers have argued that flavour and smell thus 
present a problem for sensorimotor enactivism.  
I argue that such worries do not refute sensorimotor enactivism, and that our perceptual 
experiences in these senses bear interesting analogies with our experiences through other 
senses like sight and hearing. Smelling and tasting involve complex bodily activities and 
through such activity, we can garner a great deal of information about parts of the 
environment. I propose that flavour and smell perceptually parcel up aspects of the world 
into single entities or ‘perceptual objects’ in much the same way that sight allows for the 




I am very fortunate to have been afforded the opportunity to do a PhD, and I wish to 
express my gratitude to the people who helped make this project achievable.  
First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisors, who helped me to form and develop 
the ideas and arguments expressed in this thesis. My principal supervisor Dave Ward has 
been immensely supportive and encouraging over the past four years, and has provided 
invaluable guidance, suggestions and feedback at every stage of the process. Alistair Isaac 
has also provided extremely helpful supervision and insightful comments on my thesis, 
for which I am very grateful.  
Over the course of my PhD, I have also benefitted from fruitful discussions with many 
fellow PhD students and colleagues, too numerous to mention. Thanks to all my friends 
from the Edinburgh PhD and MSc programmes, who’ve been incredibly helpful and 
supportive over the years, as well as providing much-needed distractions from work. I am 
especially grateful to Jonny Lee, Matt Sims and Mara Neijzen who read and provided 
feedback on sections of my thesis.  
My PhD was funded by an AHRC studentship from the Scottish Graduate School of Arts 
and Humanities and a Jacobsen Studentship from the Royal Institute of Philosophy. I am 
very thankful for this financial support, which enabled me to embark upon and complete 
this project. 
         9 
 
Finally, my family deserve special acknowledgement for their unwavering support. Thanks 
are owed to my mum, Kate, whose kindness and ability to throw herself into life are an 
inspiration, and to my sisters, Abi, Steph and Suzie. They have all always been there for 
me. Abi also deserves credit for generously reading through an entire thesis draft and 
providing useful feedback. 
This thesis is dedicated to my dad, who passed away last November. It is probably due to 
inheriting his enjoyment of puzzle solving and analytical nature that I became interested 
in philosophy in the first place.  
10 
 
Table of Contents 
Declaration of Authorship ............................................................................................ 3 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 4 
Lay Summary .............................................................................................................. 6 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... 8 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... 10 
1. Introducing sensorimotor enactivism and perceptual organisation .......................... 15 
1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 15 
1.1 Tenets of the sensorimotor approach ................................................................... 17 
1.1.1 Attunement to sensorimotor contingencies ................................................... 17 
1.1.2 Perceptual duality ........................................................................................... 22 
1.1.3 Perceptual presence and the world as an ‘outside memory’ ......................... 25 
1.1.4 An omission in the literature: the ‘chemical senses’ ...................................... 28 
1.2 Perceptual organisation and Gestalt psychology ................................................... 34 
1.2.1 The Gestalt grouping principles ...................................................................... 38 
1.2.2 Sensorimotor enactivism and the Gestalt approach ...................................... 43 
1.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 46 
2. Towards a sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell .......................................... 47 
2.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 47 
2.1 Objection 1: Motionless perception ...................................................................... 49 
2.2 Objection 2: Flavour and smell lack constancies ................................................... 55 
2.2.1 An initial response to Burge ............................................................................ 61 
         11 
 
2.2.2 Constancies, duality and objectivity ................................................................ 63 
2.3 Developing sensorimotor understanding and the chemical senses ....................... 74 
2.3.1 Neonates and the developmental line of argument ........................................ 77 
2.3.2 How should we understand sensorimotor understanding? ............................ 80 
3. Smelling objects ..................................................................................................... 85 
3.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 85 
3.1 Background ............................................................................................................. 87 
3.2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for objecthood .............................................. 97 
3.2.1 Figure-ground segregation .............................................................................. 98 
3.2.2 Perceptual constancies .................................................................................. 103 
3.3 Does olfaction fulfil the criteria for perceptual objecthood? ............................... 109 
3.3.1 Figure-ground segregation in olfaction: an aspatial notion based on Gestalt 
principles ................................................................................................................ 110 
3.3.2 Figure-ground segregation and the spatiality of olfaction ............................ 117 
3.3.3 Olfactory constancies .................................................................................... 127 
3.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 130 
4. Extending object concepts to flavour perception ................................................... 133 
4.0 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 133 
4.1 Putative flavour objects ........................................................................................ 134 
4.2 Figure-ground segregation and perceptual grouping in flavour ........................... 140 
4.2.1 A potential problem ....................................................................................... 146 
4.3 Sensorimotor activity and perceptual constancies in flavour ............................... 152 
12 
 
4.3.1 Flavour constancy amid gappy and changing stimulation ............................ 153 
4.3.2 Expectations and constancies ....................................................................... 156 
5. Flavour, smell and multisensory objects ............................................................... 159 
5.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 159 
5.1 Individuating the chemical senses ....................................................................... 160 
5.2 From unisensory to multisensory perceptual objects.......................................... 169 
5.2.1 A challenge: The diversity problem............................................................... 173 
5.3 Two types of evidence for multisensory objecthood ........................................... 177 
5.3.1 The grouping principles ................................................................................ 178 
5.3.2 Multisensory Gestalt shifts ........................................................................... 186 
5.4 A chemical variant of Molyneux’s question ......................................................... 194 
5.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 197 
6. Memory and the chemical senses ........................................................................ 199 
6.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 199 
6.1 Does prior experience play a role in object individuation?.................................. 200 
6.1.1 Further support for MAFG: familiarity and the chemical senses .................. 210 
6.1.2 Defusing the a priori argument ..................................................................... 213 
6.2 Familiarity and affect in the chemical senses ...................................................... 220 
6.2.1 The Proust phenomenon .............................................................................. 225 
6.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 232 
7. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 235 
7.1 Summary .............................................................................................................. 235 
         13 
 
7.2 Areas for development and future enquiry .......................................................... 239 
7.2.1 Illusions in the chemical senses ..................................................................... 239 
7.2.2 Direct realism ................................................................................................ 246 































         15 
 
1. Introducing sensorimotor enactivism and perceptual 
organisation 
1.0 Introduction 
Sensorimotor enactivism1 is the view that perceptual experience depends constitutively 
on an attunement to sensorimotor contingencies — predictable or law-like relations 
between sensory stimulation and bodily activity. In other words, perceivers have a kind of 
attunement to how their bodily movements induce sensory changes. This attunement is 
sometimes referred to as sensorimotor understanding, sensorimotor knowledge or 
sensorimotor skill (and I use these terms interchangeably) and throughout this thesis 
precisely how we should understand this concept will emerge. Through the possession of 
this sensorimotor understanding, a perceiving organism is said to attain direct perceptual 
access to the objects in its environment. 
This view was first set out by O’Regan and Noë (2001a), but related views and important 
precursors are evident in Hurley’s (1998) account. Sensorimotor enactivism draws upon 
Gibson’s (1966/1983; 1979) ecological approach to perception and Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1945/2012) embodied phenomenology of perception, and it also bears resemblances to 
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s (1991) autopoetic variant of enactivism.2 Sensorimotor 
 
1 The approach is also known as sensorimotor contingency theory, or just sensorimotor theory. Recently 
Noë (2010; 2012) has referred to his approach as ‘actionism’.  
2 For discussion of the different types of enactivism and the ancestors of the approach see Ward, Silverman, 
and Villalobos (2017). 
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theory has continued to be developed both by the theory’s originators and through 
secondary literature (see for example Hurley and Noë, 2003; Noë, 2004; 2006a; 2010; 
2012; O’Regan, 2011; for a collection of secondary works see Bishop & Martin, 2014). 
However, despite the interest the theory has attracted, there has still been little 
investigation of whether the approach is successful as an account of non-visual 
experience. 
The sensorimotor approach is intended as a non-visuocentric theory of perception, 
offering an account of all varieties of perceptual experience. In fact, Noë (2004, e.g. pp. 
72–73; pp. 96–100) argues that touch, not vision, should be our model for perception 
since touch more obviously involves bodily movement and active probing of the 
environment. But most discussion of the sensorimotor approach still centres on the visual 
case, and there has been especially little written about how the sensorimotor approach 
may apply to flavour3 and smell — the so-called ‘chemical senses’4 (though see Cooke & 
Myin, 2011 for one exception, and for explicit opposition to a sensorimotor approach to 
the chemical senses see Gray & Tanesini, 2009 and Young, 2017). This thesis will address 
this gap in the literature and outline how the sensorimotor approach can be extended to 
 
3 This thesis focuses on flavour rather than taste (in its narrow, technical sense) because we rarely, if ever, 
experience the so-called ‘basic tastes’ (sweet, salt, bitter, sour, umami) without them presenting simply as 
aspects of flavours (i.e. the sweet, sour, citrusy flavour of an orange). Some have argued that the term ‘basic 
taste’ does not truly refer to anything (Delwiche, 1996; Erickson, 2008; Spence, Smith, & Auvray, 2014). Our 
tasting activity gives rise to flavour experiences, rather than simple taste experiences.  
4 For simplicity, I will use the term ‘chemical senses’ to refer to flavour as well as smell. However, strictly 
speaking, flavour involves a combination of chemical senses (gustation, retronasal olfaction, trigeminal 
stimulation) but also contributions from other somatosensory senses (see Smith, 2015a). 
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flavour and smell. It aims to offer an empirically and phenomenologically satisfying 
account of how we ought to understand flavour and smell perception within such a 
framework.  
This first chapter outlines the central commitments of the sensorimotor approach and the 
value of engaging in the philosophy of flavour and smell perception. We shall see that 
failing to show that the approach can be extended to these senses would constitute a 
major omission in the theory. I also argue that supplementing the sensorimotor approach 
with certain ideas from Gestalt psychology will help to provide a phenomenologically 
adequate account of these senses. Among the wide-ranging differences between the 
sensory modalities, perceptual organisation is a unifying factor. These principles of 
perceptual organisation will, in future chapters, allow us to arrive at modality-neutral 
notions of figure-ground segregation and perceptual objecthood that can be applied 
across the senses. 
1.1 Tenets of the sensorimotor approach 
1.1.1 Attunement to sensorimotor contingencies 
Sensorimotor enactivism claims that perception is constitutively dependent upon an 
implicit understanding of, or attunement to, sensorimotor contingencies. This 
attunement is often referred to as ‘sensorimotor understanding’ or ‘sensorimotor 
knowledge’, but sensorimotor theorists emphasise that this ‘knowledge’ is not of the 
18 
 
propositional variety. It is intended as a kind of Rylean know-how rather than 
propositional know-that (e.g. Noë, 2004, pp. 117–122; see Ryle, 1949 for his seminal 
formulation of the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that).5 Perception 
is taken to be a practical bodily skill like riding a bike, and the perceiver need not be able 
to articulate their understanding. There has been some debate about what this 
sensorimotor understanding amounts to (e.g. see Roberts, 2009; Silverman, 2018), and as 
chapter 2 highlights, examination of the chemical senses can help provide some 
clarification of this notion.  
Sensorimotor contingencies include such things as the characteristic ways that sensory 
stimulation on the retina changes as the eye rotates. This is predictable and is based upon 
‘the size of the eye movement, the spherical shape of the retina, and the nature of the 
ocular optics’ (O'Regan & Noë, 2001a, p. 941). Similarly, visual contingencies include the 
sensory impact of blinking, which causes the retinal image to go blank, and saccadic eye 
movements. Auditory sensorimotor contingencies, on the other hand, include the way 
that head movements alter temporal asynchrony between the right and left ears, and how 
movements towards or away from a sound source affect the perceived volume (ibid.). The 
distinctive patterns of sensorimotor contingency associated with each modality are said 
 
5 See, however, Stanley & Williamson (2001) for criticism of the contrast between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that. See Noë (2005a) for a response.  
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to offer a method for individuating the senses (O'Regan & Noë, 2001a, p. 943; Noë, 2002; 
see chapter 5 for discussion).  
There are also sensorimotor contingencies related to the properties of particular objects, 
such as the sensory changes that occur as we perceive the different sides of a tomato (see 
O'Regan & Noë, 2001b, p. 88). These patterns explain why seeing a tomato differs from 
seeing a pineapple — we are attuned to the different kinds of sensory input induced by 
our interactions with these differently shaped and coloured objects. In this way, the 
sensorimotor approach is intended to offer an explanation of the quality of our perceptual 
experiences. Our experiences are the way they are because of the patterns of 
sensorimotor interaction involved. The phenomenal character of seeing the colour red, 
touching velvet, hearing bells ringing, smelling the scent of a rose or tasting chocolate are 
all to be explained by types of sensorimotor engagement involved in each perceptual 
episode.  
Positing these different types of sensorimotor contingency is supposed to help solve two 
puzzles about conscious experience, which have been referred to as the ‘comparative 
explanatory gaps’ (to be contrasted with the ‘absolute explanatory gap’) (Hurley & Noë, 
2003).6 There are two types of comparative gap: the intermodal comparative gap — the 
 
6 Whether the approach also makes progress with the ‘absolute explanatory gap’ or ‘hard problem’ of 
consciousness — the question of why physical phenomena should be accompanied by conscious experience 
at all — is more controversial. Initially, O’Regan and Noë claimed that the sensorimotor approach 
overcomes the explanatory gap (2001a, p. 960; pp. 962–963), but Noë has since seemingly retreated from 
this claim (e.g. 2004, p. 231). The absolute explanatory gap is not something this thesis addresses. 
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problem of explaining why a subject has, say, a visual rather than an auditory experience; 
and the intramodal comparative gap — the problem of explaining why a subject has, say, 
a visual experience of a tomato rather than a visual experience of a pineapple. In both 
cases, the character of conscious experience is to be explained in terms of the different 
sets of sensorimotor contingencies governing one’s skilful worldly interactions. The 
approach aims to provide a phenomenologically satisfying explanation of why experience 
feels the way it does.  
The idea that perceptual experience is constituted by attunement to sensorimotor 
contingencies is often supported by evidence from sensory substitution devices (e.g. 
Hurley, 1998, chapter 9; O’Regan & Noë, 2001a; 2001b; Noë, 2002; Hurley & Noë, 2003) 
and visual adaptation to reversing goggles (e.g. Hurley, 1998; Hurley & Noë, 2003).7 Tactile 
vision substitution system (TVSS) devices are composed of vibrators or electrodes 
 
7 Both the sensory substitution and reversing goggle results have been questioned as sources of support. 
For example, Jesse Prinz (2006; 2009; 2012, chapter 6) offers arguments that attempt to undermine these 
types of evidence for the sensorimotor approach. One line of criticism is that the phenomenology of 
experience remains tactile/auditory in the sensory substitution case: ‘none of the testimony that I have read 
persuades me that users experience anything visual’ (2006, p. 4) and vision remains unadapted in the 
goggles case. There is reason, however, to be sceptical of these arguments. Prinz’s claims conflict with 
reports of those subjects who do report visual phenomenology from sensory substitution (e.g. see Ward & 
Meijer, 2010 for examples from auditory visual sensory substitution) and do report visual adaptation to the 
goggles (Taylor, 1962). Moreover, the sensorimotor approach can also concede that elements of the 
experiences may not adapt (see Myin & Degenaar, 2014 for discussion). We would expect elements of 
sensory substitution experiences to remain unlike vision to the extent that the sensorimotor contingencies 
involved are still not quite the same as those involved in normal visual experience. Similarly, the 
sensorimotor approach allows for partial adaptation to new sensorimotor contingencies, so in the goggles 
case one might still experience writing as reversed even if other aspects of experience have gone back to 
normal (see O'Regan & Noë, 2001a, p. 953; see also Ward, 2016 for detailed discussion of how we ought to 
interpret such findings). Thus, such objections can be challenged. I shall not go into further detail about 
such debates here, since even if certain evidence for visual sensorimotor theory were undermined, the 
approach may still be successful in relation to flavour and smell. 
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attached to the skin, and they receive feedback from a head-mounted camera. Output 
from the camera is transduced to provide corresponding tactile stimulation on the skin of 
blind (or blindfolded) subjects. Initially the subjects only experience tactile sensations 
from the device, but after an adaptation period during which they actively move around 
the environment, they begin to experience quasi-visual effects. TVSS-perception is unlike 
touch in that it does not require physical contact with objects. And much like vision, the 
TVSS devices allow subjects to perceive distal three-dimensional objects arrayed before 
them in space. Subjects start being able to ‘see’ with the devices when they become 
attuned to these vision-like sensorimotor contingencies. The sensorimotor approach 
predicts that TVSS-perception will replicate ordinary vision to the extent that the relevant 
visual sensorimotor contingencies are replicated. Similar effects have been found with 
‘The vOICe’ auditory visual substitution devices, which convert visual input into auditory 
soundscapes (Ward & Meijer, 2010). 
Initially, right-left reversing goggles dramatically disrupt subjects’ experiences, flipping the 
visual field and resulting in movement causing confusing sensory effects and distortions 
(Kohler, 1962; Taylor, 1962). Veridical proprioceptive feelings of movement conflict with 
visual experience. As Hurley & Noë state, ‘[M]ovements of your eyes, head, limbs, and 
whole body quickly demonstrate that the old patterns of sensorimotor contingency no 
longer apply’ (2003, p. 149). However, after an extended period of adaptation, the conflict 
between vision and proprioception dissipates. This adaptation period (much like in the 
TVSS case) involves the subject engaging in sensorimotor interactions with the 
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environment. Reports vary, but Hurley & Noë (2003) along with Taylor (1962) characterise 
the adaptation as involving visual experience gradually correcting itself. Objects on the 
left are once more correctly seen as being on the left, for example. Others have suggested 
that it is really subjects’ proprioception and behavioural dispositions that reverse in 
accordance with visual experience (Harris, 1965; Harris, 1980). Ward (2016) argues 
convincingly that perception and one’s practical behavioural capacities are constitutively 
entwined, and so one ought not to expect one to adapt without the other adapting too, 
suggesting that neither of the above interpretations is quite right.8 Importantly, for the 
sensorimotor theorist, the experienced shift is explained by an adaptation to new patterns 
of sensorimotor contingency. Passive exposure to changing stimuli is insufficient for the 
adaptation; it requires purposeful interaction with the world.  
1.1.2 Perceptual duality 
Much of the time, we are largely unaware of the sensory changes that occur as we interact 
with the world. We generally simply perceive whole objects, rather than attending to 
transient changing sensations. However, if we adopt a particular attentional stance we 
can notice at least some of these sensory changes as we engage in bodily activity.9 This is 
 
8 Ward (2016) also highlights that close attention to the reports from Kohler’s subjects supports such an 
interpretation. Parts of the world with which the subjects are intentionally and fluently interacting are 
perceived veridically, while the rest may still be experienced as still reversed. This suggests that veridical 
perception and fluent behavioural capacities return together.  
9 We may never detect certain sensory changes, such as, for example, the sensory changes induced by most 
involuntary saccadic eye movements.  
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manifested in a kind of experienced duality to perceptual experience (emphasised 
especially in Noë’s later works, e.g. 2004; 2012).  
There are different ways to cash out the idea that perceptual experience exhibits a duality. 
With some interpretations of the sensorimotor theory, consciously experienced sensory 
changes or ‘raw sensations’ occur prior to the acquisition of sensorimotor 
understanding.10 According to this kind of approach, it is possible to have sensory 
experience (perhaps experienced as a mosaic of conscious sensations rather than 
coherent worldly objects) without sensorimotor abilities. With other versions of the 
approach these sensory changes can only reach the level of conscious experience once 
the subject has already acquired the sensorimotor skills required for perception (for 
example, see Beaton’s, 2016 interpretation of Noë’s approach, particularly p. 267, fn. 7). 
With this approach, perception and the experience of sensory change co-arise. According 
to either of these glosses on Noë’s sensorimotor approach, once we do have perceptual 
skills, we can at times attend to the sensory changes that are induced through bodily 
activity. Here I assume that with this kind of sensorimotor approach, the sensory changes 
are experienced (at least largely) as what Noë (2004) refers to as perspectival properties 
or p-properties — relational properties between the perceiver’s body and parts of the 
environment. For example, if we focus our attention we can notice that, perceived from 
an angle, there is a sense in which a plate looks elliptical, and this elliptical shape changes 
 
10 This appears to be what is suggested at various points by Noë (2004) in his discussion of changing 
‘appearances’ and ‘looks’ (e.g. see chapter 3 and pp. 228–230).  
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as we move. We can also notice that even though the plate is a uniform colour, there are 
visible differences in patches of light and shadow.  
Perceptual duality can serve as evidence for the perceptual constancies that underlie it. 
For example, when we notice how the plate looks a uniform colour, but in another sense 
has visible differences in patches of light and darkness, we are attending to features of 
colour constancy. Such constancies have been taken to be a hallmark of perception, as 
distinguished from proximal sensation (e.g. Burge, 2009; 2010; see discussion in chapter 
2). According to the sensorimotor approach, these constancies are a product of 
sensorimotor skill. We perceive a plate as being a constant size and shape despite 
perspectival and sensory changes, because of our attunement to sensorimotor 
contingencies.  
The idea that perceptual experience has this dual character is controversial. Some 
researchers are unconvinced that we really experience changing perspectival properties, 
or criticise Noë’s characterisation of them (for example, see discussions in Siewert, 2006; 
Briscoe, 2008; Kelly, 2008; Martin, 2008; Hopp, 2013).11 A number of philosophers 
specifically object to the implication that we experience constant properties and 
perspectival properties simulaneously (Siewert, 2006; Kelly, 2008). I agree with these 
 
11 Others, such as sense-datum theorists, have argued that we don’t perceive the constant, non-perspectival 
properties of things (we only truly perceive the elliptical shape of the plate and the facing sides of the 
tomato). We only judge that the plate is round and the tomato spherical. I shall not discuss this possibility 
here, but Noë argues that this is an epistemological point rather than a phenomenological one (see Noë, 
2005b for discussion).  
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researchers that it is phenomenologically implausible that we can direct our attention to 
both at once. As Kelly suggests (2008, pp. 685–686), the redirection of attention is akin to 
an aspect shift; we can’t see an image as both a duck and a rabbit at the same time. 
However, the idea that we can attend to both perspectival and non-perspectival aspects 
of the world at once doesn’t seem to be an important part of Noë’s position (see 
discussion in Noë, 2008). The sensorimotor theorist can agree that one must undergo an 
attentional shift to notice perspectival properties.  
We generally perceive the world before us without noticing transient perspectival 
changes as we move around, and only attend to these perspectival properties when we 
adopt a particular detached, ‘painterly’ attitude. However, these changing perspectival 
properties are still important insofar as they provide valuable evidence of the perceptual 
constancies that underlie them, and they mark a distinction between perceptually present 
aspects of the world and ephemeral sensory changes. In the chapters to come, I argue 
that an analogous duality can also be experienced in flavour and smell perception, a step 
on the way to vindicating a sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell. We will also see 
that the constancies underlying such duality are a necessary condition for perceptual 
objecthood. 
1.1.3 Perceptual presence and the world as an ‘outside memory’ 
The sensorimotor approach has the purported benefit of providing a solution to the 
problem of perceptual presence (Noë, 2004, pp. 59–65). This is the puzzle of how we have 
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a perceptual awareness of hidden aspects of objects and scenes — ‘that which, strictly 
speaking, I do not perceive’ (ibid., p. 60). We perceive a tomato as spherical, but how can 
this be when we do not have sensory contact with the back of it? The sensorimotor 
approach offers a solution: the hidden parts of objects are present as accessible. Through 
our sensorimotor skills, we have access to the whole, spherical tomato: 
Our perceptual sense of the tomato’s wholeness — of its volume and backside, 
and so forth — consists in our implicit understanding (our expectation) that 
movements of our body to the left or right, say, will bring further bits of the tomato 
into view. Our relation to the unseen bits of the tomato is mediated by patterns 
of sensorimotor contingency. (Noë, 2004, p. 63) 
Implicitly understanding how movements provide sensory access to different parts of the 
environment enables an experience of richly detailed scenes and whole objects. We do 
not need neurally-realised models of this detail because the detail is already there in the 
world, ready to be accessed through skilful bodily activity. This idea is sometimes 
expressed in the claim that the world serves as an ‘outside memory’ (O'Regan, 1992);12 
through bodily activity, we access the world’s detail as and when required.  
In this way, the sensorimotor approach serves as an alternative to orthodox cognitive 
science, according to which the brain constructs a richly detailed model or representation 
of the environment (i.e. views descending from Marr, 1982; see discussion in O'Regan & 
Noë, 2001a, p. 940). Because of the sensorimotor approach’s opposition to this kind of 
view, it has often been taken to eschew internal representations altogether. However, it 
 
12 C.f. Brooks’ (1991) claim that the world is its own best model. 
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does in fact remain compatible with positing representations that play an important role 
in perception, as long as these representations are not taken to be fully constitutive of 
perceptual experience. Noë clarifies this:  
No doubt perception depends on what takes place in the brain, and very likely 
there are internal representations in the brain (e.g., content-bearing internal 
states). What perception is, however, is not a process in the brain, but a kind of 
skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole. (2004, p. 2; see also p. 22) 
Some researchers offer representation-friendly versions of the sensorimotor approach 
that are largely in line with orthodox cognitive science (e.g. Seth, 2014). Other 
sensorimotor theorists (e.g. Silverman, 2013) adopt positions more in line with the anti-
representational ‘radical’ enactivism of Hutto and Myin (2013). This is not a debate this 
thesis addresses; I take my core arguments to be compatible with either representation-
friendly or anti-representational versions of the sensorimotor approach. 
The idea that visual experience isn’t realised by the activation of a high-fidelity, richly 
detailed model of the world before us is supported by research into change and 
inattentional blindness (for discussion see O'Regan & Noë, 2001a). Large portions of the 
visual field can change without subjects noticing, due to distractors such as the 
appearance of ‘mud splats’ or a global flicker across the visual field (e.g. O’Regan, Rensink, 
& Clark, 1999). Similarly, providing subjects with an attention-intensive task can cause 
them not to notice strikingly unusual events. In a famous demonstration of this, viewers 
who were engaged in counting how many times a basketball was passed among players 
often failed to notice the appearance of a person in a full-body gorilla suit (Simons & 
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Chabris, 1999). These unnoticed occurrences may be very surprising to subjects who felt 
they were, at once, seeing a whole detailed scene before them. They are, however, 
consonant with the sensorimotor approach’s claims regarding the world serving as an 
outside memory. We focus our attention only on small aspects of the field at any one 
time, allowing us to entirely miss the gorilla. The impression of a richly detailed field 
before us is, according to Noë (2004), because of our ability to access the world and its 
detail, even if in an important sense we don’t currently perceive these details. Our 
experience of the world is less determinate than might be initially thought.  
1.1.4 An omission in the literature: the ‘chemical senses’ 
Most of the discussion among sensorimotor theorists, and their detractors, relates to 
vision. And the approach succeeds, I think, in providing an empirically and 
phenomenologically plausible account of visual experience (although one need not accept 
this in order to endorse the positive arguments relating to the chemical senses throughout 
this thesis). However, if sensorimotor enactivism is to serve as a general account of 
perception, and if it is to close the aforementioned ‘comparative explanatory gaps’, it 
must also offer a satisfactory account of very different kinds of perceptual experience. In 
this regard, since flavour and smell haven’t been discussed, there is an omission in the 
literature surrounding sensorimotor enactivism. As we shall see throughout the following 
chapters, the approach (in combination with certain ideas from Gestalt psychology) is 
empirically and phenomenologically apt as an approach to flavour and smell.  
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Philosophy of perception has taken vision to be the paradigm, and among the five 
Aristotelian senses, the chemical senses are perhaps considered the furthest removed 
from sight. One important difference between vision and the chemical senses is the type 
of entity with which we are put in perceptual contact. Vision allows us to perceive 
ordinary, three-dimensional objects or ‘medium-sized dry goods’13 as some would say. 
We see tomatoes, pineapples, cats and roses. However, philosophers of olfaction have, 
for the most part, reached a consensus that the sense of smell does not allow the 
immediate perception of these ordinary objects, but rather the perception of odours (e.g. 
Lycan, 1996, 2000; Batty, 2010a, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Richardson, 2013; Carvalho, 2014; 
Young, 2016).14 There has been little discussion regarding the objects of flavour 
perception (though see Smith, 2007; 2013b; 2015b; 2016 for discussion of realism about 
flavours), but in chapter 4 I argue that for analogous reasons to the odour case, tasting 
allows the immediate perception of flavours rather than ordinary objects.  
Even though we often talk as though we taste tomatoes and smell roses, it is (at least, in 
the first instance) tomato flavours and rose odours that we perceive. The reasons for this, 
regarding olfaction, have been outlined by several researchers (e.g. Lycan, 1996; Batty, 
2010a; Richardson, 2013; Young, 2016). Olfaction is not sufficiently attuned to the 
presence and absence of objects like roses and rubbish bins, or to the way these objects 
 
13 This phrase is attributed to J.L. Austin.  
14 For a somewhat different type of account see Mizrahi (2014), who argues that we olfactorily experience 




change over time, to constitute a means of perceiving them. Richardson makes this point: 
‘For example, cooking odours linger in the kitchen long after the food is eaten, and the 
sillage of your perfume is the scented wake you leave in the elevator after you’ve stepped 
out of it’ (2013, pp. 403–404).15 For this reason, she argues that olfaction does not allow 
perceptual contact with ordinary objects. Instead, it only allows for ‘thought contact’ with 
them; we can only perceive that roses or food are there. We have a cognitive attitude, 
such as a belief, towards these objects. If we perceptually access any objective aspects of 
the world through smell, it doesn’t seem that those aspects are ordinary, three-
dimensional objects.  
We do, however, perceive the presence and absence of, and changes to, odours. That 
odours, and not ordinary objects, are the immediate target of olfactory perception is 
further supported by the fact that odours can be produced artificially, and perception of 
these artificial odours does not appear to be automatically non-veridical. As Lycan states: 
In particular, there are objects other than roses that set off the rose smell — 
artificial rose smells can be made of any substance whose molecules are shaped 
similarly to those of roses. The point is not that the nose can be fooled. Au 
contraire; it is that in the artificial case, the nose is not fooled, and the rose smell 
is not incorrectly tokened. An artificial rose that produces the rose smell is smelled 
correctly, for it does have that smell even though it is not a rose. (1996, p. 90) 
 
15 Richardson distinguishes the olfactory case from visual cases where a time-lag occurs, such as the visual 
perception of stars. In the case of seeing stars, even though there is a time-lag, we still take ourselves to be 
sensitive to the presence, absence and changes to these objects over time. The same is not true of olfaction. 
She asserts, ‘The comings and goings of, and changes in the particular sources of odours just don’t make 
very much difference to olfactory experience’ (2013, p. 404).  
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Thus, seemingly odours are the immediate objects of olfactory experience.16 The idea that 
odours do not merely serve as causal intermediaries (like light in visual experience), but 
are themselves what we perceive through olfaction has been referred to as the ‘odour 
view’ (e.g. Richardson, 2018). Chapter 3 provides another reason for endorsing the odour 
view. Namely, we shall see that it is odours rather than the source objects that fulfil the 
criteria for perceptual objecthood (figure-ground effects and constancies). Chapter 4 
highlights that analogous arguments apply to flavour perception.  
Sensorimotor interaction with the world is supposed to allow us to access meaningful, 
perceptually present wholes and, for the most part, these entities have been associated 
with ordinary physical objects (tomatoes, plates, cats, etc.). It is not prima facie clear 
whether the experience of odours and flavours can be said to involve access to 
perceptually present wholes, or whether the experience is more nebulous. Thus, there is 
a question about whether our experiences through the chemical senses are of the right 
sort to be compatible with the sensorimotor approach. 
Potential problems with applying the sensorimotor approach to the chemical senses are 
further exacerbated by other traits that have been attributed to taste and smell. For 
example, it is often thought that the sense of smell lacks the kind of informational and 
 
16 This is compatible with the possibility that we also indirectly perceive or represent ordinary objects 
through the sense of smell (Lycan, 1996). With such an account, we indirectly represent roses via the act of 
smelling the odour. See Cavedon-Taylor (2018) for discussion of how this position contrast with the more 
‘austere’ idea that odours are the only intentional objects of olfactory perception. 
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phenomenological richness exhibited by vision. According to Batty (2010b, p. 103), ‘When 
compared to visual experience, olfactory experience seems incredibly impoverished’. This 
alleged lack of informational import often goes along with claims that the sense of smell 
is aspatial and/or that odours are undifferentiated spatially (e.g. Lycan, 2000; Wilson & 
Stevenson, 2006; Matthen, 2005; Batty, 2011; 2014b; Carvalho, 2014). This has led some 
researchers to argue that the chemical senses (and, in particular olfaction), don’t allow 
for the perception of discrete entities (see chapter 3 for discussion). Batty (2010a; 2011), 
for example, argues that olfaction only allows us to perceive that there is an 
undifferentiated ‘something or other’ in one’s vicinity that instantiates properties. She 
thinks that compared to vision, olfactory experience is ‘just plain smudgy’ (2010a; 2014b). 
Such an approach wouldn’t seem to allow for the kinds of perceptually present particulars 
to which, according to the sensorimotor approach, we gain access through sensorimotor 
attunement. Rather, they would seemingly only allow for a more minimal kind of 
experience. Chapters 3 and 4 dispute such claims and argue instead that smell and flavour 
perception allow for the experience of discrete perceptual objects.  
Some researchers deny that the chemical senses are even perceptual modalities. Burge 
(2010), for example, has argued that the chemical senses do not exhibit perceptual 
constancies, and thus, they do not allow for perceptual experience at all. According to 
Burge, they instead involve merely proximal sensation. If the chemical senses are non-
perceptual, the sensorimotor approach may not be applicable to them at all since it 
purports to be a theory of perceptual experience, rather than of proximal sensation. 
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Moreover, perceptual constancies are a central aspect of the sensorimotor approach; it 
is through an understanding of how bodily movements induce changing sensations that 
we perceive constant parts of the world. So, if flavour and smell lack constancies, this 
could present a problem for the extension of the account to these senses. On a similar 
note, Gray and Tanesini (2009) argue that flavour perception provides a counterexample 
to sensorimotor enactivism since, they claim, it does not involve distinctive perspectival 
and non-perspectival aspects. They do not think the chemical senses have the kind of dual 
phenomenal character that the sensorimotor approach ascribes to perceptual 
experience.  
Others argue that the chemical senses do not involve the skilful interaction with the world 
required by a sensorimotor approach. Humphrey (2001, p. 987) asserts:  
When we taste salt on our tongues, or smell musk in our noses … how can these 
experiences plausibly be thought to depend on sensorimotor contingencies? 
There is simply nothing we do by way of exploration with our tongues (or our noses 
... ) that could provide requisite information. 
The chemical senses might thus be too simple and devoid of complex bodily activity for 
the sensorimotor approach to apply. In chapter 2, I respond to these kinds of arguments. 
In order to respond to the highlighted challenges, and to present a phenomenologically 
satisfying account of flavour and smell, this thesis draws on Gestalt approaches to 
perceptual organisation. Gestalt psychology gives us tools to understand odours and 
flavours as perceptually present wholes, despite the important differences between them 
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and ordinary physical objects. Flavours and smells aren’t just nebulous sensations or 
smudgy ‘something or others’ in one’s vicinity, rather we experience them as parsed up 
in meaningful ways. The Gestalt approach provides the beginnings of a framework for 
thinking about perception in a modality-neutral manner. In the next section, I introduce 
this approach.  
1.2 Perceptual organisation and Gestalt psychology 
Throughout this thesis I draw on aspects of Gestalt psychology.17 This section introduces 
the Gestalt grouping principles and outlines why they are useful tools for understanding 
the organisation of the perceptual landscape.  
There is a precedent for the integration of an embodied approach to perception with 
insights from Gestalt psychology. Merleau-Ponty, for example, made extensive use of the 
ideas and discoveries of the Gestalt psychologists, particularly the so-called Berlin school 
of the 1920s. Theorists such as Koffka, Köhler and Wertheimer held that experience isn’t 
stitched together from an assortment of discrete, piecemeal sensations, but instead has 
a holistic character. The perceptual landscape is segregated into unified entities, which 
cannot be meaningfully dissected further. For Merleau-Ponty, drawing on these Gestalt 
psychologists, perception requires a figure-ground structure: 
 
17 Other aspects of the Gestalt approach will be disregarded. For example, I do not incorporate or discuss 
their claims of psychophysical isomorphism (the proposed resemblance between structural properties of 
the brain and the perceptual world) (e.g. Köhler, 1947, pp. 60–63).  
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When Gestalt theory informs us that a figure on a background is the simplest 
sense-given available to us, we reply that this is not a contingent characteristic of 
factual perception, which leaves us free, in an ideal analysis, to bring in the notion 
of impressions. It is the very definition of the phenomenon of perception, that 
without which a phenomenon cannot be said to be perception at all. The 
perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle of something else, it always forms 
part of a ‘field’. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 4)  
Noë (2004, p. 135) also endorses this idea:  
A perceptual experience does not analyze or break down into the experience of 
atomic elements, or simple features. Experience is always of a field, with structure, 
and you can never comprehend the whole field in a single act of consciousness. 
Something always remains present, but out of view. 
The aforementioned studies into inattentional blindness and claims about the world 
serving as an external memory are suggestive of this kind of figure-ground structure. We 
focus our attention on a figure (the basketball), while everything else is relegated to 
background (including the gorilla). The background is less clearly specified than the 
objects of our attention, and yet we still have the impression of a detailed scene before 
us in virtue of our access to the environment. Within the sensorimotor approach, the 
figure-ground structure of experience is thus closely related to its explanation of 
perceptual presence in terms of skilful access. The parts of the world perceived as figures 
are generally targets of our attention and are accordingly more readily 
accessed/accessible than those experienced as background.  
It is controversial, however, whether olfaction and flavour allow for this kind of figure-
ground structure. If they do not, they may not count as truly perceptual (as per the quotes 
from Merleau-Ponty and Noë above) or may not allow for the experience of discrete 
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entities. The grouping principles of Gestalt psychology provide tools for investigating 
whether different types of perceptual experience exhibit a figure-ground structure. These 
principles describe the circumstances under which aspects of the environment will 
(ceteris paribus) be perceptually grouped into unified figures, separated from the 
background. As we shall see, at least some of these principles seem to apply across the 
senses and thus, they are especially useful when we expand the scope of our investigation 
beyond vision.  
One reason why they will be of value in understanding flavour and smell is because, as 
highlighted above in 1.1.4, the chemical senses do not allow the (immediate) perception 
of ordinary physical objects. We visually experience the world as perceptually organised 
into discrete, meaningful components, segregated from everything else around them (i.e. 
as exhibiting a figure-ground structure). The objects of visual experience usually 
correspond to ordinary, physical objects (with some potential exceptions, such as 
rainbows and holes). We see tomatoes, apples and roses, and the visually perceived 
boundaries of these objects are specified by the boundaries or edges of these physical 
entities. We have a fairly clear pre-philosophical understanding of the divisions between 
physical objects, and by the same token, we arrive at a (rough and ready) understanding 
of the structure of visual perception with relative ease. The world is generally visually 
carved up in accordance with the divisions between ordinary objects.  
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The chemical senses, on the other hand, do not perceptually organise the world in 
accordance with the divisions between ordinary physical objects. They allow us to 
experience odours and flavours, not roses and tomatoes. People generally don’t have 
such clear pre-philosophical intuitions about the divisions between these kinds of diffuse 
entities. This, combined with the fact that we are very visual creatures and tend to be less 
attentive to our flavour and smell experiences, makes the perceptual organisation of our 
experiences through these senses less prima facie apparent. The phenomenology of 
flavour and smell experiences seems especially difficult to grasp and articulate. This is 
evidenced a lack of consensus among researchers about whether these senses even meet 
the criteria for perception (as discussed above, Burge, 2010 argues that they do not), and 
if they do allow for perception, whether or not they allow the perception of discrete 
particulars (see discussion in chapters 3 and 4). Flavour and smell thus present challenges 
for phenomenological examination, and the Gestalt principles can aid us in overcoming 
such difficulties. Although this thesis does not offer explicit arguments in favour of the 
Gestalt framework, that the approach better allows us to understand and articulate the 
phenomenology of our experiences will serve as a kind of proof of concept for it.  
As the following chapters demonstrate, a number of the Gestalt principles are applicable 
across the senses. Gestalt psychology thus provides a modality-neutral framework for 
thinking about the perception of particulars that don’t map neatly onto three-dimensional 
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physical objects.18 In doing so, this approach shifts the focus away from ordinary physical 
objects towards perceptual objects, allowing for a refinement of the sensorimotor 
approach.19 
1.2.1 The Gestalt grouping principles 
The Gestalt psychologists (e.g. Wertheimer, 1923/1938; Metzger, 1936/2006) set out 
various perceptual grouping principles. Perception involves grouping together features 
and segregating these groupings from their backgrounds. Grouping and figure-ground 
segregation are aspects of the same phenomenon: in order for some parts of the 
environment to be meaningfully unified into a single, bounded figure, they must also be 
perceived as distinct from their backgrounds. Being grouped into a single object already 
implies a separation from whatever else is around them (see chapter 3 for more 
discussion). The grouping principles have mainly been explored in relation to vision. 
However, Wertheimer (1923/1938) and Metzger (1936/2006, p. 27) do briefly discuss 
their application to audition, with Bregman (1990) in more recent years advancing a 
detailed account of this. Metzger also discusses how they may pertain to touch (see 
especially 1936/2006, Ch. 4),20 and argues that Gestalt organisation applies across all the 
 
18 See Van Valkenburg and Kubovy (2004), who also argue that looking to perceptual organisation can serve 
as a useful modality-neutral approach. They argue that such an approach can bridge rifts in various different 
theoretical approaches to perception. 
19 I conceive of perceptual objects as including (some) ordinary physical objects (tomatoes, cats), as in the 
visual case, but also including items that aren’t so easily classified as such (e.g. flavours, smells, holes, 
shadows). Chapter 3 provides more detail. 
20 See also Gallace and Spence (2011) for in-depth discussion of Gestalt principles and touch. 
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‘higher senses’, which he thinks encompass vision, touch, hearing and a sense of 
movement (ibid., pp. 26–27).  
Not all the Gestalt principles are directly applicable to all the senses, however. As Metzger 
states, ‘Not every Gestalt law can be transferred unmodified to hearing, for instance not 
the law of closure and even less so the law of symmetry’ (Metzger, 1936/2006, p. 27) and 
there has been very little discussion of whether any of these principles apply to the 
chemical senses. In chapters 3 and 4 I argue that the chemical senses also operate in 
accordance with a number of the grouping principles and tend towards the overarching 
rule of Prägnanz (to be explained below). This will provide reason to extend notions of 
figure-ground segregation and perceptual objecthood to these senses. Below I outline the 
grouping principles that will be of particular relevance in the chapters to come.  
Principle of Prägnanz/Good Form: The most fundamental Gestalt principle is the law of 
Prägnanz, or good form, which states that percepts are organised in the most orderly, 
simple, and harmonious way possible. Koffka (1935, p. 110) states, ‘psychological 
organization will always be as “good” as the prevailing conditions allow’. All the other 
principles are subsumed by this overarching principle. The other principles (such as those 
described below) specify elements of what it means for perceptual organisation to be 
prägnant (e.g. similar and proximal elements should be grouped together, while dissimilar 
and non-proximal elements should not be). Each grouping principle is defeasible if other 
principles allow a more prägnant gestalt to emerge.  
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While the definition of ‘prägnanz’ was left intentionally vague, Wertheimer appealed to 
readers’ intuitions about the concept:  
On the whole the reader should find no difficulty in seeing what is meant here. In 
designing a pattern, for example, one has a feeling how successive parts should 
follow one another; one knows what a "good" continuation is, how "inner 
coherence" is to be achieved, etc.; one recognizes a resultant "good Gestalt" 
simply by its own "inner necessity"... (1923/1938, section VII) 
He also offered examples. Although the shapes in Fig. 1.1.a. all contain the same irregular 
hexagon (Fig.1.1.b.), they each have a tendency towards a different perceptual 
organisation (Figs 1.1–1.4 all adapted from Wertheimer, 1923/1938; see also discussion 
in Metzger, 1936/2006, pp. 23–25). We don’t immediately see the irregular hexagon 
hiding in these shapes, as this would not be the most prägnant interpretation of the 
images. Although there is nothing especially complex or disorderly about the irregular 
hexagon itself, the lines that would remain should the hexagon be experienced as 
segregated would appear odd and arbitrary. The same cannot be said in the case of 
Fig.1.1.c, where the remaining lines form an orderly grid pattern in their own right. In this 
image, then, we continue to see the irregular hexagon as a clearly individuated figure. We 
don’t divide the perceptual environment into haphazard parts, but rather into simple, 
orderly wholes. Thus, perceptual organisation can be intuitively understood as prägnant 
without necessarily knowing exactly which of the more specific grouping principles are in 
operation. Plausibly the same can be said of perception in other senses (for example, we 
organise sounds into simple and orderly streams).  
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Principle of Similarity: The principle of similarity tells us that (ceteris paribus) we group 
together similar features/parts of the world (and equally, are more likely to segregate 
dissimilar features). For example, in Fig. 1.2 we tend to group together the similarly 
coloured circles into sets of two when they are uniformly spaced. In the auditory case, we 
are more likely to group together sounds that are similar on the basis of factors such as 
timbre, frequency and/or volume (e.g. McAdams & Bregman, 1979; Bregman, 1990). 
Fig 1.1. a. Images that each hide the same 
shape. Adapted from Wertheimer 
(1923/1938, Section VII) 
b. An irregular hexagon, hidden 
within the shapes in 1.a 
c. The same hexagon within a different 




Principle of Proximity: The principle of proximity tells us that we are more likely to group 
together items in close proximity. In Fig. 1.3, we group the circles into sets of two by virtue 
of their proximity. Bregman (1990) suggests that an auditory analogue of this is separation 
in time (p. 19). For example, something akin to Fig. 1.3 could be replicated auditorily by 
using sets of temporally proximate beeps. Just as in the visual case, we would be likely to 
group together the proximate stimuli, although in the auditory case the relevant proximity 
is usually temporal rather than spatial.21 
Principle of Common Fate: We are more likely to group together items that follow a 
‘common fate’. Birds flying together as a flock are readily experienced as a unit, for 
example. And, as in Fig. 1.4, if dots start to move at the same speed in the same direction, 
they are likely to be experienced as belonging together. Again, analogues of this principle 
 
21 In some instances, proximate location is also a relevant factor in sound stream grouping and segregation, 
and it is particularly useful when other cues are ambiguous or uninformative (e.g. Darwin & Hukin, 1999; 
Bronkhorst, 2000). However, spatial location is considered a weak cue in the auditory case, especially when 
grouping and segregation occurs over short time scales (e.g. Bregman, 1990; Buell & Hafter, 1991; Darwin 
& Hukin, 1997; Schwartz, McDermott, & Shinn-Cunningham, 2012). 
Fig. 1.2. Grouping by similarity  
Fig. 1.3. Grouping by proximity  
Fig. 1.4. Grouping by common fate. The arrows depict direction of movement.  
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appear to apply to audition. Bregman (1990, p. 249) argues that this principle can be 
expanded to include elements that change together in proportional and synchronous 
ways. This would apply in cases where, for example, frequency components change 
synchronously by proportional amounts and are therefore more likely to be experienced 
as grouped.  
1.2.2 Sensorimotor enactivism and the Gestalt approach 
Although visual examples such as those in Figs 1.1–1.4 are commonly used in describing 
the Gestalt grouping principles, chapters 3 and 4 argue that these principles also have 
application to smell and flavour. Chapter 5 adds that these principles can be used in 
determining whether multisensory object perception is occurring. The grouping principles 
provide the beginnings of a framework for thinking about ‘perceptual objects’ 
experienced through non-visual modalities. The chemical senses are very different from 
vision, and there has been little agreement regarding to how to characterise the 
phenomenology of these senses. Using the grouping principles, we can determine 
whether olfaction and flavour perceptions are sufficiently similar to other, paradigmatic 
kinds of object perception for us to attribute object status to them. The Gestalt approach 
will help us to achieve a phenomenologically adequate account of the chemical senses. 
Because of this, the sensorimotor approach can benefit from it. Equally, the sensorimotor 
approach provides a satisfying way of cashing out the Gestalt approach. With the 
sensorimotor approach, it is through our sensorimotor attunement that we are able to 
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perceive whole gestalts. Thus, the two approaches complement one another. 
 One might wonder at this point, though, how the tenets of the sensorimotor approach 
relate to Gestalt psychology’s descriptions of the circumstances under which we tend to 
group together parts of the environment. A full investigation of this is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, but here I offer some initial remarks on this issue, and we shall return to 
some of these issues in chapters 6 and 7.  
The ways we group together certain salient items and segregate them from the 
background is plausibly a product of being creatures within a particular ecological niche, 
with particular types of bodies and interests, engaged in particular kinds of sensorimotor 
interaction with the world. The chemical senses often function to guide us in avoiding 
harmful substances and dangerous situations such as decaying food, fire and gas leaks. 
They also aid us in seeking out beneficial ones, such as nourishing food. Olfaction also 
allows for the recognition of kin (e.g. Porter, Balogh, Cernoch, & Franchi, 1986) and it may 
aid in mate selection (see Wilson & Stevenson, 2006, pp. 138–140 for a review of the 
evidence). Plausibly, if the chemical senses involve perceptual grouping at all, they group 
flavours and odours in such a way as to serve these kinds of functions.22 This is hospitable 
to a sensorimotor approach, according to which perception and bodily engagement with 
 
22 The ways we group and segregate aspects of the olfactory world can also be changed. According to 
research by Li, Howard, Parrish, and Gottfried (2008), whether we discriminate odours from one another 
can be altered by a process of aversive conditioning. When presenting subjects with initially 
indistinguishable odours, pairing one of the odours with an electric shock, can result in them learning how 
to discriminate the two. See also Chapter 6 for discussion of the role of prior experiences in perceptual 
organisation. 
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the world are constitutively entwined. The chemical senses are also closely tied to hedonic 
valence and emotional memories, and they also allow for aesthetic experiences, as 
exemplified by particularly good wine or perfume. The things that are salient in these 
senses are quite different from those which are salient in visual experience, just as our 
embodied activity in these senses is different from that involved in vision. We might 
perceptually group together certain complex collections of molecules because this 
combination indicates the presence of something hazardous nearby, or perhaps because 
they remind you of the perfume your Grandmother used to wear.  
In chapter 6 we will see that what counts as the most prägnant perceptual organisation 
can vary depending upon one’s prior experiences and history of embodied activity. How 
exactly the Gestalt principles shape perceptual organisation can be influenced by previous 
experiences, but they also seem to play a crucial role in the perception of novel objects, 
with which the subject does not have prior encounters. In these cases, the Gestalt 
principles appear to provide heuristics for one’s initial exploration of the environment. 
That similar and/or proximal items tend to belong together allows for initial object-related 
sensorimotor expectations about what sensations will be induced by one’s movements in 
a given environment. With the sensorimotor approach, perception is constituted by 
sensorimotor skill, which can be exercised either through protracted coupling with the 
environment or through a counterfactual attunement to how movements would induce 
sensory change (to be discussed further in chapter 2). We shall see that the Gestalt 
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grouping principles play a particularly important role in the former kind of sensorimotor 
attunement (chapter 6).  
1.3 Conclusion  
We have seen that a disregard for the non-visual modalities (and in particular, flavour and 
smell) constitutes an important omission in the sensorimotor approach. The sensorimotor 
approach purports to account for all varieties of perceptual experience, but this presents 
various challenges given the important differences between vision and the chemical 
senses. Here I outlined a variety of these differences, which will be discussed further in 
the chapters to come. 
I also introduced the notions of perceptual organisation and the Gestalt grouping 
principles. Perceptual organisation can serve as a unifying, modality-neutral approach to 
understanding perceptual experience. In the visual case it is easy to take the structure of 
perceptual experience for granted due to its close connection to ordinary, three-
dimensional objects. Senses like flavour and smell do not allow us to pick out such physical 
objects, however. Our intuitions regarding the perceptual organisation of flavours and 
odours are less clear-cut. The Gestalt grouping principles provide a framework for thinking 
about the perceptual world in non-visuocentric terms, enabling an understanding of 
perceptual groupings that don’t map neatly onto three-dimensional physical objects. In 
the next chapter, I offer the beginnings of a sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell 
and address arguments that take these senses to present problems for the theory.  
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2. Towards a sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell23 
2.0 Introduction 
Sensorimotor enactivism takes perceptual experience to be constituted by a kind of 
attunement to sensorimotor contingencies — law-like relations between sensory inputs 
and bodily activity. This attunement allows the perception of invariant worldly features 
amid sensory changes, which can be manifested as a kind of duality to perceptual 
experience. For example, we might notice that a plate viewed from an angle looks elliptical 
in one respect, while also looking round in another. Several philosophers have argued that 
flavour and (orthonasal) smell24 are problem cases for this approach, and others, while 
not explicitly targeting sensorimotor enactivism, have offered accounts of the so-called 
chemical senses that would conflict with its core tenets. In this chapter, I respond to these 
objections and obstacles for the sensorimotor approach, and in doing so offer the 
beginnings of a sensorimotor account of the chemical senses. I do not aim to convince the 
reader of the sensorimotor account here, but rather to show that flavour and smell do 
 
23 This chapter is an adapted version of a forthcoming publication of the same name in Mind & Language. 
24 Flavour perception involves gustation, retronasal olfaction, tactile and trigeminal stimulation, but these 
discrete components are generally experienced as unified (e.g. see Smith, 2015a). ‘Taste’ refers to the 
gustatory contributions to flavour, allowing for the experience of the properties of sweet, salty, sour, bitter 
and umami. However, we rarely, if ever, experience gustatory stimulation in isolation from other aspects of 
flavour such as touch and retronasal stimulation outside of experimental settings. Thus, as Spence, Smith, 
and Auvray (2014) point out, taste is likely best conceived of as simply an aspect of flavour. I do not believe 
this understanding of taste has any noteworthy impact on the arguments presented here, but it is a 
motivation for not focusing in on taste as a separate perceptual/sensory modality. Here I treat orthonasal 
olfaction as a distinct sense modality to flavour and use the term ‘smell’ only to refer to this orthonasal 
variety of olfaction. See chapter 5 for discussion of the individuation of the chemical senses.  
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not present problems for the approach. Considerations of the chemical senses also 
provide positive contributions to our general understanding of sensorimotor enactivism, 
placing certain constraints on the approach and clarifying what kind of sensorimotor 
account should be endorsed if it is to be extended to flavour and smell.  
The chemical senses have traditionally been construed as especially simple and passive 
senses, involving mere proximal stimulation rather than the perception of distal objects 
and properties. I consider two main types of argument, both of which are related to these 
intuitions: (1) flavour and/or smell is possible without bodily activity, and (2) sensorimotor 
enactivism’s proposed duality between perspectival and invariant worldly features — e.g. 
the plate appearing elliptical from a certain perspective but also still being seen as round 
— doesn’t apply in the case of the chemical senses. Both of these arguments, if successful, 
would show that the sensorimotor approach is inaccurate as a general account of 
perception. The first type of objection relies upon the idea that flavour and smell can 
occur without sensorimotor activity. The second relies upon the idea that, unlike the other 
senses, the chemical senses are devoid of perceptual constancies, thus not allowing for 
the distinction between perspectival and non-perspectival aspects of experience posited 
by the sensorimotor approach. 
This chapter responds to these objections and argues that they fail to show that 
sensorimotor enactivism cannot be extended to the chemical senses. Section 2.1 
discusses claims that flavour/smell can occur without skilful bodily activity. This first 
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objection does not present great difficulty for the sensorimotor account. As highlighted 
below, it targets only a specific interpretation of the sensorimotor approach, which takes 
current bodily activity — rather than the subject’s sensorimotor understanding — to be 
constitutive of perception. In 2.2 I respond to (the perhaps more difficult) arguments that 
take our flavour and smell experiences to be devoid of the sort of duality required by the 
sensorimotor approach. I outline constancies in flavour and smell perception and the way 
that they are manifested at the level of experience as a kind of perceptual duality, 
discussing how this approach allows for a kind of objectivism about flavours and smells. 
Finally, in section 2.3, I examine the notion of sensorimotor understanding, which is at the 
heart of my responses to the objections covered throughout this chapter. Considerations 
of flavour and smell provide important lessons about how we ought to construe the 
notion of sensorimotor understanding.  
2.1 Objection 1: Motionless perception  
As we saw in chapter 1, sensorimotor enactivism takes perception and action to be 
inextricably tied together: perception is constituted by a type of bodily skill or 
sensorimotor understanding. The motionless perception objection hinges on the idea that 
skilful sensorimotor activity isn’t necessary for certain kinds of perceptual experiences, 
and that sensorimotor enactivism therefore fails as a general theory of perception. These 
arguments claim that motionless perception is possible and therefore the sensorimotor 
approach fails. These kinds of objections have been posed against the sensorimotor 
50 
 
approach since its inception and have been applied even to those senses (vision, touch) 
that provide the paradigmatic examples upon which sensorimotor enactivism relies. Such 
arguments feature prominently in the commentaries on O'Regan and Noë’s seminal 
(2001) paper A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.25 
This sort of argument might seem to be especially convincing when it comes to the 
chemical senses. For example, in his commentary on O'Regan & Noë’s (2001) paper, 
Humphrey (2001, p. 987) asserts:  
When we taste salt on our tongues, or smell musk in our noses … how can these 
experiences plausibly be thought to depend on sensorimotor contingencies? 
There is simply nothing we do by way of exploration with our tongues (or our noses 
...) that could provide requisite information. 
For Humphrey, it is clear that taste and smell can’t depend constitutively upon 
sensorimotor skills. Taste and smell, he thinks, don’t involve complex sensorimotor 
exploration. Prinz shares the intuition that the sensorimotor approach is particularly 
implausible when applied to the chemical senses: ‘Consider two perfumes: they may smell 
different even if they do not have different consequences for action (especially if they are 
equally appealing). Do we sniff different smells differently?’ (2006, p. 11). How could taste 
and smell depend constitutively upon the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies?  
As an initial response to these objections, it is worth noting that olfaction and flavour 
 
25 See the comments from: Humphrey, 2001; Niebur, 2001; Nusbaum, Skipper, & Small, 2001; O'Brien & 
Opie, 2001; Pylyshyn, 2001. 
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perception do in fact involve a rich array of bodily activities. As will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 3, olfaction involves sniffing (of changing speeds and intensity), moving 
one’s head and body to seek out odour sources, and so forth (see Mainland and Sobel, 
2006 for a review of the empirical evidence showing that sniffing is a crucial component 
of olfactory perception; see Porter and colleagues, 2007 for a study illustrating impressive 
human odour trail tracking abilities).26  
Flavour perception involves tongue, mouth, cheek and jaw movements of various kinds 
(as well as the motor systems involved in swallowing and respiration), inducing gustatory, 
retronasal olfactory, tactile and trigeminal stimulation (e.g. see Shepherd, 2015). 
Chewing, sipping, swallowing, etc., all involve highly complex bodily activity. Without such 
bodily activity, flavour perception is impoverished (Burdach & Doty, 1987; de Wijk, 
Engelen, & Prinz, 2003) and the movements impact the way the flavour is perceived. For 
example, Burdach and Doty (1987) found that without mouth movements, flavour 
intensity is weak. They thus suggest that retronasal olfaction is a dynamic process, and 
that ‘mouth movements play a role in retronasal odor perception analogous to that 
played by sniffing in orthonasal perception’ (p. 353). Retronasal olfaction can also be 
enhanced through more advanced tasting techniques (e.g. in the case of wine tasting) 
such as deliberately keeping the usual barrier between the base of the tongue and the 
 
26 Here I take ‘sniffing’ to simply refer to the inhalation of air through the nostrils. Thus, breathing through 
the nose involves sniffing under this conception. For further arguments for the necessity of bodily activity 
in olfaction, see chapter 3. For now, it suffices to note that even if it does turn out that (in some limited 
circumstances) smelling without sniffing is possible, this will not threaten the developmental version of the 
sensorimotor approach set out in what follows.  
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soft palate open (Buettner, Beer, Hannig, & Settles, 2001). This can be achieved by 
bending the head forward to stop liquid flowing into the pharynx, or by putting only a 
small amount of liquid in the mouth. Swallowing can enhance flavour intensity in contrast 
to spitting (Burdach & Doty, 1987; Land, 1996) and different chewing patterns can 
influence one’s perception of food tenderness (Braxton, Dauchel, & Brown, 1996). 
Moreover, different properties of the food itself can induce distinct types of chewing 
activity (e.g. Foster, Woda, & Peyron, 2006; Woda, Foster, Mishellany, & Peyron, 2006). 
Thus, at least in typical tasting and smelling experiences, the chemical senses do allow for 
complex bodily exploration of features of the environment. Moreover, it is plausible that 
these kinds of bodily activities are skills that we develop. For example, perfumers and wine 
tasters seem to have more refined abilities in this area than the untrained population, and 
are able to pick out aspects of scents and flavours that most of us miss.27 However, it may 
still be the case that these senses are less complex and action-involving than the others, 
and perhaps sometimes motionless flavour and smell perception is possible. Humphrey’s 
example of salt on the tongue may be such a case. Similarly, Young (2017) argues that 
olfactory science provides cases where bodily activity is unnecessary for olfactory 
perception (though chapter 3 challenges such claims with regard to olfaction).  
 
27 It might be thought that wine tasters do not really have better perceptual abilities, but only better verbal 
abilities to describe wine in accordance with standardised terminology. Such terminology may be set out in 
a linguistic tool such as the Wine Aroma Wheel (Noble, et al., 1984). However, evidence suggests that wine 
tasters are better able to discriminate wines even where they lack the linguistic abilities associated with 
formal training in wine tasting (Melcher & Schooler, 1996; Hughson & Boakes, 2001).  
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These objections, however, do not refute the sensorimotor approach. The sensorimotor 
theorist can concede that it is empirically implausible that every instance of perception 
requires skilful bodily activity at that time. Indeed, the implausibility of this has already 
been highlighted in the visual, auditory and tactile cases. For example, Prinz (2006) and 
Aizawa (2007; 2018) refer to cases of paralysis where subjects are still able to perceive. 
Aizawa (2007, pp. 22–24) discusses surgical patients who recalled experiences of sound, 
vision, pain and touch despite being under general anaesthetic and neuromuscular 
blockade. He concludes that ‘cases of complete paralysis found in the use of neuro-
muscular blockade show that perception is possible without the exercise of sensorimotor 
skills’ (p. 24). Prinz similarly argues that ‘[p]erception is not impaired by spinal cord injuries 
that cause paralysis, by paralysis of the eye muscles or brain structures that control them, 
by atrophy of motor cortex in Lou Gehrig’s disease, by destruction of action-control 
centers in parietal cortex …’ (p. 10), thus (he thinks) making it implausible that perception 
depends constitutively upon action. For these reasons, Prinz and Aizawa argue that 
perception only depends causally upon sensorimotor activity.  
Fortunately, there is a well-known response to this branch of objections. Namely, 
arguments relating to the apparent non-necessity of bodily activity for perception tend to 
rely on a specific interpretation of the sensorimotor approach. As has been pointed out 
elsewhere (e.g. Shapiro, 2011; Loughlin, 2014), there are different ways to interpret 
sensorimotor enactivism’s claim and the motionless perception argument only targets the 
strongest of these interpretations. In particular, these problems only target an 
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interpretation of the claim, whereby for perceptual experience the agent must — at that 
time — deploy sensorimotor understanding by engaging in bodily activity. With a weaker 
interpretation, it is enough that the subject has at some point acquired the requisite 
sensorimotor understanding through bodily activity, allowing for motionless perception 
imbued with this kind of sensorimotor attunement. Even in O’Regan and Noë’s initial 
(2001a) responses to comments, they clarify that ‘[i]t is not our claim that action is 
necessary for experiencing. Our claim, rather, is that knowledge of the ways movements 
effect sensory stimulation is necessary for experience’ (p. 1015), and this knowledge does 
not require current movement. Others who have emphasised this kind of temporally 
flexible/dispositional sensorimotor approach include, among others, Beaton (2013), 
Loughlin (2014), and Myin (2016). 
Endorsing this weaker, developmentally focused interpretation of the sensorimotor claim 
can side-step motionless perception cases. Individuals who are currently motionless can 
perceive because they have in the past engaged in sensorimotor exploration, allowing the 
acquisition of sensorimotor understanding. According to such an approach, people have 
engaged in olfaction and flavour perception throughout their lives, thus developing an 
understanding of how their motor activity will induce olfactory and gustatory changes. 
With this account, it may still be the case that current bodily activity (of the varieties 
highlighted throughout this section) is required for some types of flavour and smell 
experience. For example, as we shall see in 2.2.2, complex, temporally extended flavour 
and smell experiences may necessitate more extensive bodily activity. Yet, cases such as 
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salt on the tongue giving rise to perceptual experience while motionless are still consistent 
with this weaker interpretation of the sensorimotor approach.  
One might wonder though if this weaker, developmental version of the sensorimotor 
theory is satisfactory when it comes to the chemical senses, because new-born babies 
exhibit responses to tastes and smells. This may lead to a suspicion that the chemical 
senses are simple, innate abilities rather than sensorimotor skills that develop over time. 
Young (2017) presents this style of argument against a sensorimotor approach to the 
chemical senses. I tackle this worry in section 2.3. For now, let us move on to a second, 
and perhaps more challenging, problem for the sensorimotor approach.  
2.2 Objection 2: Flavour and smell lack constancies 
With the sensorimotor approach, we detect invariances or constancies amid our changing 
perspectives on the world and this is what explains ‘perceptual presence’ — the perceived 
veridicality and completeness of aspects of the world, despite the limitations of our 
sensory access. For example, what allows us to perceive a tomato as a complete object is 
having an implicit grasp of how we would have to move to gain sensory access to those 
aspects of the tomato with which we don’t have immediate sensory contact. We implicitly 
understand how our movements will induce sensory changes. This view requires a 
distinction between invariant, perceptually present aspects of the world (such as whole 
tomatoes), and the sensory changes that we manipulate through bodily activity. 
Researchers such as Gray and Tanesini (2009) and Burge (2010) have argued that the 
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chemical senses fail to exhibit these kinds of perceptual constancies, and thus that our 
experiences lack the requisite duality for the sensorimotor approach.  
As explained in 1.1.2, in the case of visual perception, we often experience a contrast 
between invariant perceptual objects and our perspectival sensory relationship with the 
environment (i.e. perspectival properties). I can notice that a plate in some sense appears 
elliptical from an angle, but also perceive it as round. Objects remain constant even 
though our perspectives on the world continuously shift. Noë (2004, pp. 123–161) also 
applies this idea to colour perception, appealing to the phenomenon of colour constancy. 
Colour perception is explained by a grasp of how one’s own movement or movement of 
the light source will alter the perspectival properties that one experiences. In one sense I 
perceive the colour of surfaces as invariant in different illumination conditions, but at the 
same time I notice visible variations in the apparent colour of patches of shadow or bright 
illumination.  
Some researchers (e.g. Gray & Tanesini, 2009; Burge, 2010; Todd, 2018) have argued that 
the chemical senses do not allow for this kind of perception of invariances. Gray and 
Tanesini (2009) present a sustained attack on Noë’s version of the sensorimotor approach 
on these grounds, taking flavour perception to provide a counterexample. While they 
agree that tasting is plausibly an activity — wine tasters learn techniques such as smelling, 
swilling, and gurgling (p. 725) — they reject the idea that there is a duality to the 
experience. There is, in their view, no dichotomy between perspectival and non-
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perspectival aspects of flavour perception. Instead, flavour ‘is just a matter of one kind of 
property’ (p. 730).28  
They admit that flavour varies with circumstances, but they do not think these sensory 
changes are indicative of perceptual constancies. For example, they note that after a meal 
‘one is badly placed to appreciate the taste of things’ (p. 731). However, this is, they say, 
an example of perception in poor circumstances, as opposed to ideal ones, rather than a 
case of differing perspectival properties. Thus, tasting after a meal is more like looking at 
things without wearing glasses, than seeing a tomato from a particular perspective (ibid.). 
They simply don’t think that flavour perception involves the invariant kinds of features 
that, say, visual perception exhibits (invariant shapes and colours of objects, etc.). 
Although we might notice variations in taste among sips or bites, there is ‘no equivalent 
for taste of the experience that the colour has also not changed’ (p. 730).  
Gray and Tanesini (2009) are not alone in having this intuition. Recently Todd (2018) has 
made similar remarks, also denying that amid flavour sensations we are able to pick out a 
unified overall flavour or flavour profile: ‘Although from one moment to the next we may 
latch onto, focus our attention on any one particular component—a particular odour or 
 
28 Although Gray and Tanesini use the term ‘taste’ more frequently than ‘flavour’ throughout their paper 
and offer some discussion of the so-called basic tastes (sweet, sour, salty, bitter and umami), for the 
majority of the paper they are focused on flavour (or ‘taste’ in its more expansive, everyday sense). For 
example, they say, ‘Wine connoisseurs might be able to recognize, say, a Riesling by its looks, scent and 
taste. But they do not experience a homogeneous Riesling-taste; instead, they immediately notice its scent 
of petroleum’ (p. 8). This is a paradigmatic example of flavour perception, and thus, I assume they intend 
flavour perception to serve as a counterexample to the sensorimotor approach.  
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taste or texture—in what sense is that sensation we’ve latched onto the flavour of X?’ (p. 
288). Todd’s (2018) primary target here is the kind of flavour realism espoused by Smith 
(2007; 2013b; 2015b; 2016), but many of his comments also challenge the sensorimotor 
approach. With Smith’s proposed account, flavours are objective features of food and 
beverages. Smith states (here using the terms ‘tastes’ and ‘flavours’ interchangeably), 
‘Tastes are properties a wine has that give rise to certain experiences in us; and they 
cannot be reduced to, or equated with, those experiences’ (2007, p. 62) and ‘[t]he term 
flavour does not describe a construct of the brain, but it is a technical term used to 
describe the sapid and odourous properties of a solid or liquid, including properties of its 
temperature and texture, as well as the power to irritate the trigeminal nerve’ (2013b, p. 
310). Those who wish to endorse a sensorimotor approach to flavour can agree with 
Smith’s account of what flavours are. A sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell, much 
like Smith’s flavour realism, takes us to access objective parts of the world through these 
senses. Thus, the sensorimotor approach can be taken as one way of elaborating upon 
Smith’s realism about flavours; we access these objective flavours (i.e. the relevant ‘sapid 
and odourous properties’ of food or drink) through sensorimotor engagement with the 
world.  
Todd (2018), like Gray and Tanesini, denies that flavour perception allows for the 
perception of objective, unified aspects of the world through sensory change. He argues 
that the temporal structure of olfactory and flavour experiences shows that there cannot 
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be a unified, overarching flavour/smell.29 He believes that tasting only allows for 
ephemeral experiences, and denies that there is any flavour beyond this to be found:  
Whether we conceive of it as a perception-like unified impression of all the 
elements we’ve encountered while tasting, or rather as a judgement we make on 
reflection, it is unclear how we are to tell in advance that the temporal part we are 
tasting is a temporal part of the overall (future) flavour of X. Indeed, I suggest that 
for the case of complex objects like wine, or a meal, this question is in fact 
unanswerable, because there is no identifiable, unified overall flavour or flavour 
profile; or at least none that can be described nondemonstratively (p. 288)  
These issues relating to the temporal nature of flavour perception and olfaction are 
discussed towards the end of section 2.2.2. For now, it suffices to note that both Todd 
(2018) and Gray and Tanesini (2009) argue that there is no constant flavour amid sensory 
change. Gray and Tanesini explicitly take sensorimotor enactivism to be false in the case 
of flavour on these grounds. With their construal of the sensorimotor approach (ibid., pp. 
2–7), an experiential duality is what evidences perceptual experience being constituted 
by an attunement to the way one’s movement induces sensory changes. In the flavour 
case, they deny there is such a duality. This leads Gray and Tanesini to the conclusion that 
while sensorimotor skill is causally important for perception, there is a fundamental 
problem with the claim that sensorimotor skill constitutes perceptual experience. 
Sensations induced by movement aren’t the building blocks of flavour perception, 
because they are all that there is to flavour perception. 
 
29 Todd (2018) also argues that the affective nature of flavour perception and olfaction shows objectivism 
about flavours and smells to be false. This chapter does not respond to these claims but see Smith (2007) 
for the other side of the debate. See also chapter 6 for discussion of affect and the chemical senses.  
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Burge (2010), like Gray and Tanesini (2009) and Todd (2018), presents arguments that call 
into question whether sensorimotor enactivism can be extended to flavour and smell. 
Burge’s focus is perceptual constancies, which he defines as the ‘representation of distal 
attributes, as distinguished from registration of proximal stimulation’ (p. 422). Although 
he doesn’t specifically target the sensorimotor approach, he argues that neither flavour 
nor smell relies upon these perceptual constancies in its operation. If successful, these 
arguments would demonstrate that a key tenet of the sensorimotor approach fails in the 
case of the chemical senses. He groups the chemical senses with other sensory systems 
such as capacities to sense heat and pain, and various interoceptive sensory systems such 
as those that affect heart regulation and vascular constriction (p. 421). He states, ‘There 
appear to be no perceptual constancies—no traction for perceptual as distinguished from 
sensory psychology’ (ibid.). Thus, there is no space for an experience of a distinction 
between changing perspectival properties and invariant, non-perspectival properties. 
According to Burge, constancies are central to perceptual experience and for this reason 
taste and smell are in fact largely non-perceptual. The chemical senses don’t allow for 
what he calls ‘objectification’ — an abstraction away from proximal stimulus, which is 
supposed to provide a distinction between perception and sensory discrimination. This 
objectification is achieved through the exercise of perceptual constancies. Where there 
are no constancies, Burge says (speaking of pain, but presumably intending this to extend 
to taste and smell) there is ‘no explanatory need to invoke veridicality conditions or 
representational content’ (p. 421). With such an approach, taste and smell allow only 
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proximal stimulation of sense receptors, without enabling the subject to (veridically or 
non-veridically) attribute these sensations to an invariant distal object/feature.30  
In the next two sub-sections, I argue that Burge (2010), Gray and Tanesini (2009) and Todd 
(2018) are mistaken in claiming that the chemical senses don’t involve constancies and/or 
the perception of invariance among sensory change. I begin by responding briefly to 
Burge’s empirical arguments against constancies in the chemical senses, before moving 
on to more detailed phenomenological and empirical reasons for taking there to be 
perceptual constancies in flavour and smell, which can be manifested as a kind of duality 
in perceptual experience.  
2.2.1 An initial response to Burge 
The reasons Burge cites for denying constancies in taste and smell are empirical. His main 
concerns are based upon the character of olfactory and gustatory stimuli. He notes that 
the chemical blends that the olfactory system detects are changing and amorphous (p. 
415), lacking the permanence required for constancies. He argues that most animals 
simply rely upon proximal registration of intensities on one or other side of the body to 
locate food/prey, which in his view does not involve perception. This kind of homing 
 
30 Burge does concede that the chemical senses could be supplemented with conceptualisations, allowing 
for a degree of objectification. For example, we think of food as having a taste beyond the gustatory 
stimulation we experience. However, according to Burge’s account, this is not down to the senses 
themselves, but rather is a product of conceptual association and memory (p. 415). The operation of the 
chemical senses themselves is to be explained entirely in terms of functional responses to proximal 
stimulation. For some discussion of the role of memory in perception, see chapter 6. 
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activity involves a kind of ‘mimicking’ of direction constancy, says Burge, but lacks true 
representation marked by veridicality conditions (p. 424). Similar remarks apply to taste: 
he takes it to involve mere proximal chemical stimulation. Taste profiles that go beyond 
the proximal stimulation in our mouths ‘do not seem sufficiently important to animal well-
being to have forced evolution of constancy capacities for determining such taste profiles 
in gustatory systems’ (pp. 415–416).  
I am unconvinced by Burge’s claims regarding the ‘mimicking’ of constancies. It is not clear 
how an animal’s behaviours ‘mimicking’ direction constancy differs from the behaviours 
manifested by real direction constancies. Why wouldn’t an animal making use of bilateral 
variance in proximal registration of intensities to uncover the invariant direction of prey 
count as a case of perceptual constancy? Burge suggests that the difference is that in 
cases of true directional constancy, distal sources of stimulation can be localised without 
‘serial sampling’ (p. 427). It isn’t clear, however, that there really is a salient distinction 
between olfaction and vision in regard to whether serial sampling is involved. With some 
approaches to perceptual experience, one might argue that visual experience is 
constructed of serial samples received through eye saccades. However, with the 
sensorimotor approach, this is not the basis of perceptual experience. As Hurley (1998, p. 
430) says of vision, ‘[a] frozen field of view provides only impoverished information, and 
normal vision is not compounded of snapshot-like units but is essentially dynamic’. 
Although the dynamic patterns of interaction involved in olfaction differ from those in 
vision, with a sensorimotor approach, both emerge through an attunement to the sensory 
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patterns that our bodily movements can induce. Our perceptions of odours are not simply 
a matter of olfactory snapshots, but rather a grasp of invariances amid this sensory 
change. In the next section, I provide empirical and phenomenological evidence that we 
do experience these kinds of invariances in our flavour and smell perceptions.  
2.2.2 Constancies, duality and objectivity 
Gray and Tanesini (2009), Burge (2010) and Todd (2018) all agree that flavour perception 
involves changing sensations but dispute the idea that we also experience perspective-
independent properties, with Burge and Todd also extending this diagnosis to olfaction.  
Tasting involves different ways of moving the mouth and tongue, which results in different 
patterns of sensory stimulation. This allows the perceiver to access different aspects of 
the flavour. Letting chocolate melt on the tongue will result in different types of sensory 
stimulation than from chewing the chocolate. Wine tasters use wide-ranging techniques 
to detect different aspects of a wine’s flavour, such as drawing air through the wine 
(aspirating the wine), ‘chewing’ the wine, swirling it around their tongue, and so on. 
Likewise, whether one sips, swishes or gurgles wine also will result in different patterns of 
sensation and adjusting one’s breathing techniques and patterns of swallowing further 
alter the tasting experience. There is no clear sense in which the varied techniques of a 
wine taster are superior or inferior to one another. Sipping, swishing, aspirating and 
‘chewing’ are all useful methods of engaging with the wine. Thus, I do not take these to 
be instances of ‘perception in poor circumstances’ versus ‘perception in ideal ones’ 
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(contra Gray & Tanesini, 2009, p. 731), but simply instances of one’s changing sensory 
relationship with the wine31 (i.e. perspectival properties, to use Noë’s terminology). 
Importantly, though, as is argued below, there is phenomenological and empirical 
evidence that amid all these sensory changes, we also experience invariant flavour 
properties.  
First, it seems that we often think and talk as though we experience an invariant flavour, 
beyond the sensory changes induced by our engagement with the food/drink. For 
example, we often think of the same bar of chocolate as having the same flavour 
throughout each mouthful, despite the variations discussed above. If we ask someone 
what a particular type of chocolate bar tastes like, it would be unusual for them to reply 
that ‘if I let it melt it tastes one way, and if I chew it, it tastes another way.’ In one sense, 
we are aware that if we interact with the chocolate in different ways this alters our 
sensory relationship with the chocolate, but in another we think of the flavour of the 
chocolate bar, as constant and as being a property of the chocolate bar itself. Smith 
(2015b) highlights that wine tasting involves concentrating on ephemeral sensations but 
that ‘[t]he whole can exhibit something untraceable to the parts, and in the case of great 
wines it is this holistic, elusive quality that we attend to most and that novice tasters can 
acknowledge through the rush of pleasure it causes.’ Such comments are suggestive of a 
 
31 This changing sensory relationship involves gustatory, retronasal olfactory, tactile and trigeminal aspects. 
However, it is rarely possible to experience the contribution of retronasal olfaction as distinct from ‘taste’ 
due to the phenomenon of oral referral - the apparent mislocalisation of olfactory stimuli to the oral cavity 
(see Spence, 2016 for overview). 
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unified experienced gestalt beyond the changing sensations.  
Empirical and phenomenological evidence of constancies provides further grounds for 
believing that we perceive invariant odours and flavours, alongside the sensory changes 
highlighted above. For example, both olfaction and flavour perception appear to exhibit 
constancies related to intensity. In the case of smell, changes in sniff vigour do not alter 
the perceived intensity of an odour (Teghtsoonian & Teghtsoonian, 1982). Consonant with 
the sensorimotor approach, when the changes to airflow rate are not under the control 
of the subject but are instead controlled artificially by a special device, this constancy 
effect does not occur. Relatedly, the rate at which a subject moves their mouth while 
tasting impacts the number of stimuli released by food/drink. However, according to 
research by Theunissen and Kroeze (1996), changes in the rate of mouth movement don’t 
cause a subject to perceive the food’s flavour as more intense. They suggest this may be 
a product of a kind of constancy analogous to the olfactory case.32  
Careful examination of the phenomenology of olfactory and flavour perceptions indicates 
that such constancies are manifested in terms of a duality to experience (see also 4.3 for 
a more detailed examination of constancies in flavour perception). If I take a vigorous sniff 
 
32 Flavour involves very wide-ranging and complex bodily activities and involves an interplay of gustatory, 
retronasal olfactory, tactile and trigeminal components. Thus, even if there is a constancy relating to mouth 
movement speed and intensity, there will be trickier cases where it is less clear whether only one’s 
perspectival relationship with the flavour is changing, or whether the objective flavour itself is changing. For 
example, by chewing food, the texture is changed, and this thereby also alters the flavour, and temperature 
can also cause such changes. There is not space here for a full investigation of this issue, but it is worth 
being aware that fully parsing out the objective flavour from the changing perspectival properties will be a 
complex issue for the sensorimotor theorist. See also the discussion of temporally extended flavours and 
odours below.  
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of my coffee, there is a sense in which I can notice a difference in odour intensity from 
when I take a smaller sniff. The fact that I am sampling more volatile particles is reflected 
in my perceptual awareness and the experience has a greater strength to it. However, I 
do not attribute this change to the coffee odour itself. It doesn’t seem that the smell has 
become stronger; I perceive the odour itself as remaining of the same intensity between 
these sniffs. Likewise, if I alter my savouring activities, this may induce stronger flavour 
sensations, but often I do not take these changes to be down to changes in the food’s 
flavour itself. In both cases, there is an aspect of the experience which is perspectival in 
that it depends upon our current bodily engagement rather than on the flavour/odour 
itself. Bodily activity results in different sensory relationships with the same perceptual 
object, and with the sensorimotor approach, it is our attunement to these sensorimotor 
contingencies that allows for a stable experience of the invariant, overarching perceptual 
objects. 
Another type of constancy exhibited in olfactory experience (and plausibly also flavour, 
though the empirical evidence in this area is sparser) is amodal completion. This 
phenomenon is also often talked about in the literature in terms of ‘filling-in’, although 
for the sensorimotor theorist, there is strictly speaking no need to ‘complete’ or ‘fill in’ 
anything. The claim is that perception is constituted by an attunement to sensorimotor 
contingencies, rather than merely the immediate gappy sensory stimulation. When 
smelling an odour, we only usually detect some of the molecules typical of that particular 
odour, and yet are still capable of recognising the odour for what it is, such as coffee, for 
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example (see, e.g. Barnes, Hofacer, Zaman, Rennaker, & Wilson, 2008). This too is 
manifested at the level of conscious experience in terms of a duality of experience. When 
smelling coffee or wine, one can notice that different sniffing activity allows the detection 
of different aspects of the odour (perspectival properties), and yet still perceive that the 
odour is a wine/coffee odour. This is much like how when we see an object, although we 
are only in immediate contact with its facing side, our perception is as of a whole object.  
Although the best evidence for this type of perceptual invariance amid change comes 
from the olfactory case, there is also suggestive empirical evidence in relation to flavour. 
In particular, manipulating expectations can induce flavour constancies. For example, 
consumers tend to assume rates of saltiness will remain the same across mouthfuls, and 
manipulating these expectations can result in a perceived constancy even if subsequent 
mouthfuls are less salty (Dijksterhuis, Boucon, & Le Berre, 2014). Such findings are 
consonant with the sensorimotor approach, according to which it is our sensorimotor 
expectancies that allows for these constancies. Implicit expectations about the kinds of 
salty sensations that will be induced through tasting give rise, on this view, to the overall 
constant perception of flavour.  
Similar evidence of this kind of constancy comes from Woods et al. (2010) who found that 
an expectation of homogenous taste caused subjects to perceive sips of different drinks 
to be more similar, up to a point where the differences between the drinks were too great. 
In several trials, it was made to appear that drinks were being poured from the same jug, 
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creating an expectation of sameness. In these instances of homogenous taste 
expectation, tasters deemed these drinks to be more similar than in cases in which drinks 
were shown to be from different jugs. Woods et al. claim that this shows that expectations 
regarding flavour act to smooth out variations in taste ‘within a window of taste 
differences’ (p. 174). Plausibly, we learn that certain food types have particular flavours, 
and such expectations allow us to experience flavour perception as relatively constant. 
Woods et al. claim, ‘These results lend readily to the possibility of perceptual constancy 
in taste’ (p. 179). It may be that subjects do not have enough time to fully explore a drink’s 
flavour when briefly sipping it. With the sensorimotor approach set out, a subject’s 
sensorimotor expectations ensure they do not experience gappy sensory stimulation (see 
4.3.2 for further discussion). Instead, one’s attunement to sensory changes gives rise to a 
perception of homogeneity, in much the same way that visual experience presents itself 
as of a richly detailed scene, even though we have limited sensory information at any one 
time.  
Sensorimotor theorists take the world itself to serve as an outside memory store, which, 
in the visual case, can be accessed through eye movement (and head and bodily 
movements) as and when required (O’Regan, 1992). This is said to give rise to the ‘illusion’ 
that we are perceiving a richly detailed world before us, despite only having immediate 
sensory access to certain aspects of the world. As discussed in chapter 1, this view is 
supported by studies on inattentional and change blindness, which suggest that the brain 
does not construct a richly detailed internal representation of the environment (e.g. see 
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O'Regan & Noë, 2001a for discussion). Surprising changes can occur in the visual scene 
without the perceiver noticing, despite the impression that the perceiver is seeing the 
whole detailed scene. Relatedly, Noë invokes the idea that the world is ‘virtually present’ 
(2004, pp. 49–52). When viewing the online version of the New York Times, your computer 
will only download one article at a time as required, rather than downloading the whole 
edition of the newspaper. Yet the whole paper is virtually present, as the whole of it is 
accessible. Similarly, when we see the environment, we visually connect to parts of the 
world when needed rather than having to construct a detailed inner representation, and 
thus the world is virtually present due to our dynamic access to it.  
The aforementioned cases of amodal completion in smell and flavour directly map onto 
these lines of support for the sensorimotor approach. With a sensorimotor approach, our 
understanding of how to bring other parts of the world into view allows for this apparently 
detailed experience of the world. Extending this idea to the chemical senses, our 
understanding of how to access further aspects of a flavour or odour through additional 
savouring or smelling enables the experience as of a gestalt perceptual object (a notion 
to be cashed out in the next chapter). Plausibly, in cases where we don’t already have 
clear flavour or smell expectations, or where our expectations are violated, it is only 
through a longer experience of a flavour or odour unfolding, whereby we develop new 
sensorimotor understanding, that we become aware of the invariant flavour/odour.  
As we saw in 1.1.2, in the visual case, we often just see whole objects, and only notice our 
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changing perspectives on the world if we adopt a particular ‘painterly’ attentional stance. 
In the case of flavour and smell, this is likely also true. We generally simply experience the 
odours and flavours, and only notice our changing perspectives on these phenomena if 
we adopt a similar kind of attentional stance (perhaps the stance of the wine taster or the 
perfumer, rather than the painter). The wine taster seems to be especially adept at 
attending to their rapidly changing sensory relationship with the wine. For example, in 
describing the process and the difficulty of wine tasting, Smith (2015b) states, ‘Wine 
tasting is exacting, requiring short but sustained feats of concentration. There is the quick, 
almost ephemeral, moment of sipping and swallowing a wine whose precise character 
may elude us at first … We must concentrate on the sensations at each stage without 
impeding the normal progress of the liquid across the palate by which the wine has its 
effect on us.’ 
It is also worth noting that the invariances we detect through skilful sensorimotor activity 
allow for a kind of objectivism about smells and flavours.33 According to a sensorimotor 
approach, it is through an implicit grasp of how smelling and savouring induces sensory 
changes that we can perceive gestalt odours and flavours. Against Burge’s claims (2010), 
we pick out genuine, salient patterns of invariance as we interact with the world via the 
chemical senses. For example, when we perceive an odour, we are perceiving real 
 
33 As noted above, Smith’s body of work (e.g. 2007; 2013b; 2015b) sets out a related objective approach to 
flavour perception. 
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collections of volatile chemicals, and we experience it as exhibiting constancies because 
we pick out patterns of invariance through worldly exploration. The aforementioned 
constancies demonstrate that there is more to our olfactory engagement with the 
environment than a set of olfactory snapshots or serial samples, and similar remarks apply 
to flavour.  
Finally, I would like to briefly address Todd’s (2018) worry, mentioned in the previous 
section, that there cannot be an overarching, objective flavour or smell because flavours 
and smells themselves change and evolve over time. Todd is not explicitly targeting the 
sensorimotor approach, but rather an objectivism about olfaction and flavour experience 
(e.g. see Smith, 2015b) that takes there to be a unified flavour or smell beyond the 
changing sensations. However, it should be clear that this worry targets the sensorimotor 
approach to the chemical senses. A similar challenge has been posed against the 
sensorimotor approach in relation to temporally extended sounds (Clark, 2006), and has 
been responded to by Noë (2006a). Whether similar responses can be made in defence 
of a sensorimotor approach to the chemical senses has implications for the viability of 
extending the approach. 
Recall that Todd (2018) argues that the temporal nature of flavour perception and 
olfaction presents a problem for there being an overarching, unified flavour or smell. He 
argues that odours are intrinsically temporal,  
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not merely in that they change through time, but in that they can develop through 
time. They change, trivially, in coming into being (and into awareness) and fading 
away; but they can also develop in taking on new properties, dimensions, or 
aspects. An odour may start off as sweetly floral and then take on sharper floral or 
citrus aspects (p. 287).  
While I do not think this kind of description applies to all the odours we encounter (or 
even the majority of them), I agree that this captures the phenomenology of the 
perception of some complex odours. Some scents do change significantly over time rather 
than merely fading away. A perfume may have a refreshing top note that is evident when 
the fragrance is first applied, before blending into an aromatic middle note, which 
eventually trails away into a sustained, heavier base note. These different aspects of a 
fragrance can be gradually revealed one by one. Other scents are simpler — there is not 
much of an olfactory trajectory when it comes to the smell of a lemon or a rose. 
Contra Todd (2018), however, the existence of complex scents and flavours that evolve 
over time is not at odds with there being an overarching flavour or smell. The overarching 
flavour and/or smell is temporally extended and may exhibit an objective trajectory, and 
this trajectory is something that one’s perceptual investigations can uncover. Noë 
discusses this issue in relation to the perception of sustained sound-streams: ‘[Y]ou hear 
them as having a certain trajectory or arc, as unfolding in accordance with a definite law 
or pattern’ (2006a, p. 29). Our sensorimotor attunement can extend to such trajectories 
— through a grasp of such arcs, the changes to sound-streams can become perceptibly 
present, along with the more constant aspects of the sound-streams (such as the timbre 
or volume). Perceiving the structure of these auditory trajectories requires skilful 
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engagement and a degree of familiarity. For example, Noë notes that we may struggle to 
perceive unfamiliar, experimental music as anything more than ‘mere noise’ (p. 31), but 
once we become familiar with a style of music, we are better able to perceive the acoustic 
trajectory’s structure and complexities.  
Some complex flavours and odours also follow these kinds of arcs. For example, Smith 
(2015b; 2016) argues that wines have a temporally extended, dynamic flavour profile, and 
‘the wine has that evolving flavor independently of each moment of tasting’ (2015b). 
Likewise, the way that an odour evolves to allow top notes to morph gradually into middle 
and then base notes is, importantly, not equivalent to the fleeting sensory changes we 
experience by detecting different aspects of a flavour or smell. Such flavours and odours 
unfold in a definite manner (and in the case of perfumes and wines, this may be carefully 
planned out by the designer of the fragrance or the wine-maker) rather than mapping 
onto nebulous sensory changes as we engage in tasting and smelling activities (involving 
different mouth and tongue movements, or rates and intensities of sniffing, for example). 
In the case of these evolving, complex flavours and smells, more temporally extended 
perceptual engagement will likely be a requirement in order to fully perceive the overall 
flavour or smell profile. Simpler flavours and odours will be perceptible through a lesser 
degree of extended tasting and smelling, in part because there is not the same degree of 
change over time to uncover. This is unsurprising given the phenomenology of our flavour 
and smell experiences: it seems that I can perceive the unified odour of lemon very quickly 
(because of my pre-existing sensorimotor understanding, according to the view set out), 
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whereas to perceptually make sense of the evolution of a complex perfume, I may need 
to engage in more temporally extended smelling activity.  
In sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, I responded to the worries of Gray and Tanesini (2009), Burge 
(2010), and Todd (2018) by outlining the ways which the chemical senses allow for the 
perception of invariant, objective aspects of the world. Now we move on to some further 
challenges for the sensorimotor theorist. The idea that we can perceive unified odours 
and flavours through a mastery of sensorimotor contingencies presents some puzzles 
when we consider how the chemical senses develop. In the next section, I consider how 
the notion of sensorimotor understanding ought to be understood if we are to allow for a 
sensorimotor account of the chemical senses.  
2.3 Developing sensorimotor understanding and the chemical senses 
Sensorimotor understanding is crucial to my responses to the argument about the 
chemical senses lacking constancies and the motionless perception argument. Motionless 
perception is possible only where one has already developed the requisite sensorimotor 
understanding, and sensorimotor understanding allows for the perception of constancies 
amid sensory changes. In this section I discuss how the chemical senses can inform our 
conceptualisation of sensorimotor understanding.  
Recall that in 2.1 I suggested that the sensorimotor theorist could side-step arguments 
about motionless perceiving by relying upon a kind of developmental argument. It can be 
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argued that subjects have already acquired the relevant sensorimotor understanding to 
be able to perceive odours/tastes, even in the current absence of the motoric elements 
of smelling/tasting. Once we have an implicit understanding of how bodily movements 
will induce sensory changes, we need not actually perform these movements. The 
sensorimotor approach must rely on counterfactual sensorimotor understanding. We 
experience the whole tomato as present, even without moving to look at the back of it. 
Similarly, having a tastant placed on the tongue may allow a perceptual experience 
because we have certain expectancies about how, if we were to move our jaw or tongue, 
this would cause certain types of sensory changes. This counterfactual sensorimotor 
understanding is supposed to develop over time. And this developmental notion of 
sensorimotor understanding allows the sensorimotor theorist to draw on the empirical 
evidence from the cases such as Bach-y-Rita’s tactile vision substitution systems (TVSS) 
and vision reversing goggles discussed in chapter 1.34 
Recall, a number of sensorimotor theorists have drawn upon the example of TVSS (e.g. 
Noë & O’Regan, 2001a; Noë, 2004; Hurley & Noë, 2003). TVSS devices are composed of a 
head-mounted camera, which sends signals to a matrix of electrodes or vibrators attached 
to the subject’s skin or tongue. The electrodes/vibrators produce patterns of stimulation 
that correspond to changes in the visual information received by the camera. Initially, 
users of such devices only experience tactile stimulation, but after a period of adaptation 
 




they begin to have vision-like experiences. However, it was found that only subjects who 
were allowed to actively move around — and thus learn how their movements induced 
particular sensory effects — experienced this vision-like perception. They must reach a 
certain level of proficiency in using the device before they have such experiences. Again, 
this supports a developmental interpretation of the sensorimotor claim: perception is 
something that we learn to do over time. Cases of adaptation to vision inverting goggles, 
which distort the way the light enters the eyes, also suggest that we become attuned to 
sensorimotor contingencies over time (eg. Noë, 2004, pp. 8–10).  
However, this developmental approach may seem to pose a problem for the sensorimotor 
theorist when applied to the chemical senses. Evidence suggests we can perceive 
olfactory qualities from a very early stage in our development, which has led to suspicion 
of the developmental notion of sensorimotor understanding. In particular, Young (2017), 
arguing that olfaction is a problem for the sensorimotor approach, asserts:  
…the developmental line of reply will not help in this instance, as the olfactory 
system is on-line and allows us to perceive the olfactory qualities of odorants as 
neonates if not in utero… (p. 106) 
There is a potential inconsistency between the developmental version of the 
sensorimotor approach required to alleviate the motionless perception worry and the 
apparent olfactory abilities of neonates. Young’s idea is that olfaction cannot be 
something we develop over time as a sensorimotor skill because even neonates can smell. 
He cites studies that relate to the fact that new-born infants turn their heads towards the 
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smell of their mothers’ breast milk (e.g. Stein, Ottenberg, & Roulet, 1958). The objection 
is implicitly premised on the notions that (1) neonates are able to smell but (2) they have 
not engaged in the relevant sensorimotor activity that would be required to develop 
perceptual skills according to the sensorimotor approach. There is reason, however, to 
question both of these premises, but doing so places certain constraints upon the notion 
of sensorimotor understanding.  
2.3.1 Neonates and the developmental line of argument 
New-born babies have apparent olfactory abilities: they turn their heads towards the 
smell of their mothers’ breast milk (e.g. Stein, Ottenberg, & Roulet, 1958), and show 
specific responses to the smell of their own mother’s breast milk in contrast to a control 
breast milk odour (Sullivan & Toubas, 1998). As noted above, Young (2017) thinks this 
shows the developmental version of the sensorimotor approach to be false, since (1) 
neonates are able to smell but (2) neonates have not had the opportunity to develop 
sensorimotor understanding. There is scope to challenge either one of these premises. 
The sensorimotor theorist can: a) reject the first premise by denying that the neonate is 
actually perceiving, or b) reject the second by taking sensorimotor understanding to be 
something that must be learned from experience, but take sensorimotor learning to have 
already begun in utero.35 
 
35 A further option not discussed here would be to take (a degree of) sensorimotor understanding to be 
innate, so (at least some) perception need not be learned from experience.  
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Contra Young’s first premise, it is questionable whether neonates’ responses to breast 
milk odours are truly perceptual. It has been suggested that lactating mothers’ breast 
secretions may contain a particular stimulus, which is a candidate human pheromone. It 
is thought to be this specific stimulus to which neonates respond (see Wyatt, 2015 for 
review). All babies respond to areola secretions with suckling and nipple search behaviour, 
and it is doubtful whether such responses can truly be said to based on olfactory 
perception.36 If this is not a perceptual phenomenon, the sensorimotor approach is not 
threatened by apparent neonate olfaction, and it remains a possibility that smell (and, 
perhaps also flavour perception) is a skill developed over time after birth. Moreover, if 
neonates are unable to engage in olfactory perception, this would appear to further 
bolster the idea that perception is a skill developed over time, even in the case of the 
‘simple’ chemical senses. However, it may perhaps still be the case that neonate 
responses to areola secretions are on a continuum with olfactory perception, even if they 
themselves aren’t perception-based responses.  
If it turns out that neonates are engaging in (at least a rudimentary type of) genuine 
olfactory perception, Young’s second premise can instead be challenged. It may be that a 
degree of sensorimotor learning can occur in utero, allowing for some rudimentary 
perceptual abilities from birth. Numerous flavour and smell eliciting compounds are 
present in amniotic fluid, and after around six months of gestation, foetuses actively 
 
36 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of the paper based on this chapter for their helpful comments 
on this issue.  
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inhale this fluid as they mimic breathing motions (Schaal, Marlier, & Soussignan, 1998). 
This allows them to obtain chemosensory information in a manner similar to orthonasal 
olfaction. Towards the end of gestation foetuses also swallow amniotic fluid, which 
mimics certain tasting behaviours. Thus, while foetuses do not seem to engage in genuine 
smelling (since their nostrils are full of fluid), they do engage in activity closely connected 
to our tasting and smelling behaviours. While this idea requires further empirical 
investigation, it is far from clear that neonate olfactory and gustatory abilities present an 
immediate problem for the sensorimotor approach.  
Evidence suggests certain sensory abilities, beyond the case of taste and smell, begin to 
develop in utero. For example, research suggests that foetuses also develop a basic 
understanding of their own bodily behaviours, gaining tactile and proprioceptive abilities. 
Foetuses engage in self-touch, and they display a sensitivity to their own bodily 
movements. Using four-dimensional ultrasound (which takes 3D images of foetal 
movements over time), researchers have found that from 19 weeks, foetuses are able to 
(in some sense) anticipate their own hand-to-mouth movements.37 They open their 
mouths before their hands make contact, suggesting these movements cannot be mere 
accidents, and that they have some kind of understanding of the associated sensorimotor 
contingencies (Myowa-Yamakoshi & Takeshita, 2006). From 22 weeks, foetuses’ reaching 
 
37 This doesn’t directly support prenatal sensorimotor learning with regard to the chemical senses but does 
support the more general claim that sensorimotor skills can be developed in utero (in this case, in relation 
to proprioception and tactile sensation). 
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movements show the characteristic kinematic patterns of intentional actions (involving 
distinctive acceleration and deceleration phases depending upon the target of their 
movements), involving motor planning (Zoia, et al., 2007). For example, when moving to 
touch fragile parts of their bodies, such as their eyes, they will move more slowly. Motor 
control is an ongoing process of learning that is evident even at the prenatal stage.  
Neonates’ apparent olfactory responses therefore do not rule out sensorimotor 
enactivism’s claim that perception is a skill. Whether they have truly perceptual olfactory 
abilities is questionable, but even if their responses do indicate a kind of rudimentary 
olfactory perception, this may be based upon prenatal learning. The work surveyed above 
suggests that olfactory activity begins as a very minimal ability, perhaps not even 
classifiable as perception or as the sense of smell as we know it. At the other end of the 
scale are highly trained perfumers and wine tasters, who have the ability to (in some 
sense) smell things that most of us cannot. Wine experts have greater discriminatory 
(Solomon, 1990) and identificatory (Marino-Sanchez, et al., 2010) abilities than novices, 
detecting distinctions between flavours with greater accuracy than non-experts and 
demonstrating more refined abilities to describe and identify smells.  
2.3.2 How should we understand sensorimotor understanding? 
We have seen that flavour and smell don’t present a problem for the sensorimotor 
enactivist, and in overcoming various challenges, I have outlined the beginnings of a 
plausible sensorimotor approach towards the chemical senses. The preceding discussion 
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also places certain constraints upon the notion of sensorimotor understanding. 
Sensorimotor understanding is supposed to be an implicit, practical understanding of how 
our movements give us sensory access to different aspects of the world. It cannot require 
that the subject is making current, actual movements because of the motionless 
perception cases discussed above, so it must be counterfactual species of understanding.  
Sensorimotor theorists deny that sensorimotor understanding is an intellectual or 
propositional kind of knowledge of the world; instead it is supposed to be a type of know-
how — an understanding of how to act and access different aspects of the world. 
However, despite these proclamations, sensorimotor theorists have been criticised for 
being inconsistent in whether they flesh out this notion in a non-cognitivist, or a more 
cognitivist and intellectual, manner (e.g. Hutto, 2005). If it turns out that pre-natal 
olfactory and gustatory learning occurs, this adds weight to the claims that sensorimotor 
knowledge should not be treated as an intellectual or propositional kind of know-that. 
And even if one rejects neonate perception and prenatal sensorimotor learning, the 
chemical senses are often considered more primal and simple than the supposed ‘higher 
senses’ like vision. Extending the sensorimotor approach to the chemical senses thus 
bolsters the idea that sensorimotor understanding does not require propositional 
knowledge (it is hard even for human adults to describe their flavour and smell 
experiences in propositional form).  
It may be puzzling that a simple type of practical attunement, potentially even manifested 
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by babies, could still be counterfactual in the sense required by the sensorimotor 
approach (e.g. see Silverman, 2018). However, many paradigmatic cases of practical 
understanding involve a sensitivity to counterfactual states of affairs. For example, one 
might know how to play the piano. This involves a kind of sensitivity to the different 
notes that will be produced by hitting each key. Likewise, knowing how to ride a bike 
involves a practical, and yet counterfactual, understanding of the effects of pedalling, 
changing the gears, pulling the break, and so on. Knowing how to ride a bike and how 
to play the piano are kinds of practical knowledge: they are abilities to engage in an 
activity in a way that is sensitive to the impact that different types of movements would 
have. Similarly, knowing how to access different aspects of the environment involves a 
sensitivity to the sensory stimulation that will be induced by bodily movement.38  
While there is much work to be done in the provision of a fully fleshed out sensorimotor 
account of smell and flavour, we have seen throughout the preceding discussion how 
perceptual constancies in the chemical senses can be appealed to in service of developing 
a sensorimotor account. An ability to act in a way that is sensitive to sensorimotor 
contingencies can allow for the perception of unified, gestalt odours and flavours (notions 
to be fully cashed out in the next two chapters), alongside more transient sensations. 
Moreover, there is something objective about these unified gestalts; we detect genuine 
 
38 Here I am in agreement with Silverman’s (2018) interpretation of the sensorimotor approach. He 
argues that we ought to construe sensorimotor knowledge as an ability to act in a way that is sensitive to 
sensorimotor contingencies (p. 165). 
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patterns of invariance through our sensorimotor engagement. Constancies in the case of 
the chemical senses, such as amodal completion, directly parallel the sensorimotor claims 
about the world serving as an external memory store, and the world being ‘virtually 
present’. We only ever have limited immediate sensory contact with odours and flavours, 
but other aspects are present as accessible to the perceiver. Those who are convinced by 
such claims in the visual domain ought to recognise that analogous perceptual 
phenomena are occurring in the case of flavour and smell.  
Having argued that the chemical senses do not present a problem for the sensorimotor 
approach, in the next chapter, I begin the positive task of setting out a 
phenomenologically adequate account of the chemical senses. I elucidate the notion of 
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3. Smelling objects39 
3.0 Introduction 
Objects are central to perception and our interactions with the world. We perceive the 
world as parsed into discrete entities that instantiate properties, and these items capture 
our attention and shape how we interact with the environment. For example, our visual 
experience divides the world up into clearly distinguished, meaningful units like flowers, 
dogs and chairs. The objects we perceive are key to our understanding of the world; 
concepts, beliefs and desires relating to objects are ubiquitous. However, to understand 
the nature of these entities, we need to uncover the criteria for perceptual objecthood. 
What conditions must be fulfilled for something we perceive to be an object, as opposed 
to, say, a range of nebulous, unbounded properties? And could the sense of smell allow 
the perception of discrete objects?  
Philosophers have claimed that compared to visual perceptions, olfactory experiences are 
‘smudgy’ (e.g. Batty, 2010a) and do not involve the perception of discrete objects. Rather, 
they only allow for the perception of either nebulous olfactory properties (Matthen, 2005) 
or objects in a very weak sense. These weaker object-based approaches include a non-
phenomenological variety of objecthood from Lycan (1996; 2000) and an existentially 
quantified variety from Batty (2010a; 2010c; 2011; 2014a; 2014b), whereby all olfaction 
 
39 This chapter is an adapted version of my paper of the same name (Millar, 2017), published in Synthese. 
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allows us to perceive is an undifferentiated something or other in one’s vicinity that 
instantiates properties (Batty, 2010a). This chapter argues against such views in favour of 
a robust kind of olfactory objecthood. We experience odours as discrete units that bear 
properties and retain their identities through perspectival change. I argue that figure-
ground segregation (which underpins object individuation) and perceptual constancies 
(which, I claim, underpin various object recognition skills) are individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for this type of objecthood. Paying attention to Gestalt psychology, the 
role of bodily movement and tactile stimulation in olfaction, and olfactory 
phenomenology, I argue that these criteria apply to the olfactory case. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 provides background on the debates 
surrounding the issue of perceptual objecthood. Section 3.2 offers two empirically 
tractable criteria for assessing whether discrete perceptual objects are exhibited in a given 
perception — susceptibility to figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies. 
While the importance of these aspects of object perception has been highlighted 
elsewhere, I offer a novel argument for the claim that they are individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for objecthood. Section 3.3 argues that both figure-ground segregation 
and perceptual constancies are exhibited in olfactory perception. First, in 3.3.1, I argue in 
favour of a kind of non-spatial figure-ground segregation in smell. Drawing analogies with 
the other senses, I suggest that the Gestalt grouping principles — thought to govern how 
features are grouped together and segregated from everything else within the perceptual 
field — can provide valuable evidence for a non-spatial form of figure-ground segregation 
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in olfaction. In 3.3.2, I argue that contrary to majority opinion, that there can also be 
spatial olfactory figure-ground segregation. To see this, we need to look to empirical 
evidence showing that tactile stimulation and bodily movements play a crucial role in 
olfactory phenomenology. Finally, in 3.3.3, I highlight a number of perceptual constancies 
exhibited in olfactory experience, considering both olfactory phenomenology and 
empirical research.  
3.1 Background  
The notion of perceptual objecthood that is of primary concern in this chapter is a robust 
phenomenological sense of objecthood: single, discrete entities exhibited in our 
experience that nonetheless exhibit many distinct properties. For example, in the case of 
vision, when we perceive a flower, we perceive it as a single object, despite it consisting 
of a long green stem, petals of different colours and so forth. This relies on our capacity 
for object individuation — perceptual systems can discern that groups of features belong 
to the same individual. Another crucial aspect of perceptual objecthood is that we 
perceive objects as remaining constant amid changes in our own perspective, movements 
of the objects themselves and, within limits, as they change over time. As Rüdiger von der 
Heydt says in a recent review article, ‘One characteristic of perceptual objects is continuity 
(object permanence). When an object is briefly occluded by a foreground object and then 
reappears, it is perceived as the same object. A token seems to persist’ (2015, p. 6). 
Likewise, O’Callaghan tells us that ‘objects perceptibly persist and survive changes’ (2016, 
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p. 1273). This apparent persistence of an object is closely connected with our object 
recognition abilities (see section 3.2.2 for discussion of the connection between 
perceptual constancies and object recognition), which are considered important aspects 
of object perception. Object recognition encompasses abilities such as tracking objects, 
perceiving them as complete objects despite occlusions or the limitations of our particular 
perspective (amodal completion), and perceiving them as persisting through time.  
As discussed in chapter 1, the Gestalt psychologists uncovered an array of principles that 
appear to govern when we perceive worldly features as grouped together. Examples of 
this include: the ‘law of common fate’, which states that we tend to group together 
elements that move together; the laws of similarity and proximity, which say that features 
perceived as similar and/or in close proximity are more likely to be perceived as grouped 
together into objects; the law of closure, which says that features are more likely to be 
perceived as grouped if they are part of a closed figure; and the overarching law of good 
form or ‘Prägnanz’, which says that we tend to group together elements that are 
coherent, balanced, simple and so forth (Wertheimer, 1923/1938). Researchers have 
found that many of these regularities apply not only to visual perception but also 
perceptions via other senses, such as audition (e.g. Bregman, 1990) and touch (Gallace & 
Spence, 2011). This motivates some of the discussion of perceptual objecthood because 
there are significant similarities in how we perceive and parse the world via our different 
senses, suggesting that there may be a notion of objecthood applicable to non-visual 
perception. Here I aim to find non-visuocentric necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
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robust notion of perceptual objecthood. Gestalt principles such as similarity and proximity 
as formulated by Wertheimer, are not themselves suitable for this because they are 
defeasible and seem to be neither necessary nor sufficient for object perception.40 
However, as section 3.3 argues, they still provide strong evidence of figure-ground 
segregation.  
Although a number of researchers have considered whether we perceive objects through 
non-visual modalities such as audition (e.g. Kubovy & Van Valkenburg, 2001; Griffiths & 
Warren, 2004; Matthen, 2010), taste (Stevenson, 2014), and smell (for detailed 
discussions see Lycan, 1996; Batty, 2010a; 2011; 2014a; 2014b; Carvalho, 2014; Young, 
2016),41 most discussions of objecthood still centre on the visual case, which is often taken 
to be paradigmatic of object perception. Perhaps this is in part because in the visual case 
these perceived objects are mainly ordinary, three-dimensional objects. When we look at 
a red ball, rather than merely seeing features such as redness and roundness, we can 
perceive these features as belonging to an object that is red and round. Yet even in the 
visual case, perceptual objects are a broader category than everyday objects like balls and 
flowers. O’Callaghan (2016, p. 1274) argues that we see items such as shadows and 
rainbows in an object-like way even though they aren’t ordinary material objects. We still 
see such items as being, like the ball, spatially arrayed in our visual field and as exhibiting 
 
40 This defeasibility perhaps excludes the law of Prägnanz, which instead faces the problem of being left too 
intentionally vague to itself provide satisfactory necessary and sufficient conditions. Moreover, as I shall 
argue, objecthood also requires constancies in addition to grouping/segregation. 
41 See also briefer remarks on such issues from Peacocke (1983) and Matthen (2005).  
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(relatively) clear boundaries, and as persisting over time and as we move around. Thus, 
an adequate phenomenological account of objecthood ought to allow for such cases.  
The challenge of providing a satisfactory account of objecthood is even more pronounced 
when considering the sense of smell. In contrast to the visual case, it is controversial 
whether we perceive olfactory objects at all. Our olfactory perceptions are unlike our 
visual perceptions in that they don’t seem to present us with items with clear, sharply 
distinguished edges. Thus, it is not immediately clear whether olfaction could allow the 
perception of discrete objects, and as we shall see, there is little consensus on this issue. 
Moreover, there are a number of potential complications in arguing in favour of olfactory 
objecthood. For example, an initial problem is to decide what sort of objects we could 
perceive via olfaction. As discussed in chapter 1, most researchers of olfaction endorse 
what has been called the ‘odour view’ (Richardson, 2018). This is the view that it is odours, 
and not source objects, that are immediately perceived through the sense of smell (e.g. 
see Lycan, 1996; Batty, 2010a; Richardson, 2013; Young, 2016 for discussion). There are 
two main reasons for this. First, we can smell a rose scent, for example, without having to 
be in the direct vicinity of a rose, and a rose scent may persist after the rose itself is 
removed or destroyed. It is also possible to give rise to a rose scent artificially — say, 
through a rose-scented air freshener. It would be strange to say that our perceptions in 
such cases are non-veridical because of the lack of an actual rose. Thus, the most common 
view among those who endorse an object-based account is the immediate objects that 
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we perceive through olfaction are odours, rather than source objects. It is sometimes 
added that we can still indirectly perceive the source objects via the perception of the 
odour (Lycan, 1996; see also Cavedon-Taylor, 2018 for a review of these issues). While 
the issue of whether source objects are represented in olfactory perception is important 
in determining the intentional objects of olfaction, here my concern is whether we 
immediately perceive odours as objects in a phenomenological sense (to be spelled out in 
section 3.2). My claim is that for odours to count as objects in this sense, they must be 
perceived as discrete entities, which instantiate properties and survive shifts in 
perspective. I remain neutral on the question of whether olfaction may also involve an 
indirect representation of source objects and take these issues to be orthogonal to the 
discussion here. For the purposes of this chapter I assume that the odour view is correct 
(though for some challenges to this position see Aasen, 2018). This assumption is shared 
in the key literature that I discuss throughout this chapter (e.g. Lycan, 1996; 2000; Wilson 
& Stevenson, 2003; 2006; 2007; Batty, 2010a; 2011; 2014a; 2014b; Carvalho, 2014). While 
this isn’t the primary purpose of the arguments here, this chapter also provides a further 
reason for endorsing the odour view. Namely, as will become clear, it is odours rather 
than the source objects that are subject to olfactory figure-ground effects and 
constancies. 
A second, related complication is that even if we agree that it is odours rather than source 
objects that we directly perceive through olfaction, there is some debate on the nature 
of these odours. For the purposes of this thesis, I follow philosophers such as Lycan (1996) 
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and Roberts (2015) in taking an odour to be a molecular cloud of volatile particles, which 
may instantiate olfactory properties such as smokiness, sweetness, and so forth. I shall 
not discuss the nature of odours further (see Cavedon-Taylor, 2018 for an in-depth 
discussion), but it is worth noting that not all parties in the debates about olfaction share 
the same idea of what an odour is. 
The theorists that I discuss in detail in this chapter all endorse world-directed accounts of 
olfaction. However, this is itself somewhat controversial and some philosophers have 
claimed that our olfactory experiences may be merely sensational; i.e. olfaction only 
makes us aware of properties of our own experiences rather than properties of, or objects 
in, the world. One clear example of this comes from a brief but suggestive remark from 
Peacocke: ‘a sensation of…[smell] may have no representational content of any sort, 
though of course the sensation will be of a distinctive kind’ (1983, p. 5). As we saw in 
chapter 2, Burge also argues that the chemical senses are non-perceptual. Others have 
claimed that the phenomenology of olfaction is in accordance with the sensation-based 
view, even if the sensation-based view is inaccurate for other reasons (e.g. Lycan, 1996). 
With a sensation-based view, we do not perceive objects or worldly features in the case 
of olfaction because sensations are not world-directed.42 Most researchers, however, 
seem keen to accommodate olfaction in world-directed accounts of perception, rejecting 
 
42 As noted in 1.1.4 if olfaction is not perceptual, the sensorimotor approach may not apply since it purports 
to be a theory of perceptual experience. 
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the sensation-based view.43 There have been several different world-directed approaches 
to olfaction.  
The first world-directed approach to smell is the feature-based view. Those that endorse 
this approach concede that olfaction is world-directed but claim that what we olfactorily 
perceive are not objects but only properties or features (see Matthen’s brief discussion of 
olfaction in 2005, pp. 284–285 for such an account). We don’t smell the fruitiness, 
smokiness and maltiness of a coffee as bound together, but instead simply perceive these 
properties, free of any object. Matthen says that smells, ‘have, at best, a primitive — that 
is, an undifferentiating — feature-location structure — every smell of which I am aware is 
simply here’ (p. 284). He adds that olfactory content ‘does not come in object-attribute 
form’ (ibid.). This sort of feature-based approach has also traditionally been dominant 
within olfactory science, where the primary goal has been to understand olfaction by 
identifying how different features of a chemical stimulus are represented in olfactory 
experience.44 However, the tides are turning in the olfactory sciences and an object-based 
approach to olfaction, advocated by Wilson and Stevenson (2006; 2007), has recently 
gained in popularity. Wilson and Stevenson (2006) argue that an object-based approach 
can make sense of a growing body of data from neurobiology and psychology. In 
particular, they think an object-based approach better accounts for the behavioural 
 
43 Here I use the term ‘world-directed’ to refer to any theory of perception that takes worldly entities to be 
accessible or represented through our experience. This would cover relationalism (such as the direct realism 
often attributed to the sensorimotor approach) as well as varieties of representationalism. I intend my 
discussion in this chapter to be neutral between these different approaches.  
44 See Wilson and Stevenson (2006) for an in-depth discussion of this model of olfactory experience. 
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evidence and for the need to perceive biologically salient groups of odorants amid 
changing olfactory stimulation (p. 1892).  
Among the object-based approaches to olfaction, there are wide ranging views. First is 
the abstract view, endorsed by Batty (2010a; 2011). This view is similar to that of Matthen 
(2005), but allows for a weak, existentially quantified form of olfactory objecthood. For 
Batty, olfactory experience only ever involves the representation that there is something 
or other in one’s vicinity, instantiating olfactory properties. She argues that we never 
attribute olfactory properties to particular objects, and there cannot be any object 
individuation in the case of olfaction. A coffee smell and a lemon smell perceived 
concurrently won’t be experienced as individuated objects but simply properties 
instantiated by something or other ‘here’. In this chapter, I argue in favour of a much 
stronger notion of olfactory objecthood — one in which smelling does allow us to parse 
the olfactory world into individuated objects. We perceive particular (rather than 
existentially quantified) olfactory objects.  
Lycan (1996; 2000) also endorses a weak variety of olfactory objecthood. For Lycan, there 
are olfactory objects in the sense that our olfactory experience represents odours — and 
an odour is ‘a vaporous emanation, a diffusing collection of molecules typically given off 
from a definite physical source… they are public physical entities available for sensing by 
anyone who happens, fortunately or unfortunately, by’ (1996, p. 91). Like Batty, however, 
he does not allow for the representation of discrete objects in experience. His account is 
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based upon the idea that taking olfaction to represent odours — public physical entities 
— allows us to best account for the olfactory correctness conditions discussed above; an 
experience of a rose smell is veridical just in case there is a rose odour in one’s vicinity, 
regardless of whether there is also a rose nearby. Yet he thinks that this sort of world-
directed object perception is not apparent on phenomenological grounds. In fact, he 
thinks that ‘phenomenally speaking, a smell is just a modification of our consciousness, a 
qualitative condition or quale… in us, lingering uselessly in the mind without representing 
anything’ (1996, p. 90). In what follows, I argue in favour of a kind of phenomenological 
objecthood in olfaction — we perceive odour objects that exhibit figure-ground 
segregation and perceptual constancies. 
Both the feature-based and weaker object-based approaches are largely motivated by the 
apparent paucity of spatial information associated with olfactory experiences, as 
compared to other senses. Vision — which is taken to provide the paradigmatic example 
of object perception — allows us to differentiate objects and understand their spatial 
relations with one another and to our own bodies. We see objects as spatially extended 
and bounded entities, arrayed within the visual field. In contrast, among theorists on all 
sides of the debate regarding olfactory objects, there is a common suspicion that olfactory 
perception is aspatial (e.g. Lycan, 2000; Wilson & Stevenson, 2006) or spatially 
undifferentiated (Matthen, 2005; Batty, 2011; 2014b; Carvalho, 2014). Carvalho (2014) 
and Wilson and Stevenson (2006) agree that smell is aspatial, but think that it is possible 
to perceive individuated objects in a non-spatial manner, while theorists such as Batty 
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(2010a; 2010c) and Matthen (2005) treat spatial differentiation as a prerequisite for 
object individuation. This idea that spatiality is key to object individuation is quite intuitive 
given the primacy of vision within perceptual research; in vision, we segregate objects 
based on spatial locations and their spatially situated edges. Thus, if olfaction fails to be 
adequately spatially differentiated, this may give prima facie credence to a feature-based 
or a weak object-based approach (although as we shall see, there are legitimate non-
spatial types of figure-ground segregation). 
Some such as Carvalho (2014) and Wilson and Stevenson (2003; 2006; 2007) offer 
stronger accounts of object perception, taking olfactory experience to present to us 
particular odour objects individuated on the basis of their chemical structure. While my 
own view is more closely aligned with these approaches, both Carvalho and Wilson and 
Stevenson agree with Batty and Lycan that olfaction does not allow for spatial 
discrimination of odours, and as we shall see, their arguments for the individuation of 
odours are alone insufficient to counter Batty’s objections. In what follows, I argue that 
odours can be individuated both in an aspatial manner based on Gestalt grouping 
principles and in a spatial manner when we take into account the role of bodily movement 
and tactile stimulation for olfactory phenomenology.  
Finally, there have also been criticisms that target the whole dispute between the 
different object-based and feature-based approaches. Theorists such as Cooke and Myin 
(2011) and Barwich (2014) argue in favour of more process-driven approaches, accusing 
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philosophers such as Batty and Lycan of taking the phenomenal character of perceptions 
to be in some way independent of the processes that give rise to these experiences, a 
view that Barwich and Cooke and Myin call the Independence Thesis. Allegedly, those 
guilty of endorsing this thesis tend to assume that sensory perceptions can be understood 
as static, autonomous units, whose properties may or may not be correlated to the 
properties of physical objects. Barwich (2014) argues that we can understand olfaction 
without recourse to perceptual objects or properties of objects, paying attention instead 
to olfactory processes. This thesis does not address such views in detail, but in section 
3.3.2 I illustrate how we can take insights from such approaches, while still endorsing an 
object-based account.  
In what follows, I oppose the feature-based views and the weaker object-based views of 
Batty and Lycan and argue that there are perceptual objects in olfaction in a robust sense. 
Olfaction allows the perception of particular objects, rather than merely an existentially 
quantified something or other in one’s vicinity. I begin by providing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for this robust phenomenological sense of objecthood before 
showing that these criteria are fulfilled in olfactory perception.  
3.2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for objecthood 
This section argues that figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies are each 
necessary for the perception of particular (rather than merely existentially quantified) 
objects, and that they are jointly sufficient. As mentioned above, discrete objects exhibit 
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boundaries and are able to survive changes in our own perspective, as they move and (to 
some extent) over time. These phenomenological features of perception involve abilities 
to discern the boundaries of objects (this falls under the category of object individuation) 
and to recognise objects across different viewing conditions and in different contexts 
(abilities that are central to object recognition in ways I discuss below in 3.2.2). Whether 
these abilities are accounted for in one’s theory of objecthood is a useful test for 
determining whether we have adequate phenomenological criteria for object perception. 
Regardless of whether one endorses the sensorimotor approach outlined in the previous 
chapters, the phenomenology of experience ought not be wholly disconnected from the 
skills involved in perception.  
Figure-ground segregation is the defining feature of the ability to perceive boundaries 
(object individuation), while perceptual constancies allow perceived objects to appear 
invariant across different perspectives and amid changes (underpinning various object 
recognition abilities). First, let us consider figure-ground segregation.  
3.2.1 Figure-ground segregation 
‘Figure-ground segregation’ refers to our ability to distinguish figures from backgrounds. 
This figure-ground structure is central to our visual experiences: we perceive, for example, 
houses against a background of the sky, and books against the background of a desk. We 
are unable to take in a whole detailed scene at once due to the limitations of our 
perceptual access to the world, so we attend to a particular figure or set of figures at a 
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given time, relegating everything else to background. We perceive these backgrounds as 
relatively undifferentiated and less determinate than the figures themselves.  
It has been suggested by Kubovy and Van Valkenburg (2001) that susceptibility to figure-
ground segregation is the defining feature of perceptual objects; it is both necessary and 
sufficient for the perception of objects (p. 102). Those features of the world that become 
figures for us are perceptual objects. A number of other researchers have agreed that 
figure-ground segregation is central to the perception of particular objects, and have used 
this criterion to argue both for (e.g. Wilson & Stevenson, 2007; Carvalho, 2014) and 
against (e.g. Batty, 2011; 2014b) the idea that olfactory experience could allow for objects 
in this sense. Part of Kubovy and Van Valkenburg’s motivation for taking figure-ground 
separation to be the defining feature of objecthood is to provide a non-visuocentric 
account of perceptual objects. Research suggests that figure-ground segregation is 
exhibited in non-visual types of sense perception, such as auditory experience. For 
example, audition researcher Bregman claims that hearing involves the parsing of 
auditory scenes into distinct auditory streams (1990) — which can be understood as a kind 
of boundary allocation — and studies show that listeners are unable to pay attention to 
more than one sound stream at a time, which is also indicative of figure-ground 
segregation. One such study by Bregman and Campbell (1971) found that perceivers were 
unable to judge the order of sounds presented in a repetitive cycle where these sounds 
were experienced as two distinct streams. Participants were presented with three high-
pitched sounds (ABC) and three low-pitched sounds (123) in the order A–1–B–2–C–3. 
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However, the majority of participants experienced the order as either A–B–C–1–2–3 or 
1–2–3–A–B–C as they were only able to pay attention to one stream at a time; one stream 
at a time is experienced as a figure against a background. As I discuss in section 3.3.1, this 
suggests that figure-ground segregation need not be a spatial feature of perception and 
can be applied to non-visual senses such as audition.  
Kubovy and Van Valkenburg are right to avoid a visuocentric notion of perceptual 
objecthood given important similarities in how we perceive the world through different 
senses — e.g. both vision and audition involve figure-ground segregation, Gestalt grouping 
principles, and so forth. Figure-ground segregation is at the heart of ‘object individuation’, 
and a successful phenomenological account of object perception should highlight the 
importance of this capacity. Figure-ground segregation allows us to make sense of the 
idea that perceptual objects are discrete and have boundaries. In fact, figure-ground 
segregation is both necessary and sufficient for the exhibition in experience of boundaries 
(which, as suggested by the auditory case above, need not be spatial): if there is figure-
ground segregation, there must be boundaries allowing the separation of the figure from 
background. Likewise, if we perceive something as having boundaries, this entails that we 
perceive it as segregated from everything else around it. Boundedness and figure-ground 
segregation are two sides of the same coin. Boundedness (and thus, figure-ground 
segregation) is certainly necessary for a robust sense of perceptual objecthood that goes 
beyond the mere representation that there is something or other with olfactory 
properties in one’s vicinity, but it is less clear that it is also sufficient. For full-blown 
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perceptual objecthood we also need to recognise the object as persisting through change, 
which as we shall see, is crucial for object recognition. As mentioned, the standard notion 
of perceptual objecthood involves the idea that these entities can — at least to some 
degree — survive shifts in our own perspective, movements of the objects themselves and 
certain changes over time. I do not think that figure-ground segregation alone gives us 
this. 
Here are two cases in which it seems that figure-ground segregation applies, but where 
there isn’t full-blown object perception. First, imagine the experience of standing under a 
railway bridge, looking up at its underside as the train passes by overhead.45 You perceive 
flashes of light through the gaps between the tracks as the carriages pass by. These flashes 
of light stand out to us against a background of the environment under the bridge. 
However, these flashes do not seem to be perceived as perceptual objects, but merely as 
differences in lighting that jump out in our experience. I do not think we ought to include 
these flashes as examples of perceptual objects, because if we were to do so, our notion 
would be extremely weak and wouldn’t correspond with any normal usage of the term 
‘object’. The notion of objecthood that I am interested in here is one that involves both 
object individuation and object recognition abilities — the two sets of skills considered to 
be at the heart of object perception. Perceiving the flashes doesn’t appear to involve 
object recognition abilities such as tracking, amodal completion or the perception of them 
 
45 With thanks to Alistair Isaac (personal communication) for providing this example. 
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as persistent. Thus, nor does it involve perceptual constancies — the flashes aren’t 
perceived as invariant across changes in perspective, but they are merely transient figures 
that capture our attention.  
A second example in which there seems to be figure-ground segregation without 
perceptual objecthood is the experience of an after-image following the perception of a 
bright light. After-images appear segregated from everything else we experience, allowing 
for figure-ground segregation. However, they don’t present themselves to us as objects 
in the world, but instead seem overlaid on our visual field, lacking phenomenal objectivity. 
They continue to appear to us in whichever direction we look. Hence, we do not perceive 
after-images as invariant amid changing sensory stimulation, because no matter how 
one’s perspective varies, after-images do not provide different sensory input.  
Figure-ground segregation is thus not sufficient for perceptual objecthood; there are 
counter-examples to such a theory. Kubovy and Van Valkenburg’s criterion for perceptual 
objecthood (susceptibility to figure-ground segregation alone) is too weak to capture an 
important aspect of the perception of objects — the perceived entity’s ability to survive 
changes of perspective and in the object itself. Adding the criterion of the exhibition of 
constancies provides a more robust and useful notion of objecthood, which better 
encapsulates what is generally meant by the term, i.e. something that persists, which we 
can track, and so forth. Recall O’Callaghan’s assertion that ‘objects perceptibly persist and 
survive changes’ (2016, p. 1273). Now we turn to the second criterion for perceptual 
         103 
 
objecthood: the exhibition of perceptual constancies.  
3.2.2 Perceptual constancies 
Contra Kubovy and Van Valkenburg (2001), in my view the exhibition of perceptual 
constancies is also necessary for the perception of objects. Perceptual constancies are the 
invariances we perceive amid changing sensory stimulation. For example, I can perceive 
the invariant size of an object even if my perspective changes, giving rise to a duality to 
the experience. Consider Peacocke’s (1983, p. 12) well-known example of seeing two 
trees of exactly the same size, one of which is further away than the other. There is a 
sense in which one of the trees looks bigger in that it takes up more space in the visual 
field, but there is another clear sense in which the trees are perceived as the same size. 
The perceiver sees the observer-independent size of the trees. Similarly, Noë (2004, p. 
78) observes that although a plate, in some sense, looks elliptical from an angle, the viewer 
also perceives the objective roundness of the plate. In fact, these observer independent 
properties are generally much easier to attend to than perspective-dependent 
appearances; when I look at a plate, it takes some effort to notice the elliptical 
appearance. A novice artist may struggle to recreate the lines and angles required for an 
accurate drawing of the plate, and may simply draw it as a round circle. We are able to 
detect patterns and invariances as our perspective on the world shifts. Perceptual 
constancies are a requirement for coherent object perception. Part of what it is to 
perceive an object is to recognise it as the same object from different perspectives. 
Without such an ability, our perceptions would be extremely confusing — as soon as we 
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moved our eyes, the world around us would appear to change.  
Object recognition encompasses a range of skills that are closely connected to these 
perceptual constancies. It includes capacities to recognise invariance amid change along 
with semantic categorisation. It involves the ability to recognise tokens of the same type 
(for example, one might see two tomatoes and recognise a kind of sameness among them) 
and also the ability to perceive objects as the same token object from one moment to the 
next. Thus, skills such as tracking, etc. are taken as object recognition abilities. This aspect 
of object perception has been emphasised by a number of olfaction researchers (e.g. 
Wilson & Stevenson, 2003; 2006; 2007; Batty, 2010a). Batty’s abstract view takes there 
to be something akin to object recognition in the case of olfaction, even though there is 
no object individuation.  
Perceptual constancies underpin various object recogition abilities such as tracking, 
perceiving an object as persistent, and amodal completion. They are needed to perceive 
an object as maintaining its identity moment to moment, or to categorise objects as 
belonging to a particular type. Consider an example of tracking an object: I watch a car 
driving down the street. As I do so, the shape of the car projected onto my retina 
continually changes as it moves past and different aspects of the car come into view. 
Despite all of these dramatic perspectival changes, I do not perceive the car itself as 
changing shape or the colour of the car as changing when the sun reflects off different 
parts of it. I perceive the car as an invariant three-dimensional object of a particular colour 
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moving in a particular direction. Without these constancy effects, it is not clear that we 
could track the object amid the flux of changing appearances. Likewise, it seems that these 
constancies are crucial in perceiving the object as persisting over time. I perceive the car 
as remaining the same object over time, even as my eyes move and I walk around, and as 
I see different aspects of the object.  
Amodal completion can be construed as a variety of perceptual constancy (as suggested 
in the previous chapter). In vision, amodal completion is the perception of an object as 
complete even though it is not entirely visible. As in the previous cases, this seems to 
involve an ability to go beyond the immediate sensory evidence to perceive the overall 
shape of an object. We are presented with a world of whole, invariant objects rather than 
simply the facing sides of objects with which we are in direct sensory contact. Noë (2006b) 
notes that when one looks at a tomato, although one is only in direct sensory contact with 
its facing side, ‘The visual experience of the tomato, when one takes it at face value, 
presents itself to one precisely as a visual experience as of a whole tomato’ (p. 413, italics 
in original). This is a case of amodal completion, and one that, according to Noë, depends 
upon our expectancies regarding how different aspects of the tomato would come into 
view if we were to change our perspective; our grasp of constancies enables the 
perception of whole objects despite the limitations of our perspectives. Burge (2010, p. 
417) notes that in both tracking cases and amodal completion cases we ‘perceptually 
anticipate’ that which is not strictly speaking present to our senses. This also suggests a 
commonality with the constancy cases discussed above. Just as we can perceive the round 
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shape of the plate even though this involves a kind of extrapolation from the immediate 
sensory evidence, we are able to perceive the tomato as whole even though we cannot 
strictly speaking see all of it at once. Thus, amodal completion is plausibly a special case 
of our ability to perceive constant aspects of the world — the object is perceived as having 
an invariant, complete shape despite our sensory limitations. As we saw in 2.2.2 and will 
be reiterated in 3.3.3, something similar applies in the case of olfaction.  
While perceptual constancies are closely connected to object recognition, there are some 
aspects of object recognition that I am hesitant to include as necessary for object 
perception. For example, object recognition is often also taken to involve implicit object 
memories — the ability to recognise (at least implicitly) that an object is of the same type 
as a previously experienced object. While object memories are able to influence the way 
we categorise objects and seemingly can even influence figure-ground assignments (e.g. 
Peterson & Gibson, 1994; see chapter 6 for discussion), raising interesting questions 
about how object recognition and object individuation are interlinked, this aspect of 
object recognition does not itself appear to be necessary for the perception of objects. 
After all, if this were the case, it would not be possible to perceive novel objects of which 
the subject has no prior memories. Thus, it is the perceptual constancies that underpin 
object recognition abilities that are necessary for the perception of objects, rather than 
(all aspects of) object recognition itself. Perceptual constancies are required for achieving 
the initial perception of a coherent object along with feats of recognition such as tracking, 
persistence, and amodal completion.  
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Perceptual constancies have been observed across other modalities and are intimately 
tied to the notion of perceptual objects across the senses. Researchers have, for example, 
found various constancies exhibited in auditory perception. It has been observed that the 
perception of sound streams involves the phenomenon of timbre constancy (e.g. 
Bregman, 1990; Isaac, 2017). Bregman points out:  
A friend's voice has the same perceived timbre in a quiet room as at a cocktail 
party. Yet at the party, the set of frequency components arising from that voice is 
mixed at the listener's ear with frequency components from other sources. The 
total spectrum of energy that reaches the ear may be significantly different in 
different environments. (1990, p. 2) 
We recognise invariance of timbre even though there is also a sense in which we hear 
something quite different in a cocktail party and in a quiet room. Another example is 
highlighted by Matthen (2010), who, drawing on the work of neuroscientist and musician 
Daniel J. Levitin (2006), notes that melodies retain their identity even if they are played in 
a different key. We recognise the sameness of the melodies amid changes. Thus, Matthen 
takes them to be analogous to the three-dimensional objects we perceive through vision 
and describes them as a type of auditory object.  
Such perceptual constancies are a necessary condition for object perception. As noted, 
without such constancies, we would not be able to recognise an object as persisting amid 
change. We would merely experience a barrage of changing sensations rather than 
coherent objects. Thus, if it turns out that olfactory experience does not exhibit such 
constancies, smell cannot involve the perception of objects in a robust phenomenological 
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sense. However, perceptual constancies alone are not sufficient for the perception of 
objects as there are types of perceptual constancies that apply to properties, which may 
not be instantiated by a particular perceived object. In particular, colour constancy may 
occur in cases where we do not perceive an object. One such case is provided by Kennedy 
(2007), who suggests that where someone is engulfed in fog, although their experience 
presents to them a uniform, undifferentiated colour, there may still be cases of colour 
constancy.  
The blue as it is presented to me in a Ganzfeld fog could seem a bit thicker or 
smoother while still appearing to be the same color. In this sort of case, the color 
character of my experience changes, but I still seem to be aware of the same color. 
One's experience in a color-constancy Ganzfeld-case would have a significant 
phenomenological similarity to one's experience of an object's color as constant 
(p. 315).  
The experience of the fog doesn’t present itself as of an object, and doesn’t exhibit figure-
ground segregation, but it can still involve perceptual constancies. 
If a perception involves both boundaries (figure-ground segregation) and constancies, this 
will be a case of full-blown object perception in a phenomenological sense. The joint 
exhibition of these features in perception ensures that the putative object is perceived as 
discrete and bounded, and that it can survive changes in one’s perspective and 
movements of the object itself. This is a much stronger notion of objecthood than the 
non-phenomenological notion offered by Lycan and the weak existentially quantified 
variety offered by Batty, allowing for the perception of particular objects rather than 
merely some-or-other undifferentiated object. Using these conditions enables a robust, 
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non-visuocentric notion of perceptual objecthood, which avoids the counterexamples 
faced by Kubovy and Van Valkenburg’s (2001) theory. Thus, plausibly susceptibility to 
figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies are jointly sufficient for the 
perception of particular objects, as well as individually necessary. If I am right, then 
demonstrating that these features of perception are exhibited in olfaction would show 
there to be olfactory objects in a robust sense.  
3.3 Does olfaction fulfil the criteria for perceptual objecthood?  
Here I argue that olfactory experiences often exhibit both figure-ground segregation and 
perceptual constancies — and thus, we perceive discrete objects through olfaction. As we 
have seen, figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies are each necessary for 
this kind of perceptual objecthood, and so, if either is missing from olfactory experience, 
this would show that we do not perceive olfactory objects in a robust phenomenological 
sense. If there are perceptual constancies but not figure-ground segregation, this would 
allow for Batty’s weak abstract variety of object, but not allow the perception of particular 
objects. 
This section begins by looking at whether there is a figure-ground structure to olfactory 
experience. I argue that there can be a type of non-spatial figure-ground segregation in 
olfaction (3.3.1), based on the Gestalt grouping principles, which have been used to 
provide evidence for perceptual grouping and segregation in vision and audition. 
Secondly, I argue that there is also a form of spatial figure-ground segregation that applies 
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in the case of smell (3.3.2). Section 3.3.3 focuses on perceptual constancies, which are 
also required for full-blown objecthood. I recap the empirical research and evidence from 
olfactory phenomenology (also briefly discussed in 2.2.2), which suggest that there are 
least two types of perceptual constancy exhibited in olfactory experience, and thus, that 
olfaction does involve perceptual objects. 
3.3.1 Figure-ground segregation in olfaction: an aspatial notion based on Gestalt 
principles 
While there has been research into audition suggesting that figure-ground segregation 
can occur in a temporal, rather than spatial, manner (Bregman, 1990), the phenomenon 
is often still described in explicitly spatial terms. For example, Batty (2014b) asserts, ‘In 
those types of experience in which we think of figure-ground segregation as achieved—
vision, audition and touch, for example—we do so on the basis of the richness of its spatial 
representation’ (p. 10). Visual experience provides a paradigmatic example of this kind of 
rich spatiality, presenting us with clearly bounded, spatially arrayed objects that we 
distinguish from each other and from the background. Olfaction doesn’t ostensibly do this 
and as mentioned above, many researchers consider olfaction to be aspatial or spatially 
undifferentiated (Lycan, 2000; Matthen, 2005; Wilson & Stevenson, 2006; Batty, 2011; 
2014b). It therefore remains highly controversial whether olfaction achieves figure-
ground segregation. 
Researchers that have argued in favour of olfactory figure-ground segregation include 
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Wilson and Stevenson (2006; 2007), Carvalho (2014) and Young (2016). Wilson and 
Stevenson (2006; 2007) and Carvalho (2014) have broadly similar accounts of olfactory 
figure-ground segregation. They suggest that we should understand figure-ground 
segregation in smell as being an ability to perceive an individual odour against a 
background of other odorants. Carvalho says: ‘for one of these odors to be experienced 
as such, as the odor that it is, the olfactory system needs to be able to extract a very 
complex blend against a background of irrelevant odorants and competing olfactory 
objects’ (2014, p. 63). For example, intuitively, when I walk into a coffee shop, I can 
perceive a unified coffee odour despite there also being a complex blend of odorants from 
cleaning products, food, perfume and so forth. We perceive the coffee as a ‘unitary 
percept’ (Wilson & Stevenson, 2006), which then stands out against the other odorants 
in the air. Batty takes these sorts of arguments to rely on the idea that the coffee odour 
has ‘experiential prominence’ (2014a; 2014b) and argues that her own approach is equally 
well-placed to explain the experiential prominence of the coffee smell.  
Recall, Batty believes that olfactory experience is just too ‘smudgy’ to involve bounded, 
discrete objects. Rather than particular objects, olfactory experience only allows the 
perception of olfactory properties instantiated by some-or-other object ‘here’ in one’s 
vicinity. She takes ‘here’ to be an undifferentiated location, claiming that we do not 
distinguish where the smell is instantiated from where it is not (2010a, p. 9). The content 
of olfactory experience is thus indexical (in that odours are experienced as ‘here’) and 
abstract in the sense that rather than representing particular objects they simply 
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represent ‘that there is something or other here with certain properties’ (Batty, 2011, p. 
170). She takes olfactory experience itself to be silent on which odour instantiates which 
olfactory property (since she denies there is object individuation in olfaction). If one can 
smell coffee and perfume, for Batty the experience will merely report that it smells 
perfumey and coffee-like here (see 2010, p. 534; 2011, pp. 166–167). If certain aspects of 
one’s experience are especially prominent (say the coffee smell sticks out to the perceiver 
over the perfume smell), for Batty, this will be a case of experiential prominence, which 
need not be understood as a kind of figure-ground segregation. This could merely be a 
case of certain properties being experienced as more prominent than other properties of 
some-or-other object, and this could be explained in terms of attention/expectation, or 
the mechanisms of learning and memory, without the need to attribute figure-ground 
effects and discrete objects to the experience (2014a, p. 237). Thus, Batty claims that her 
abstract view is, prima facie, equally well equipped to explain our olfactory experiences. 
If Batty is right, how ought we decide whether olfactory perception involves figure-ground 
segregation? It appears that relying upon experiential prominence, as Wilson and 
Stevenson (2006; 2007) and Carvalho (2014) do, will alone not suffice to establish this. As 
mentioned, much of the motivation for object-talk in perception is the interesting set of 
commonalities among our perceptual processes and the entities we perceive as grouped. 
The Gestalt psychologists uncovered a range of principles that govern when we perceive 
stimulus features as bounded and discrete (and thus exhibiting figure-ground 
segregation). These principles may be useful in determining whether figure-ground 
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segregation is exhibited in the olfactory case because if they apply, this would suggest 
that groupings and segregations analogous to those in the other senses are occurring. A 
robust notion of olfactory figure-ground segregation ought to bear a resemblance to the 
way separations of figure and ground occur in the other senses, especially as people’s 
intuitions on this point seem to differ a great deal.  
The Gestalt psychologists placed phenomenal experience at the heart of their approach 
to the mind. They believed that we do not first experience disjointed sensations, but 
rather an organised field of structured wholes, segregated from their fields, and sought 
to uncover stimulus features that determine how the perceptual field is organised. Recall 
that Wertheimer (1923/1938) outlined aspects of a stimulus that influence perceptual 
organisation, giving rise to a range of grouping principles such as similarity, proximity, 
common fate and good form (the law of Prägnanz). For example, in the case of the 
principle of similarity: items that are similar in colour, shape, texture, etc. are more likely 
to be visually grouped. The Gestalt psychologists found that these grouping principles 
exerted a significant influence on the way that people perceive visual displays (e.g. 
Wertheimer, 1923/1938), and it has been found that all of these principles are also 
applicable to auditory perception (e.g. Bregman, 1990).  
If olfaction only allowed the perception of nebulous properties (Matthen, 2005) or merely 
the weak sense of existentially quantified objecthood advocated by Batty, olfactory 
experience would not involve structured wholes segregated from their surroundings. If, 
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however, the Gestalt principles of perceptual organisation apply to the objects/features 
we perceive through smell, this would be a good reason for describing olfaction as 
exhibiting figure-ground segregation. It would demonstrate clear similarities to the pre-
established notions of visual and auditory figure-ground segregation and would suggest 
that perceptual organisation in olfaction occurs in ways analogous to the other senses. In 
fact, there is evidence that, even disregarding any potential spatial import in olfactory 
experience, several of these principles apply.46  
Principle of Similarity: The principle of similarity states that we tend to group similar 
aspects of a stimulus together. There are some issues in assessing how we are to 
determine whether items are similar, but generally it is assumed that parts of a stimulus 
that, for example, share the same colour or shape are more similar (at least in these 
respects) than those that don’t (see fig 1.2). For example, in the case of vision, two red 
dots are more likely to be grouped into a structured whole than a red and a blue dot. 
These sorts of specific cases of similarity are taken to be instantiations of a broader 
 
46 Other Gestalt principles may well also apply in the olfactory case, but there is limited research in this area. 
The principle of common fate says that we are more likely to perceive elements that move together as being 
grouped. Bregman (1990, p. 249), however, suggested that this principle can be expanded to include 
elements that change together in proportional and synchronous ways. He says that would show this 
principle to be applicable to audition, in cases where, for example, two frequency components changed 
synchronously by proportional amounts and were therefore likely to be perceived as grouped. Olfactory 
experiences, like auditory ones, rely heavily on the temporal extension, unfolding over time in important 
ways. It would be interesting to see if something analogous occurs in the case of smell. It is plausible that 
experiencing odours as changing in a synchronous manner would result in a greater likelihood of grouping, 
but as far as I am aware there is no research exploring this issue. The applicability of at least some of the 
principles does, nevertheless, add empirical support to the view that olfaction involves figure-ground 
segregation.  
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principle of similarity.47 There is evidence that something analogous is applicable in the 
case of olfaction. Research shows that mixtures of similarly smelling components are 
more likely to be perceived as having unified, novel olfactory qualities than mixtures of 
dissimilar components. In cases where the components smell dissimilar it is generally 
easier to individuate them and perceive them as separate than in the cases where the 
individual odorants smell similar (Wiltrout, Dogra, & Linster, 2003; see Young, 2016 for 
further discussion). This seems to be an instance of perceptual grouping based on 
similarity and lends weight to the idea that figure-ground segregation occurs in olfaction. 
Principle of Proximity: Another of the Gestalt Principles is the law of proximity, which 
states that elements that are closer together are more likely to be perceived as grouped 
(see fig 1.3). Generally, in the visual case, this is simply measured by manipulating 
distances between aspects of the input image. For example, studies show that dots that 
are clustered closely together are more likely to be perceived as grouped together into a 
unified figure (e.g. Compton & Logan, 1993). In audition, Bregman (1990) suggests that 
 
47 These kinds of simple visual examples have the potential to be misleading. In the case of grouping 
together dots, the individual dots may themselves be perceived as figures against a background in some 
cases (presumably based in part on further grouping principles), but they are also often perceptually 
combined into larger perceived objects. Thus, it may be ambiguous whether we perceive an individual dot 
as a figure against a background or the larger grouping of dots as a figure (perhaps like cases of bi-stable 
figure-ground perception such as Rubin’s ‘vase-or-face’ image, which can be perceived according to two 
distinct figure-ground interpretations; see Fig. 6.1). In many cases, however, there isn’t such an ambiguity. 
Plausibly, part of the reason we perceive a tomato as a unified, bounded object is because of the similar 
shades of red across different parts of it. In such cases we don’t perceive one patch of the tomato as itself 
a figure against a background, even though it may be possible to attend to one patch of it. Likewise, in the 
case of olfactory grouping by similarity, the perception is of a unified odour, and even if it may be possible 
in some instances to attend to different aspects of the odour, these aspects don’t seem to be segregated 
from the whole. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer of the paper on which this chapter is based for 
prompting clarification on this issue. 
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an analogue of this is separation in time (p. 19). One manifestation of this principle in 
audition is that concurrent onset of sounds provides a good indication that they are 
members of the same stream, while different start times can signal different streams 
(O'Callaghan, 2008, p. 822). Separation in time seems to also be relevant in the olfactory 
case, as there is evidence suggesting that (as in audition) concurrent onset of olfactory 
stimuli increases the chance of our perceiving them as belonging together. Studies show 
that in multimodal flavour-smell interactions, simultaneous onset makes them more likely 
to be integrated (Pfeiffer, Hollowood, Hort, & Taylor, 2005; Stevenson, 2014). While this 
hasn’t been directly tested in the non-multisensory olfactory case, it is very plausible that 
something similar would apply. I take this to be indirect evidence of the law of proximity 
applying in the case of olfaction. 
Principle of Prägnanz/Good Form: Finally, it is worth considering the principle of good 
form or ‘Prägnanz’ — an overarching Gestalt principle that is often said to encompass the 
other grouping principles. This states that we are more likely perceptually group together 
assemblies of parts that are coherent, balanced, simple, and so forth. We generally group 
together elements into the simplest and most internally coherent figures that are 
compatible with the available sensory information. Intuitively, good form is something 
that can be achieved in the olfactory domain. Perfumery provides an example of this and 
suggests that good form aids in the grouping of odours. Perfume manufacturers seek to 
develop well-balanced fragrances, combining top, middle and base notes to obtain a 
perfume accord. An accord is a blend of notes that produces a harmonious odour, in which 
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the notes lose their individual identity and are perceived as unified. Perfume accords are 
plausibly bounded and segregated from other scents, and good form seems to be an 
important factor in achieving this. The balance, harmony and internal coherence exhibited 
by these accords is crucial to the perception of a unified scent. 
These examples highlight that several of the Gestalt principles apply in the case of 
olfaction, influencing whether we perceive olfactory features as unified and discrete. This 
doesn’t look like mere experiential prominence but rather, olfactory experience seems to 
be organised in ways analogous to in the other senses. Thus, there is good reason to apply 
the notion of figure-ground segregation to olfactory perception. Importantly, if the 
evidence I have provided does indicate that the several of the Gestalt principles apply to 
smell (thus providing evidence for figure-ground segregation), they seem to apply in a 
non-spatial manner. In the next section, I argue that in addition to this type of figure-
ground segregation, olfaction also exhibits a form of spatial figure-ground segregation.  
3.3.2 Figure-ground segregation and the spatiality of olfaction  
We have seen that there are reasons to think that, as in the auditory case, there is a non-
spatial form of figure-ground segregation in olfaction. However, some researchers have 
rejected the idea of non-spatial figure-ground segregation, suggesting that the notion 
should be reserved for instances of spatial discrimination (which is usually thought to 
preclude olfaction). Batty (2014b) argues that we need a spatial account of figure-ground 
segregation in order to make interesting comparisons between human and non-human 
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olfactory perceptions. In particular, it is clear that some animals have a directional sense 
of smell. Batty notes that the hammerhead shark’s sense of smell enables it to 
immediately turn in the direction of the source of a blood odour (p. 10). Moreover, its 
nasal cavities are far apart, giving it a stereo sense of smell. According to Batty, the shark’s 
sense of smell can rightly be said to involve a kind of (spatial) figure-ground segregation, 
while ours cannot. She says, ‘If we are to account for the difference between us and the 
hammerhead, then, we require the spatial notion of figure-ground segregation’ (ibid.). 
This ability to immediately detect the direction from which the blood arrives is, she claims, 
analogous to our ability to detect the location of a sound in audition (ibid.). 
Batty’s argument is primarily pragmatic; it is based on the alleged utility of reserving the 
term ‘figure-ground segregation’ for spatial types of perception. Extending the term to 
non-spatial cases, she thinks, threatens its usefulness in accounting for differences 
between varied types of perception (such as human olfaction and that of the shark). As 
we have seen, Bregman (1990) and others have claimed that there are important notions 
of figure-ground segregation that aren’t reliant on spatial features, allowing us, for 
example, to make sense of how we perceive distinct sound streams. While audition does, 
as Batty notes, enable us to spatially locate objects and events in the environment, it also 
appears to be governed by a myriad of Gestalt grouping principles that are heavily reliant 
on temporal and non-spatial features. These principles provide evidence of non-spatial 
figure-ground effects in audition. Furthermore, we have seen that at least some of these 
Gestalt principles apply to olfaction also. Nevertheless, even if one were to reserve the 
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notion of figure-ground segregation for spatial cases, we will see that it can still apply to 
olfactory experience. Thus, here I also disagree with Wilson and Stevenson (2006; 2007) 
and Carvalho (2014), who think only non-spatial figure-ground segregation occurs in 
olfaction, and others such as Lycan (2000) and Matthen (2005) who reject any kind of 
figure-ground segregation in olfaction. In what follows, I respond to Batty and argue that 
spatial olfactory figure-ground segregation is at least sometimes achieved. To see that 
olfaction does provide us with spatial information, we need to first understand that bodily 
activity is required for olfactory experience and that tactile inputs can give rise to olfactory 
phenomenology (see also discussion in chapter 2).  
A clear sense in which olfaction involves (a minimal kind of) bodily movement is through 
the act of sniffing. Empirical research demonstrates that the act of inhalation is necessary 
to have any olfactory experience whatsoever. Proetz (1941) highlighted the necessity of 
airflow through the nostrils by pouring a solution of eau de cologne into the nostrils of his 
students, noting that this did not give rise to an olfactory perception: ‘Although it 
obviously reaches his olfactory area he will not detect the odor’ (p. 366). Further evidence 
for the necessity of the inhalation comes from Bocca, Antonelli, & Mosciaro (1965), who 
intravenously injected odorants into subjects. Odorants were delivered to the epithelium 
via the blood stream, but subjects did not perceive any odour except for when they sniffed 
and breathed normally through the nose. Thus, the act of inhalation is crucial for olfactory 
experience, with some taking the sniff to be ‘as integral to olfactory perception as the eye 
movement is to visual perception’ (Mainland & Sobel, 2006, p. 1). In addition, evidence 
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suggests that multiple sniffs are needed to differentiate odours (Mainland & Sobel, 2006). 
Thus, we ought to acknowledge the role of this kind of temporally extended olfactory 
exploration in considering whether figure-ground segregation is achieved.  
Active sniffing also appears to offer us more spatial information than has generally been 
supposed. A conservative endorsement of spatiality in olfactory experience comes from 
Richardson (2013). She argues that the act of sniffing causes us to perceive smell in an 
exteroceptive manner: we perceive odours as being brought into the nose from the 
outside. In this way, smell differs from bodily sensations like pain, for example. Richardson 
doesn’t think that distance and direction are represented in olfactory experiences, 
claiming that they are more akin to the tactile experience of a breeze blowing against your 
face: ‘One is not aware of some distance that the air that touches your face has travelled. 
But nevertheless, it does seem as if the breeze is coming to the body from somewhere 
beyond it—from without’ (p. 411). Although Richardson may be correct that distance is 
not represented in such cases, I think the analogy highlights (contra Richardson) that we 
can learn about direction from air blowing into your face. Wind might hit my left cheek, 
but not my right cheek, giving me information about which direction it is coming from. 
Something similar might hold in certain cases of olfaction.  
In fact, Roberts (2015) uses this line of thought — and a similar example — in arguing in 
favour of spatial content in olfaction. He asserts: 
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Firstly, consider that some odours arrive on the breeze, and are experienced as 
such. Directional ventilation can add a dimension of spatial content that is missing 
in olfactory encounters with static air, permitting the subject to smell where an 
odour is coming from. A scent that is carried by a current that is felt upon the left 
hand side of one’s face can, plausibly, be perceptually localised to that direction… 
(p. 9) 
The example of odours carried on a breeze seems to show that there can be directional 
content in olfaction (for further arguments in favour of directional content in olfactory 
experience see Aasen, 2018). This goes beyond the exteroceptivity that Richardson 
highlights, illustrating the beginnings of a more robust account of spatiality in olfaction.  
As well as the case of odours arriving on a breeze, empirical studies indicate that we can 
gain some directional information through smelling by stimulation of the trigeminal nerve 
(Kobal, Van Toller, & Hummel, 1989) — a nerve involved in activity such as chewing and 
responsible for (what are usually considered to be) tactile and pain sensations in the face. 
Participants can discern whether odours are on the left or right if they involve elements 
such as cooling, warmth or pressure sensations. It might be protested that these 
directional experiences aren’t truly olfactory, given the involvement of trigeminal or, (as 
in the breeze case) other types of tactile stimulation. However, as Roberts (ibid.) points 
out, it seems to be a mistake to think that there is ever ‘pure olfaction’ devoid of input 
from the other senses (p. 19, fn. 17; see also Richardson, 2013, section 6.3). As we have 
seen, plausibly the act of smelling always involves bodily movement in the form of the 
sniff,48 which like the experience of a breeze hitting us, involves a degree of tactile 
 
48 Though see Young (2017) for arguments to the contrary.  
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stimulation. If we agree with Richardson that our olfactory experiences are exteroceptive, 
this seems to crucially involve the experience of the inhalation of air through the nostrils. 
This exteroceptivity is a vital aspect of olfactory phenomenology, but one that depends 
upon tactile input.  
Likewise, many smells rely on trigeminal stimulation for their perceived quality. For 
example, the cool scent of menthol, the pungency of ammonia and the acridity of burning 
rubber are all reliant on trigeminal stimulation. Yet these do seem to be features of 
odours, we detect them by sniffing, and they seem to present themselves as olfactory 
properties. Our experiences of these properties seem to undermine the idea that we can 
neatly carve off olfactory phenomenology from tactile phenomenology. It might be 
thought that considering anosmia, where patients have lost their sense of smell, would 
allow us to isolate the trigeminal from the olfactory aspects of experience. However, in 
fact this doesn’t provide a clear way to separate the two because anosmia also comes 
with a decrease in trigeminal sensitivity (Hummel, et al., 1996), illustrating the tight 
connection between olfactory and trigeminal stimulation in smell. Trigeminal stimulation 
is ubiquitous in our normal olfactory experiences and the vast majority of odorants also 
stimulate the trigeminal nerve (e.g. Wysocki et al., 2003). 
There have also been interesting experiments demonstrating that humans have a capacity 
for tracking odour trails. Porter, et al. (2007) show that we are in fact able to track odour 
trails using smell alone (participants were blindfolded, given sound-blocking earmuffs 
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etc.).49 Accuracy dropped significantly when the subjects had one nostril taped up, and 
when a device was used to combine airflow so both nostrils received the same 
information. This suggests that our bilateral nostrils play a role in the spatial information 
derived from olfaction: ‘Here we find that mammals performing a scent-tracking task, 
freely able to move their nose and sample the olfactory environment in real time, reap 
added benefit from sampling via their two spatially offset nostrils’ (p. 29).50 They conclude 
that we are able to spatially localise odorants. In this case, it is very plausible that the 
subjects experience the scent trail as a figure against a background — a case of olfactory 
figure-ground segregation that is achieved spatially. Whether we move our bodies to seek 
out the scents that we inhale, or whether the air is brought to us on a breeze, we can 
garner spatial information from olfaction.  
Now we are in a position to re-consider Batty’s (2014b) shark example. Batty infers a 
spatial type of perception from the shark’s abilities, taking hammerhead sharks to have a 
 
49 Again, some researchers are likely to argue that this isn’t an example of ‘pure’ olfaction. Lycan, who, as I 
have mentioned, claims olfaction is aspatial, would disagree with this account of spatial content in olfaction 
because he thinks that spatial information derived from sniffing while moving our heads or bodies wouldn’t 
count as spatial content from olfaction itself (personal communication). His focus is only on whether there 
is spatial content in smell when we don’t move around (i.e. synchronic perception). However, once we 
recognise that some bodily movement is a requirement for having any olfactory experience whatsoever, it 
is a small step to accept that ordinary olfactory experience involves exploratory sniffing. We move our heads 
towards roses to smell them, we move away from bad smells, we lift the coffee cup towards our noses to 
smell its odour, and so forth.  
50 Based on this research, a possible experiment to test the role of sensorimotor understanding in olfaction 
would be reverse the olfactory input received by each nostril, in much the same way that experiments 
involving reversing goggles are used to support the sensorimotor approach for vision. If olfaction were then 
noticeably distorted for the subject, the sensorimotor approach would predict an adaptation of their 
olfactory experience and associated behavioural dispositions as they became attuned to the new 
sensorimotor contingencies.  
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directional sense of smell because they have the ability to immediately turn in the 
direction of the source of a blood odour, for example (p. 10), as well as noting that their 
offset nostrils allow stereo smell. Yet Batty’s ‘abstract’ account of human olfaction 
requires that we assess the phenomenology of a motionless perceiver. She says: ‘If we 
bracket information gained from movement and any other sensory modality, and consider 
olfactory experience at-a-time, then we see that any locatedness of these properties—
other than simply “here”—goes as well’ (2010a, p. 9). As we have seen, the idea that 
olfactory properties are simply instantiated ‘here’ is central to her account, highlighting 
that she believes that bracketing off movement and information from the other senses is 
the correct approach to understanding human olfaction. Batty says, ‘[I]t would be strange 
to conclude that the hammerhead’s olfactory experiences are to be evaluated according 
to one notion of figure-ground segregation, while ours are not’ (2014b, p. 10). However, 
human scent tracking also involves differential stimulation of the nostrils and Porter, et 
al.’s research seems to suggest clear similarities in the perceptual abilities of humans and 
sharks. Participants in the study moved their heads in such a way as to follow the odour 
trail, from which we can infer the sort of spatial phenomenology that Batty claims is the 
preserve of non-human animals. Thus, there doesn’t seem to be a reason to accept 
evidence for figure-ground segregation from a shark’s abilities but not from those of a 
human. If the hammerhead shark’s sense of smell is said to involve figure-ground 
segregation, it seems that (at least) in certain circumstances human olfaction does so too.  
In fact, a key role of olfaction is to spatially localise the sources of odours, and exploratory 
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sniffing also allows us to track the direction from which some odours arrive. We don’t only 
perceive odours as exteroceptive through olfaction but can also learn about direction and 
other spatial features of odours, which may assist us in segregating them. Thus, contra 
researchers like Batty (2011; 2014b), Lycan (2000) and Matthen (2005) it appears that we 
do have spatial discriminatory abilities in olfaction. By adopting this approach to olfaction, 
we can also take insights from the process-based accounts of olfaction (mentioned in 
section 3.1) while retaining a robust notion of objecthood. Barwich (2014) says that we 
ought to reject the notion of perceptual objects because researchers treat them as static 
units of analysis, independent of perceptual processes (p. 264). However, with the 
proposed approach we can see that perceptual objects are crucially dependent upon 
perceptual processes. Without bodily activity like sniffing, plausibly we cannot perceive 
objects at all, and moving our heads and bodies can give us rich spatial information about 
odours, allowing us to spatially segregate them from complex mixtures of odorants in the 
air.  
The preceding discussion’s emphasis on the role of tactile and trigeminal stimulation in 
olfactory phenomenology opens up questions about whether we ought to take olfactory 
experience to be multisensory (perhaps akin to how flavour perception is often 
understood). These kinds of questions will be covered in detail in chapter 5. For now, 
some brief remarks suffice. In my view, there are three main ways to construe olfaction 
here: (a) as a multisensory type of perception involving olfactory, tactile and trigeminal 
sense modalities, (b) as a unisensory type of perception, which takes the tactile/trigeminal 
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involvement to merely influence olfaction rather than forming part of the olfactory 
experience itself, or (c) as a unimodal type of perception that takes the tactile and 
trigeminal involvement to form a constitutive part of a unified olfactory sense 
modality/perceptual modality. How this question is answered will depend on the way in 
which the senses are individuated.51 There have been wide-ranging approaches to this 
issue. Traditionally, most of these accounts have based individuation on either the 
phenomenal character of a sense experience, types of receptors, the sense organ involved 
or the representational content of the experience (Macpherson, 2011b). Others have 
suggested we individuate the senses in accordance with types of perceptual activity (e.g. 
Matthen, 2014) or societal convention (Nudds, 2004). These different strategies for 
individuating the senses result in different answers to the question of whether olfactory 
experience is multisensory (see chapter 5 for further discussion).  
With the account I have put forward, odours are presented to us as spatiotemporally 
extended entities. Even though they have less clearly specified spatial boundaries than 
the objects presented in, say, vision, they do allow spatial differentiation when we actively 
engage in the activity of smelling. There is evidence that figure-ground segregation applies 
in olfaction: it is possible to discriminate odours both on the basis of non-spatial and 
spatial factors. Batty (2014b) argues against the presentation of particular objects in 
 
51 See Macpherson (2011a) for an introduction to different approaches to individuating the senses and see 
Richardson (2013) for discussion of the exteroceptivity of olfaction and its implications for the debate on 
individuating the senses. 
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olfaction because of the alleged lack of figure-ground segregation, so a key argument in 
favour of the abstract view fails. Similar considerations would hold against the feature-
based view prevalent in the olfactory sciences; we have seen that there is good reason to 
think that olfaction involves the experience of discrete structured wholes, rather than 
disjointed properties. However, to assess whether there are olfactory objects, we must 
also determine whether olfaction involves perceptual constancies. 
3.3.3 Olfactory constancies 
In the previous sections, I discussed two ways in which figure-ground segregation is 
exhibited in olfaction. We saw that figure-ground segregation alone, however, is not 
sufficient for the exhibition of particular objects in experience. Perceptual constancies 
must also be exhibited in olfactory experiences for olfaction to meet the criteria for the 
perception of particular objects. For robust object perception, I have claimed, we require 
more than a mere moment-by-moment individuation of odours; we also need these 
odours to retain their identity across change (involving object recognition capacities). In 
chapter 2, I argued contra researchers such as Burge (2009; 2010) that there are 
constancies in our flavour and smell experiences, allowing for the experienced duality to 
perceptual experience posited by the sensorimotor approach. Not only do such 
constancies vindicate this aspect of how the sensorimotor approach construes 
phenomenology, but when alongside figure-ground segregation, they also fulfil the 
criteria for perceptual objecthood. Let us briefly recap this evidence.  
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Firstly, amodal completion occurs in olfaction; we perceptually ‘fill in’ chemical 
substances. We are able to perceive odours as the odour-type that they are, even if they 
are corrupted or missing elements due to poor perceptual conditions (Barnes, Hofacer, 
Zaman, Rennaker, & Wilson, 2008; see Carvalho, 2014 for a discussion of this type of 
constancy). We perceive a coffee odour as a coherent whole, which retains its identity, 
even if the precise odorants that stimulate the nasal cavity don’t include all 600 chemical 
elements that typify a coffee odour. We recognise it as a coffee odour even if the particular 
compounds that we are in contact with vary. It is thought that this is a result of object 
recognition processes (Stevenson, 2011, p. 1892). This is analogous to the sort of visual 
object recognition that allows us to see objects as complete, even though we only have 
direct sensory contact with their facing sides and in cases where they are partially 
occluded. 
A second type of perceptual constancy in olfaction relates to intensity. The size of sniff 
that one takes has a significant effect on the neural response of the olfactory nerve but 
does not result in significant changes to the apparent intensity of an odour (Teghtsoonian 
& Teghtsoonian, 1982). We seem able to perceive an invariant feature of an odour — its 
intensity — even though our perspectives on the world change. This appears to be related 
to an awareness of how one’s own sniffing activity influences the olfactory stimuli that 
reaches the olfactory epithelium. Crucially, when the changes to airflow rate are not 
controlled by the subject, there is no such constancy effect and there is a perceived 
change to odour intensity, highlighting again the importance of bodily activity (here, in 
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terms of the effect of effort expended when sniffing) in olfactory perception (Hahn, 
Scherer, & Mozell, 1994). Olfaction involves constancies, just like the other sensory 
modalities.  
As we have already seen in the previous chapters and section 3.2.2 here, in the cases of 
perceptual constancy exhibited in visual experience, there is generally a kind of duality to 
the phenomenology of the experience. There is a sense in which one tree looks smaller 
than the other, and the plate looks elliptical, but in another more robust sense, the trees 
look the same size and the plate looks round. Could something like this apply to the 
olfactory constancies discussed above? In the case of intensity constancy, it is clear to me 
that it does. There is a sense in which if I take a big sniff of coffee and a small sniff of 
coffee, I can notice that there is, in a way, a different intensity to the experience, but at 
the same time I perceive the coffee odour as having an invariant intensity. Likewise, there 
is a case for something like this applying to olfactory phenomenology regarding amodal 
completion. This type of constancy is analogous to the visual case of seeing an object as 
complete even though we only see its facing side, or it is partially occluded by something. 
In the visual case, there is a sense in which the object appears as a whole object even 
though in another sense we recognise that we only see part of it. Plausibly in the case of 
olfaction, one could recognise that not all of the properties typical of the coffee odour are 
apparent at once (picking out, say, the fruitiness and yet needing to move closer to coffee 
cup to pick out the chocolate notes), and yet still also recognise the coffee odour as 
complete and unified in another sense. As suggested in chapter 2, an expert coffee taster 
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would likely be better at picking out these perspective-dependent olfactory properties, 
just as an experienced artist is better able to pick out the angles and shapes apparent 
from a perspective. The unified coffee odour — like the objective shape of the plate — is 
generally easier to pick out than the particular properties apparent at each moment. 
If we accept the role of tactile stimulation and bodily movement in olfactory 
phenomenology, we can see that olfaction involves both figure-ground segregation and 
perceptual constancies, and thus fulfils the criteria I laid out for a robust type of 
perceptual objecthood. This object-based approach improves upon the abstract and 
feature-based approaches, which usually rely on the claim that olfaction is aspatial and 
can’t exhibit figure-ground effects. With my suggested approach, we can appreciate the 
important ways in which olfaction is similar to other varieties of perception, providing us 
with rich information about the world. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I argued that olfaction allows the perception of discrete objects in the form 
of odours. Figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies are the hallmarks of the 
perception of particular objects, providing individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions. We saw that there is empirical evidence that the Gestalt principles of 
similarity, proximity and good form apply in the case of olfaction, suggesting that there is 
a non-spatial variety of figure-ground segregation exhibited by smell. Additionally, 
however, we saw that olfaction involves a second, spatial type of figure-ground 
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segregation and odours can be experienced in a spatial manner. The figure-ground 
structure and spatiality of olfactory experience is especially evident when we pay 
attention to the role of tactile stimulation and bodily movement in olfactory experience. 
Furthermore, there is empirical and phenomenological evidence of perceptual 
constancies in olfaction, which together with figure-ground segregation, fulfils the criteria 
for a robust kind of perceptual objecthood that goes beyond the weak, abstract notion of 
objecthood or the perception of nebulous features.  
Olfaction may have seemed to present a challenge for the sensorimotor approach since 
it doesn’t appear to allow for the immediate perception of physical objects in the 
environment. We now have a notion of perceptual objecthood, and it is these more diffuse 
odour objects that we access through olfaction. The sensorimotor approach says that our 
skilful sensorimotor attunement allows for the experience of perceptually present wholes 
— and here these wholes are understood as perceptual objects. The approach set out in 
this chapter, drawing upon Gestalt psychology, thus both removes an imposing obstacle 
for a sensorimotor approach to the chemical senses and can help to flesh out the idea of 
perceptual presence (see also section 1.1.3 and chapter 2). Moreover, it also provided a 
methodology for reflecting on the difficult-to-grasp phenomenology of olfaction. In the 
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4. Extending object concepts to flavour perception 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter argues that flavour perception, like olfaction, allows for the experience of 
discrete perceptual objects. I survey the empirical and phenomenological evidence for 
flavour fulfilling the conditions on objecthood. Some unique challenges emerge, with 
researchers questioning whether anything could constitute a ‘background’ (which may be 
required for figure-ground assignments) in flavour experience.  
This is how we shall proceed. In 4.1, I explore initial motivations for applying object 
concepts in the case of flavour perception and investigate what (if anything) the 
immediate perceptual objects of flavour perception would be. We have seen that the 
relevant objects of olfaction are odours rather than everyday objects like roses and 
rubbish bins. Here I argue that there are analogous reasons to take the immediate objects 
of flavour perception to be flavours rather than everyday objects like bananas and 
chocolates. In 4.2 I consider whether flavour experiences exhibit figure-ground effects —
a necessary condition on object perception. I argue that the phenomenon of oral referral 
provides persuasive evidence for perceptual grouping and figure-ground segregation in 
flavour perception. Congruent olfactory and gustatory stimuli are generally experienced 
together as gestalt, spatially located flavours rather than distinct sensations. I also 
respond to a worry that there isn’t anything that could count as the relevant background 
in many typical tasting experiences. Finally, in 4.3 I explore the ways in which bodily 
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activity and implicit sensorimotor expectancies are involved in the perception of flavour 
objects as objective aspects of the world. Skill-laden bodily movement gives rise to 
perceptual constancies in flavour. This allows us to access overarching, objective flavours 
even in imperfect perceptual conditions and through limitations to our immediate sensory 
stimulation.  
4.1 Putative flavour objects 
Flavour perception is underpinned by a wide variety of stimuli and sensory processes (for 
detailed overviews, see Delwiche, 2004; Spence, Smith, & Auvray, 2014; Smith, 2015a). It 
involves the tongue-based gustatory system, retronasal olfaction, and tactile and 
trigeminal somatosensation. The gustatory system enables the detection of the five ‘basic’ 
tastes — sweet, sour, bitter, salty and umami.52 Retronasal olfaction involves volatile 
molecules rising up through the nasopharynx via the mouth, and in combination with the 
‘basic’ tastes, this allows for the perception of flavours such as ‘chocolate’ or ‘banana’. 
Psychophysical research has suggested that odours that have previously been identified 
orthonasally are not automatically identifiable retronasally (Rozin, 1982). Flavour appears 
 
52 Some researchers have suggested that fat (Gilbertson, Fontenot, Liu, Zhang, & Monroe, 1997) and 
metallic are additional basic tastes, with some arguing that there may be twenty or more such tastes (e.g. 
see Stuckey, 2012, Ch. 13). However, this is controversial because, for example, fat may serve as a 
flavourant, which merely modulates other taste qualities (see e.g. Mattes, 2010 for discussion) and metallic 
taste experiences are partly due to olfactory stimulation (e.g. Hettinger, Myers, & Frank, 1990). Others are 
sceptical of the concept of basic tastes, and question whether the term meaningfully refers to anything at 
all (Delwiche, 1996; Erickson, 2008; Spence, Smith, & Auvray, 2014). 
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to be phenomenologically distinct from a mere conjunction of olfactory and gustatory 
stimuli.  
Tactile and trigeminal somatosensation also play a significant role in flavour perception. 
Many ingredients trigger trigeminal stimulation, which involves the kind of chemical 
irritation and nociception evident when we eat hot chillies, menthol, wasabi and spices. 
This trigeminal sensation is an integral part of many flavour experiences, from spicy curry 
to minty chewing gum. Tactile somatosensory cues in the mouth provide information 
regarding food texture. For example, it is tactile stimulation that is responsible for our 
perception of chewiness (e.g. see Delwiche, 2004) and the experience of the astringency 
of a tannic red wine (Breslin, Gilmore, Beauchamp, & Green, 1993). Tastants also induce 
thermal sensations on the tongue. The temperature of a meal can make the food taste 
better or worse (the majority of people wouldn’t enjoy warm lemonade or lager, or most 
varieties of soup served cold), and temperature often accentuates other aspects of flavour 
(see Lemon, 2017 for a review of the ways temperature modulates taste). One study 
showed that increasing the serving temperature of Cheddar cheese augmented its 
perceived sourness (Drake, Yates, & Gerard, 2005). Similarly, perceived sweetness tends 
to increase as a food or drink is warmed, as is exemplified in the cloying sweetness of 
melted ice cream (Green & Frankmann, 1988).  
Despite the varied sensory processes that underpin flavour perception, we seemingly 
experience unified overall flavours (see also chapter 2). Rather than merely experiencing 
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transient sensations, flavour plausibly involves a kind of perceptual grouping. For 
example, the experience of eating a tomato seems to give rise to a singular tomato 
flavour, and we can recognise other instances of this type of flavour when we eat other 
tomatoes (or tomato soup, ketchup, etc.). This provides a prima facie motivation for using 
object concepts in the case of flavour. Small and Green (2011, Section 36.1) assert that, 
in the case of flavour, ‘though the resulting perception depends on inputs from multiple 
sensory modalities, it is experienced as a unitary percept of a food or beverage’, which 
they describe as a ‘coherent “flavour object”’. According to Auvray and Spence, ‘[T]he act 
of eating allows the different qualities of an object to be combined into a whole percept’ 
(2008, p. 1027). Delwiche (2004) asserts, ‘[W]hen eating or drinking, or even smoking … 
it is the gestalt (or whole) of this overall experience that is of interest to those eating, 
drinking, and cooking...’ (p. 137). These alleged gestalts or unitary percepts offer an initial 
motivation for believing that flavour perception involves individuated perceptual objects. 
It is plausible that we experience unified flavour objects that instantiate properties such 
as sweetness, tanginess, and ‘citrusyness’. However, as we have seen, there are 
constraints upon the notion of objecthood; to count as perceptual objects, these flavour 
experiences must involve figure-ground assignments, allowing for object individuation, 
and perceptual constancies, allowing for object recognition.  
Before investigating whether flavour perception meets these criteria in 4.2, let us consider 
what (if anything) the immediate perceptual objects would be in the case of flavour. We 
have seen that in olfaction, the relevant perceptual objects are odours (see discussion of 
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the ‘odour view’ in chapters 1 and 3). Recall, there were a number of reasons for this. As 
has been discussed by various researchers (e.g. see Lycan, 1996; Batty, 2010a; Richardson, 
2013; Young, 2016), taking the relevant perceptual objects to be odours makes best sense 
of olfactory accuracy conditions. For example, odours can be produced artificially. If 
someone detects an artificial rose odour, it doesn’t seem that their perception is non-
veridical because of the lack of an actual rose. They accurately perceive the rose odour. 
Additionally, odours can perdure temporally even in the absence of a source object. The 
odour of mouldy food may remain even when the mouldy food has been disposed of or 
destroyed. Again, there is nothing non-veridical about perceiving the odour, despite the 
absence of the original source object.53 A further reason for endorsing the odour view 
should have become apparent throughout the previous chapter: it is odours rather than 
source objects that are subject to olfactory figure-ground effects and constancies. 
By analogy with the olfactory case, there are two key candidates for perceptual objects in 
flavour perception. One possibility is that these objects are everyday objects — tomatoes, 
bananas, chocolate bars. Another possibility is that they are flavours within the food. 
There are reasons to endorse this second option. Although these parallels have not yet 
(to the best of my knowledge) been addressed in the literature, a number of the same 
considerations apply to flavour perception as they do to olfaction. First, akin to the 
 
53 What would be non-veridical would be the perception of a mouldy food odour when there is no such 
odour or experiencing the odour as having different properties to those that it actually has. For discussion 
of non-veridical experience in the chemical senses see 7.2.1. 
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argument regarding artificial odours, many flavours can be produced artificially. Just as 
smelling an artificial rose odour is not a non-veridical experience, tasting an artificial 
flavour isn’t non-veridical either. Isoamyl acetate is a compound that is found naturally in 
bananas. However, it is also produced synthetically and confers a banana-like flavour. If 
someone consumes isoamyl acetate and perceives a banana flavour, it doesn’t seem that 
they are having a non-veridical experience despite a lack of actual bananas. Rather, the 
subject would seem to be accurately perceiving a banana flavour.54  
Secondly, there are also parallels to the argument regarding odours persisting in the 
absence of a source object. Although it is less immediately apparent than in the olfactory 
case, flavours too can persist in the absence of an everyday object. Much of the 
perception of flavour occurs after swallowing, when volatile molecules are released into 
the throat and reach the olfactory epithelium retronasally. Directly paralleling the 
orthonasal olfactory case, these volatile chemicals are separate from the everyday objects 
that give rise to them. Volatile molecules are not ordinary objects like bananas and 
chocolates, and they are no longer detectable through other senses such as vision or 
touch. If such an argument shows that odours, and not source objects, are the perceptual 
objects of olfaction (as in e.g. Batty, 2010a; Richardson, 2013; Young, 2016), the same 
reasoning must be extended to flavour perception. Moreover, in the case of flavour, 
 
54 This idea seems increasingly pertinent as imitation meats and dairy replacement products become more 
popular and more closely resemble the items they are based upon. If a veggie burger accurately replicates 
the taste of beef, the taster isn’t wrong to perceive a beef-like flavour, even if the burger is actually made 
from soy protein. The manufacturers have likely gone to great lengths to replicate a specific taste. 
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questions arise as to whether an everyday food object even retains its identity once the 
tasting process has begun. Food is transformed through chewing into a soft bolus and 
eventually as more saliva is added, a more fluid mash (see Shepherd, 2016, chapter 5). It 
isn’t clear whether the ordinary object’s identity is retained through these 
transformations, and it is only through such changes that we fully experience flavour. If 
the volatile molecules and the transformed substances that allow for flavour perception 
are not ordinary objects, then ordinary physical objects cannot be the immediate object 
of flavour perception.  
For analogous reasons to the olfactory case, we must conclude that everyday objects like 
bananas and chocolate bars are not the immediate objects of flavour perception; it isn’t 
everyday objects that are perceptually parcelled up into discrete objects via the activity 
of tasting. Instead, flavours can perdure over time, even as the everyday object is 
transformed and/or swallowed. Few have presented realist approaches to flavour, but 
Smith (e.g. 2007, 2013b) is a notable exception. With his proposed account, tastes are 
objective features of food and beverages that can be uncovered through perceptual 
exploration. According to Smith, ‘The term flavour does not describe a construct of the 
brain, but it is a technical term used to describe the sapid and odourous properties of a 
solid or liquid, including properties of its temperature and texture, as well as the power 
to irritate the trigeminal nerve’ (2013b, p. 310). I am in agreement with Smith’s account 
of flavours as objective aspects of the world to be discovered, and in what follows I offer 
arguments in favour of such an approach. However, with my proposed account, I add that 
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flavours are not only properties of food and wine, but also discrete property-bearing 
perceptual objects in their own right (much like sounds and smells). The act of tasting 
involves parsing the perceptual landscape into discrete flavours. 
Also analogous to the olfactory case, this is not to say that we couldn’t also, more 
indirectly perceive foods and beverages through the act of perceiving flavours (see Lycan, 
1996 for the application of such an approach to olfaction). A layered approach to 
perceptual representation is compatible with the account set out here. However, if the 
act of tasting allows us to immediately experience perceptual objects at all, these 
perceptual objects (which pop out as figures and exhibit constancies) are flavours.  
4.2 Figure-ground segregation and perceptual grouping in flavour 
Figure-ground segregation is a necessary condition of perceptual objecthood. It is how 
objects are perceptually individuated from one another and elucidates the notion of an 
object’s boundaries in a non-visuocentric manner. Do flavour experiences exhibit these 
kinds of figure-ground effects? This issue has received little attention in the literature 
(however, see discussions in Stevenson, 2014, p. 1373; Spence & Youssef, 2016; Roque, 
Auvray, & Lafraire, 2018, pp. 4–5). Here I suggest that, as in the olfactory case, there is 
evidence of Gestalt grouping principles applying to flavour perception. However, flavour 
perception presents some unique difficulties as it has been argued that there is nothing 
that could count as a background against which flavour objects are perceived. 
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Intuitively, we can detect and individuate different flavours through the act of tasting. 
Here I suggest that the phenomenon of oral referral provides evidence of figure-ground 
effects. Oral referral is the apparent mislocalisation of olfactory stimuli to the oral cavity 
(see Spence, 2016 for overview). Much of our experience of flavour is underpinned by 
retronasal olfaction, where volatile molecules released from the food are pumped 
towards the olfactory epithelium throughout the savouring process. Yet, we don’t 
experience these sensations in our noses, but rather in our mouths — where the food is. 
And as noted above, the experience of flavour involves a blending of retronasal olfactory, 
somatosensory and gustatory tongue-based sensations, resulting in a unified flavour 
experience spatially located in the mouth. The spatiality of this experience leaves room 
for a kind of spatial figure-ground segregation in flavour perception. The spatial 
boundaries of flavours may be less clear than in visual case, but we need not hold the 
chemical senses to visuo-centric standards.  
As regards the blending of somatosensory and gustatory sensations, researchers have 
argued that the common location in the mouth and the common timing of the sensations 
is likely sufficient for binding them together (see Stevenson, 2012). More controversial is 
the question of which factors modulate the oral referral of olfactory stimuli to the mouth 
(for reviews see Stevenson, 2012; Spence, 2016). Traditionally, the prevailing hypothesis 
was that oral somatosensory stimulation induces the referral of the olfactory stimulation 
to the mouth (Murphy & Cain, 1980; Rozin, 1982), but later studies have conflicted with 
these results (Lim & Johnson, 2011; Lim & Johnson, 2012). Other researchers suggest that 
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temporal synchrony plays an important role, as is typically the case in cross-modal binding 
across the senses (see Stevenson, 2012). Von Békésy (1964) presented evidence to 
support this claim, which demonstrated that the onset times of stimuli alters the 
perceived location of the flavour. According to this research, manipulating the onset times 
of the odour/taste components of a mixture can change the perceived spatial location of 
the resultant percept. The mixture is perceived as being on the tip of the nose if the 
olfactory stimuli precede the gustatory stimuli, but it is perceived as being in the mouth if 
stimuli are presented simultaneously. More research is required here, however, since 
these results have not been replicated and few methodological details of this study were 
given. 
More recently, research into oral referral has demonstrated convincingly that the 
congruence of the olfactory and gustatory stimuli plays an important role in modulating 
oral referral (Lim & Johnson, 2011; Lim & Johnson, 2012). Congruent combinations of 
stimuli are defined as those that commonly appear alongside one another, and are highly 
associated with one another (2012, p. 516). In the first round of experiments (2011), Lim 
and Johnson, used a pipette to place a tastant onto subjects’ tongues as they inhaled an 
odorant retronasally.55 Congruent combinations, such as a vanilla odorant experienced 
alongside a sweet taste solution or a soy sauce odorant with a salty taste solution, gave 
rise to more cases of oral referral than incongruent combinations (vanilla with salt or soy 
 
55 Retronasal olfaction was achieved by inhaling through a straw and exhaling through the nose. 
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sauce with sweet). Giving a subject a tasteless liquid along with an odorant didn’t have an 
effect on whether there would be a referral when compared to retronasally inhaling an 
odour alone without the accompanying liquid. Comparable results were found in further 
studies (2012) that aimed to replicate more normal tasting conditions by giving subjects 
a gelatine disc, which either contained a tastant or was flavourless, rather than pipetting 
a liquid. Tasteless discs experienced along with odorants showed no more referral than 
cases in which an odorant was inhaled by itself without the disc. These studies suggest, 
contra Murphy and Cain (1980) and Rozin (1982), that oral somatosensory stimulation in 
and of itself doesn’t induce oral referral. Rather, the congruence of odorants and tastants 
makes it more likely that a unified, spatially located flavour will be perceived.  
Several studies also emphasise the role of cross-modal congruency in the enhancement 
of stimuli. In particular, odours like strawberry or vanilla that are congruent with sweet 
tastants are known to enhance the perceived sweetness (Frank & Byram, 1988; Frank, 
Shaffer, & Smith, 1991). The combination of a strawberry odour and a sucrose solution is 
perceived as sweeter than a sucrose solution alone.56 It has also been suggested that 
congruency may aid in the detection of stimuli. Weak tastes and smells might alone each 
be subthreshold for detection but can be sensed together if they are congruent (Dalton, 
Doolittle, Nagata, & Breslin, 2000; Breslin, Doolittle, & Dalton, 2001; however, see 
Delwiche & Heffelfinger, 2005 for conflicting results). This further confirms that taste and 
 
56 Conversely, such ‘sweet’ odours can also reduce the perceived sourness of tastants like citric acid 
(Stevenson, Prescott, & Boakes, 1999). 
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smell are integrated in the congruent cases (see also chapter 5 for how related evidence 
supports multisensory objects). 
The overarching principle of Prägnanz or good form says that harmoniously connected 
elements are more likely to be grouped together, and this appears to occur with the 
integration of retronasal olfactory and gustatory stimulation. Oral referral and taste 
enhancement show that congruent stimuli tend to be perceptually grouped, and this 
congruence intuitively exemplifies a kind of harmonious connection or prägnanz.57 
Interestingly, which combinations of stimuli count as congruent appears to be culturally 
relative. In Western society, almond odours are generally most associated with sweet 
tastes, while in Japan they are associated with umami. This is reflected in which tastes are 
enhanced by almond odours for Western and Japanese subjects (Breslin, Doolittle, & 
Dalton, 2001).58 Which items are meaningfully related may differ among perceivers (see 
chapter 6 for detailed discussion of how learning and memories can impact object 
perception). 
Even aside from oral referral and sweetness enhancement, there is an intuitive sense in 
which the principle of Prägnanz applies. It is phenomenologically evident that foods and 
beverages can be composed in harmonious ways, resulting in a more cohesive flavour 
experience. In a well-balanced wine, the tannins, acidity, sweetness, and alcohol are all 
 
57 See also Spence & Youssef (2016) for a related discussion of how the phenomenon of emergence occurs 
in flavour perception. 
58 A number of researchers have taken odour-taste congruency to arise from associative learning (see Small 
& Prescott, 2005 for review).  
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incorporated in such a way that no one component stands out. This allows for a more 
coherent, gestalt flavour. This would seem to be a plausible manifestation of the principle 
of Prägnanz, suggesting that grouping occurs in flavour perception, as with the other 
senses. 
The principle of Prägnanz is an overarching principle under which the other Gestalt 
principles are subsumed. More specific grouping principles such as the principles of 
similarity and proximity also seem applicable. The principle of similarity states that 
elements tend to be grouped together if they are similar to each other. The congruence 
of odours and tastes has been expressed in terms of the perceived similarity of stimuli, 
since odours are often experienced as having taste-like qualities (e.g. Stevenson & Boakes, 
2004). For example, odours like strawberry and vanilla are often described as ‘sweet’, 
even though strictly speaking sweetness is a gustatory property. If we understand 
congruence in terms of similarity, grouping into a spatially located, unified percept (i.e. 
oral referral) can be said to be more likely where stimuli are more perceptually similar to 
one another.  
The Gestalt law of proximity tells us that sensations that are (spatially or temporally) 
proximate are more likely to be grouped together into a single percept. As mentioned 
above, with regard to the gustatory and tactile aspects of flavour, both the common 
location in the mouth and the common timing of stimulation likely play a role in the 
experience of them as bound together (Stevenson, 2012). This suggests that both spatial 
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and temporal versions of the Gestalt law of proximity are in operation. Moreover, while 
there is not sufficient empirical research to draw conclusive results, temporal synchrony 
(along with the congruence of the relevant stimuli) may also modulate the referral of 
olfactory stimuli (as in, e.g. von Békésy, 1964; see also Pfeiffer, Hollowood, Hort, & Taylor 
2005 for further suggestive support). The way that gustatory and olfactory stimuli 
temporally unfold plausibly impacts whether such stimuli are grouped into a unified 
flavour. 
On the basis of the above discussion, various Gestalt principles guide groupings in flavour 
perception. This provides evidence — as in the olfactory case — that figure-ground 
segregation occurs in flavour perception. The unified and spatially located flavours that 
we experience are plausibly individuated figures.  
4.2.1 A potential problem 
Despite the evidence for grouping and segregation in flavour perception, there is a 
potential problem. Flavour perception may not allow for figure-ground segregation due 
to lacking a suitable background. If so, flavour perception fails to meet the criteria for 
perceptual objecthood. 
Stevenson (2014, p. 1373) argues that flavour perception (unlike olfaction, in his view) 
fails to exhibit figure-ground segregation. He thinks that in vision, audition and orthonasal 
olfaction it is evident that there is both a figure and a background. For example, we smell 
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the coffee odour against the background of cakes and air-freshener. Yet in Stevenson’s 
view, there is no readily apparent background in the case of flavour perception. He 
considers whether eating multiple foods together in a meal might allow for figure-ground 
segregation, suggesting that it is possible that ‘the combinations placed in the mouth all 
reflect several viable flavor objects that can each be perceived individually, with the 
others forming the background (e.g., with a mouthful of pheasant, roasted parsnip, and 
leek; the “pheasant” object with the “parsnip and leek” background)’ (p. 1373). However, 
he quickly rejects this idea because meals with multiple ingredients ‘may not represent 
the type of diet that the flavor system evolved to deal with (i.e., relatively few food types 
eaten to repletion…. It would appear then that there may be no background to experience 
a flavor object “against.”’ (p. 1373).59 When tasting a tomato, is there a background to 
this experience? 
Stevenson also points out that a primary reason for perceiving objects is to enable the 
rapid detection and identification of complex environmental information (p. 1374). Yet, 
we generally identify foods through vision and orthonasal olfaction prior to tasting them, 
and thus, we have little need to detect or identify objects through flavour perception. 
Experiencing perceptual objects through flavour may carry an unnecessary cognitive cost. 
This worry may, at first glance, carry a contentious assumption that we experience the 
 
59 Here I won’t address the evolutionary aspects of Stevenson’s worries in detail. However, it is worth noting 
that object perception in flavour could have simply occurred through a happy accident, without a need for 
a clear evolutionary rationale. In any case, there is still a legitimate concern about whether flavours are 
usually experienced against a background. 
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same perceptual objects via these different senses. While odours can carry information 
about source objects, the immediate perceptual object is the odour (the tomato odour), 
and the immediate perceptual object of vision is the everyday object (the tomato). In the 
previous section, I argued that for similar reasons to the olfactory case, we ought to regard 
the immediate objects of flavour perception to be flavours. However, the argument 
remains that there may be no added benefit to experiencing flavours as individuated 
perceptual objects (rather than, say, ephemeral sensations or disjointed properties) if 
sufficient ecological information has already been obtained prior to tasting.  
In response to this concern, it is worth noting that even if foods are identified before 
tasting them, it may still be useful to perceive gestalt, individuated flavour objects. One 
reason for this is that we can be mistaken about what the food in question is or what its 
properties are. Similar-looking foods may have very different properties, which can be 
revealed through flavour perception. For example, poisonous Canadian moonseed berries 
closely resemble edible wild grapes in appearance and would be difficult to distinguish by 
sight. However, the moonseed berries reportedly taste very bad (e.g. Tyler, 1980, p. 119), 
which would provide a valuable clue that they ought not to be eaten. Specific aspects of 
flavour are likely to serve further functions. For example, tasting is very useful for 
assessing whether a food has gone off or is fresh (see Roque, Auvray, & Lafraire, 2018 for 
discussion of the functions of freshness perception). Even if a food is identified before 
tasting, we can still learn ecologically important information about it through the 
perception of flavours.  
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Stevenson’s question about whether there is anything that could serve as a background 
against which we perceive perceptual objects in flavour perception is potentially more 
serious. If flavours do not involve figure-ground segregation, then such experiences will 
fail the criteria for perceptual objecthood.  
As an initial point in favour of flavour exhibiting a figure-ground structure, Stevenson’s 
own example of tasting different ingredients in a dish (2014, p. 1373) is quite a plausible 
case of figure-ground segregation, even though he himself ultimately rejects it. Intuitively, 
we can segregate flavours from one another when tasting complex combinations of food 
and pick out the flavour of one food. Plausibly our attention selects a putative flavour 
object and everything else is relegated to background. As in vision, we can shift our 
attention, altering what counts as figure and what counts as background. One might focus 
on the pheasant with the leek and parsnip as background, but then shift their attention 
to the parsnip flavour, shifting the pheasant to background along with the leek. The 
background will be relatively homogenous, less determinate and perceived as in some 
sense ‘behind’ the figure. There is a worry about this kind of example, however. We don’t 
always eat foods with multiple ingredients. This raises a phenomenological issue for 
accounts of figure-ground segregation in flavour. If someone tastes a single food by itself, 
there isn’t an obvious background to the figure like there is in the multi-ingredient case. 
The flavour of a tomato seems unified, but it isn’t prima facie clear that there is a 
background to the experience if it is the only thing being tasted. 
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However, in response to the worry about tasting a single flavour alone, it isn’t clear that 
there needs to be another flavour or set of flavours for figure-ground segregation to 
occur. In fact, placing these kinds of restraints upon figure-ground segregation would rule 
out many paradigmatic instances of figure-ground segregation across the senses. A clear 
palate — an absence of stimuli — may also be able to serve as a background. There is a 
precedent for this as researchers, focusing on other sense modalities, have endorsed the 
idea that we can in fact perceive absences60 and that such absences can serve as 
backgrounds to perceptual objects. Martin (1993) uses the example of a visual perception 
of a Polo mint to highlight this:  
One experiences not only the white parts of the mint, but also the hole in the 
middle and the area around its outer edge. In order to see the mint as a ring-shape, 
one needs to distinguish the figure from the ground, but the ground here need be 
no more than the empty space around the object. (p. 214). 
Similarly, Gurwitsch (1964/2010) asserts that auditory stillness is ‘the experience of an 
auditory background par excellence out of which sounds emerge and into which they 
relapse’ (p. 109). With such an account, being in a silent room and hearing a sudden bang, 
would be a paradigmatic case of figure-ground segregation. He takes this kind of auditory 
example to be analogous to the visual case of illuminated points arising out of a 
background of darkness. Similarly, we may perceive a single odour in an otherwise odour-
free environment. Figure-ground segregation is a necessary condition on objecthood, and 
 
60 For positive accounts of absence perception in vision see also Richardson, 2010; Soteriou, 2011. For 
discussion of absence perception in olfaction see Roberts, 2015; Todd, 2018. See Mac Cumhaill, 2017 for 
discussion of whether empty space can serve as a background in tactile perception.  
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it would be counter-intuitive for sounds and odours to only count as perceptual objects 
when occurring alongside other sounds and odours. Likewise, an account of objecthood 
shouldn’t exclude visible figures that happen to be emerging from darkness rather than 
being in a fully illuminated setting. The same can be said of the perception of flavours. To 
avoid arbitrary constraints upon perceptual objecthood, we must concede that a clear 
palate, an odour-free environment, a silent room, and empty space or darkness can serve 
as backgrounds in experience. Figures must be contrasted with something, but they can 
be contrasted with emptiness.  
The problems posed by Stevenson (2014) for figure-ground segregation in flavour 
perception are unconvincing. The worry about flavours lacking a relevant background can 
be extended to many paradigmatic examples of figure-ground segregation in vision and 
audition, suggesting it isn’t a genuine problem at all. A flavour can pop out in experience 
both against other flavours and against a clear palate. They are perceived as unified 
individuals, which exhibit many of the usual hallmarks of figure-ground segregation. Many 
distinct types of stimuli are grouped together into spatially located flavour gestalts 
through oral referral mechanisms, and we have seen that a number of Gestalt grouping 
principles plausibly apply in flavour perception. Proximity and similarity of stimuli makes 
it more likely that odours and tastes will be unified into a gestalt flavour. Likewise, 
harmonious combinations of ingredients are also more likely to result in this kind of 
unified and spatially situated flavour experience, manifesting the law of Prägnanz.  
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4.3 Sensorimotor activity and perceptual constancies in flavour 
With the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experience is constituted by a skilful 
attunement to sensorimotor contingencies. Through this attunement we can perceive 
invariant, objective aspects of the environment. Perceptual objects are more than mere 
transient sensations; they are objective entities we can access amid changing sensory 
stimulation. As argued in the previous chapter, perceptual constancies are a necessary 
condition on perceptual objecthood. We have seen that they underpin various object 
recognition abilities, which are generally taken to be a crucial aspect of object perception. 
Perceiving constant properties of objects allows for object categorisation, reidentification 
of the objects in changing conditions, amodal completion, and perceiving them as 
persisting through time. Building on the discussion in 2.2.2, I argue that sensorimotor 
activity enables us to uncover constancies in flavour perception, and that thus, flavours 
fulfil the criteria (figure-ground segregation and constancies) for perceptual objecthood. 
Across the senses, we often experience properties as constant despite variations in 
perceptual conditions and amid sensory changes. According to the sensorimotor 
approach, this is due to an understanding of how one’s bodily movements induce the 
variations in sensory stimulation that we come to perceive the invariant properties of 
things. Various types of perceptual constancy are evident in flavour perception, providing 
reason to treat flavours as objective, non-perspectival aspects of the world.  
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4.3.1 Flavour constancy amid gappy and changing stimulation 
Tasting food involves highly complex bodily activity, involving the manipulation of the jaw, 
tongue, lips, cheeks and muscles in the neck. Such oral movements are crucial in the 
release of flavour compounds from foods (for reviews see Salles, et al., 2010; Foster, et 
al., 2011). For example, the perception of almost all flavour and mouth-feel attributes 
requires a degree of tongue movement (de Wijk, Engelen, & Prinz, 2003). Retronasal 
olfaction also involves complex bodily activity, and it has been suggested that mouth 
movements enable retronasal olfaction in a manner analogous to how the sniff enables 
orthonasal olfaction (Burdach & Doty, 1987). As one engages in the dynamic process of 
tasting, the border between the soft palate and the tongue (velum-tongue border) 
alternately opens and closes. When it opens, retronasal olfaction can occur. Less solid 
foods (and beverages) result in the velum-tongue border opening less, but also induce a 
higher rate of swallowing which then instigates an aroma burst to the olfactory 
epithelium. Retronasal olfaction is under a degree of voluntary control and can be 
deliberately augmented with certain types of activity. For example, wine-tasters are able 
to keep open the velum-tongue border to boost the stimuli that reach the olfactory 
epithelium (Salles, et al., 2010). This is achievable by taking only a small amount of wine 
into the mouth and deliberately inhaling air through the lips and/or by bending the head 
forwards while inhaling so liquid doesn’t flow into the pharynx.  
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Retronasal stimulation occurs when the velum-tongue border is open, but this border is 
only open periodically (Salles, et al., 2010). It usually opens when food is first placed in the 
mouth (Buettner, Beer, Hannig, Settles, & Schieberle, 2002), but it is generally closed 
when chewing and swallowing, for example. So, one might expect flavour experience to 
be punctuated with gaps, where we only experience gustatory and tactile stimulation and 
not the richer flavours (tomato, chocolate, etc.) of things. However, we do not experience 
such lapses. This is comparable to the way we don’t generally notice the lack of visual 
stimulation when we blink or experience continuous perturbations as our eyes saccade. 
We see the stable world before us, and likewise we taste the stable flavour of tomato. 
With the sensorimotor approach, this is unsurprising: visual perception occurs through 
such bodily activity, rather than despite it (see O'Regan & Noë, 2001b, p. 92). Similarly, it 
is through the periodic opening and shutting of the velum-tongue border as we chew and 
swallow food that we experience flavours; it is part of the normal machinery we use to 
sample and explore flavours.  
We are subject to a wide variety of different types of sensory stimulation as we engage in 
the activity of tasting, but we rarely notice corresponding variations in flavour. As noted, 
we generally seem to perceive a flavour in a gestalt manner; it pops out against other 
flavours (or a clear palate) and is experienced as unified. We perceive the flavour of, say, 
tomato as in some sense unchanged throughout the process of eating, and in different 
circumstances. According to the sensorimotor approach, this is explained by our 
attunement to the way that bodily activity induces sensory changes. We are sensitive to 
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how tongue movements, chewing and swallowing induce give us access to different 
aspects of flavours. Exhalation after swallowing gives rise to significant retronasal 
stimulation, for example. It is because of an implicit understanding of how to induce 
different ephemeral sensations that we are able to experience the whole overarching 
flavour. We never access all parts of a tomato flavour at once, just as we don’t visually 
access all parts of a tomato at once. Yet all parts of the perceptual object are accessible 
(through wide-ranging tasting activity), and it is because of this that we experience these 
objects as complete and real parts of the world to be discovered.  
As discussed in chapter 2, another example is that we experience the intensity of flavours 
as constant, despite there also being a perspectival sense in which flavour intensity varies. 
Theunissen and Kroeze (1996) found that although mouth movements impact the amount 
of sensory stimulation induced by tasting, the rate of these movements does not affect 
the perceived intensity of the flavour (although as argued in chapter 2, I think there is still 
a sense in which we can also experience the varying perspectival intensity levels). They 
suggest that this phenomenon may be analogous to how the intensity of a sniff does not 
affect the perceived intensity of the odour (Teghtsoonian & Teghtsoonian, 1982; see 
chapter 3). These results are consonant with the sensorimotor approach, which would 
predict that when mouth movements are under the control of the subject, properties of 
the perceptual object(s) would be experienced as relatively constant. We recognise how 
our own bodily activity induces certain kinds of sensory changes, and don’t attribute those 
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changes to the object itself. In the case of tasting, we have implicit expectancies about 
how increased mouth movement will result in an increase of sensory stimulation. 
4.3.2 Expectations and constancies 
Perception is a skill and, according to the sensorimotor approach, it requires implicit 
sensorimotor understanding of how bodily activity will alter the kinds of sensory 
stimulation we receive. With this ability, one can perceive unified flavour objects of 
particular intensities, and so on. As we saw in section 4.2, congruent combinations of 
olfactory and gustatory stimuli are more likely to be perceived as unified and spatially 
located in the mouth. These combinations are familiar and mimic common food sources 
(for example, a citral aroma with sucrose and citric acid was said to taste like a lemon 
gelatin dessert) (Lim & Johnson, 2012). A sensorimotor approach can explain this in terms 
of a subject’s implicit sensorimotor expectations. In the case of congruent, familiar 
combinations, the subject has already developed an attunement to how the stimuli unfold 
through the act of tasting. This enables the experience of a unified flavour in the mouth. 
This attunement is plausibly disrupted, on the other hand, when incongruent stimuli are 
presented. In the incongruent case, it is more likely that the subject will merely experience 
an array of disjointed sensations.  
As also discussed in chapter 2, manipulating a subject’s expectations can also cause 
interesting constancy-based effects. Anything that we know about a food or beverage, 
based on visual and olfactory cues for example, can shape our flavour expectations (for a 
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review of the role of expectations in flavour perception see Piqueras-Fiszman & Spence, 
2015). Woods et al. (2010) showed that an expectation that two samples of drink are the 
same — inferred from the two (different) drinks being poured from the same jug — results 
in the samples being perceived as more similar. An expectation of homogenous taste can 
result in a kind of flavour constancy. We don’t get much information about a drink’s 
flavour from a single sip, but our background knowledge facilitates the perception of a 
unified flavour despite our sensory limitations. Researchers have further suggested that 
expectations that arise from the first sip or bite of a food also serve to induce a kind of 
perceptual constancy (Dijksterhuis, Boucon, & Le Berre, 2014).61 These kinds of 
expectations would seem to be on a continuum with sensorimotor expectations, 
influencing our attunement to sensorimotor contingencies and our ability to perceptually 
interact with objects in the world.  
One the basis of the evidence surveyed, flavours are experienced as constant amid gappy 
and changing sensory stimulation. Perceptual constancies are necessary for objecthood 
and are tied to our experience of objects as perceptually present: they are experienced as 
whole, worldly entities even though our sensory contact with them is limited. The 
phenomenology of perceptual experience outstrips current sensory contact with 
perceived objects. We experience a tomato as round even though we don’t immediately 
 
61 This study found that a salty first bite of a food resulted in increased salt perception of the remainder of 
the tasting experience. Understanding flavour constancies may have important implications for consumers’ 
health (by allowing for salt-reduction, for example).  
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see the back of it. Likewise, we experience a flavour as a unified gestalt, even though we 
only access certain aspects of a flavour at any one time and sensory stimulation is gappy. 
Tomato flavours, like tomatoes, are experienced as constant and perceptually present 
objects because of our attunement to the way our activity induces different kinds of 
sensory stimulation. Because of these constancies we experience coherent flavours that 
can be recognised and reidentified in future.  
This chapter argued that flavours pop out in experience as unified perceptual objects. 
Gestalt grouping principles apply to flavour perception, providing evidence that tasting 
involves the same kinds of spontaneous perceptual groupings and segregations seen 
across the sense modalities. Thus, there are empirical and phenomenological reasons for 
taking flavours to be experienced as figures, and I further argued these figures may be 
perceived against the background of either other flavours or a clear palate. We also saw 
that flavour perception involves the experience of whole, perceptually present entities 
amid gappy and transient sensory stimulation. Constancies in flavour perception appear 
to operate in analogous ways to visual constancies. To the extent that the sensorimotor 
approach provides a good explanation of our ability to perceive whole, constant entities 
amid change in vision, it also does so in flavour perception.  
Flavours fulfil the criteria for perceptual objecthood, and we ought to take them to be 
objective aspects of the world to be uncovered. In the next chapter, I explore whether the 
chemical senses are involved in multisensory object perception.  
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5. Flavour, smell and multisensory objects 
5.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we saw that there is good reason to apply object concepts to 
both smell and flavour perception. Views diverge, however, about whether the chemical 
senses allow for multisensory perceptual objects. It is often held that there is something 
peculiarly multisensory about flavour perception. Yet it remains controversial whether it 
really involves multiple distinct sense modalities rather than a single, unified flavour 
sense. Likewise, standpoints conflict about whether retronasal and orthonasal olfaction 
constitute two separate senses of smell and how we should understand the relationship 
between flavour and smell and between these senses and other senses like vision and 
audition. The account of perceptual objecthood outlined in the previous chapters sets 
certain constraints on which perceptual episodes can be deemed to involve perceptual 
objects. It thus provides the tools to answer these questions about multisensory 
objecthood in the chemical senses. 
Three main questions will be addressed in this chapter. (1) First, it is often claimed that 
flavour encompasses a variety of different senses such as taste, touch and smell, and as 
seen in the previous chapters, smell also involves tactile and trigeminal stimulation. Thus, 
the question arises as to whether flavour and smell are multisensory modes of perception. 
As we shall see, the answer to this question depends on one’s approach to individuating 
the senses. (2) Secondly, there are close connections between flavour and (orthonasal) 
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smell, so we might also wonder whether these senses are able to jointly pick out unified 
flavour-smell objects. I shall give a positive answer to this question. (3) Thirdly, research 
also indicates that our flavour and smell experiences can be impacted by other senses 
such as vision and audition. Do these other senses perceptually combine with the 
chemical senses to allow for overarching multisensory perceptual objects? As we shall 
see, it is implausible that they do combine in this manner. 
5.1 Individuating the chemical senses  
Generally, we experience the world through multiple senses. I currently see a scene full 
of tables, chairs, people and coffee cups, while hearing chattering voices and instrumental 
music, and smelling coffee. This experience may not involve truly multisensory perception 
of objects, however; it may merely be an assortment of co-conscious perceptual episodes 
through different sense modalities. The question of whether any given perceptual episode 
is multisensory (rather than merely the conjunction of experiences through different 
senses) cannot be answered without committing to some method of individuating the 
senses (see also Richardson, 2013). Without knowing how to distinguish one sense from 
another, we would have no principled way of determining whether one or multiple senses 
are involved. This is particularly pronounced in relation to the chemical senses where 
there is little agreement about how many senses are involved in any given experience.  
While we tend to have clear intuitions regarding, say, vision being a single type of sense, 
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distinct from other senses such as audition,62 things aren’t so clear in relation to the 
chemical senses. Researchers disagree about whether flavour constitutes a single sense, 
and the idea that flavour is partly down to the sense of smell has arguably also reached 
folk understandings of the senses.63 It is well known, for example, that having a blocked 
nose impairs our ability to taste foods properly.  
Flavour perception involves a variety of different sensory inputs — gustatory, olfactory, 
tactile and trigeminal. Without the combination of retronasal olfaction and the 
stimulation of taste receptors in the mouth, we cannot experience flavours like orange, 
chocolate or tomato. This is accompanied by tactile stimulation in the mouth and very 
often has a trigeminal component. Thus, it seems quite natural to deem flavour 
perception multisensory, and this is the orthodoxy in research into the chemical senses. 
Yet, other researchers instead consider flavour perception to be a singular modality 
encompassing both olfactory and gustatory processes. French gastronome Brillat-Savarin 
asserts, ‘I am not only convinced that there is no full act of tasting without the 
participation of the sense of smell, but I am also tempted to believe that smell and taste 
form a single sense, of which the mouth is the laboratory and the nose is the chimney’ 
(Brillat-Savarin, 1835/2009). In more recent times, Gibson (1966/1983) and those 
influenced by his approach, such as Auvray and Spence (2008) and Matthen (2014),64 have 
 
62 Although, see Fulkerson (2014) for reasons to doubt whether even vision is clearly classifiable as a single 
sense modality. 
63 See Nudds’ (2004) and MacPherson (2011a) for debate about whether folk conceptions of the senses are 
changing and/or changeable on the basis of empirical evidence.  
64 Smith (2013a, p. 734) and Spence, Smith, and Auvray (2014, p. 31) also offer discussions of this idea. 
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suggested we can treat flavour as a single perceptual system over and above any 
component sensory processing. As Gibson states (and is repeated by Auvray and Spence, 
2008, p. 1022), ‘Smelling and tasting however, need not be defined by receptors and 
nerves. They can be defined by their functions in use…’ (p. 136). As we shall see, the 
sensorimotor approach, which is heavily influenced by Gibson, also advocates this kind of 
method of individuating the chemical senses.  
We saw in chapter 3 that (orthonasal) smell, much like flavour, involves multiple distinct 
types of sensory stimulation. Tactile and trigeminal stimulation play an important role in 
our olfactory experiences. Richardson (2013) has highlighted that olfactory perception 
involves an experience of bringing in odours from the outside; smell is experienced in an 
exteroceptive manner. This essentially involves the tactile component of air stimulating 
the nostrils. Many odours rely upon trigeminal stimulation for their perceived quality (e.g. 
menthol, ammonia, etc; see Wysocki, 2003). Thus, if we are to treat flavour as the product 
of multiple senses, we ought to say the same about the sense of smell. If we take both 
flavour and smell to necessarily involve multiple senses, then it is trivially true that all 
perceptual objects experienced through these senses are multisensory. 
Further questions arise about whether taste constitutes a separate sense modality to 
flavour, or whether we ought to construe taste as simply an element of flavour (as argued 
by, e.g., Spence, Smith, & Auvray, 2014), and about whether we ought to take there to be 
two distinct senses of smell. There are both orthonasal and retronasal pathways to the 
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olfactory epithelium, so it has been claimed that olfaction is a ‘dual sensory modality’ 
(Rozin, 1982). This idea is further supported by evidence of differing neural responses 
depending on the route by which olfactory receptors are stimulated (Small, Gerber, Mak, 
& Hummel, 2005). However, one might instead think both belong to a unified sense of 
smell since they are simply different pathways to the same olfactory receptor cells. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that retronasal olfaction merely serves as part of the 
sense of flavour, rather than being any aspect of the sense of smell. 
Determining whether a given object perceived through the chemical senses is 
multisensory requires some kind of answer to these questions, and the answers that one 
gives will depend on how the senses are individuated. There are many possible methods 
of individuating the senses (see Macpherson, 2011a for a useful overview). For example, 
the most common traditional approaches aim to individuate the senses on the basis of 
one (or more) of the following: the experience’s phenomenal character, its 
representational content,65 the kind of proximal stimulus involved, or the type of sense 
organ involved (Grice, 1962/2011; Macpherson, 2011a). The core distinction between 
seeing and smelling for example, may be pinned on: (a) differences in how visual and 
olfactory experiences qualitatively feel; (b) the fact that seeing represents physical objects 
that instantiate colours, shapes and other visibly perceived properties, and smelling 
 
65 See Mizrahi (2017) for an application of such a strategy to the sense of taste. She argues in favour of using 
the ‘proper object’ of each sense — those items only perceptible to one unique sense — to individuate the 
senses. See my brief discussion of sensibilia in 5.4 for a potential initial challenge to such an approach.  
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represents odours with olfactory qualities like pungency and smokiness; (c) the fact that 
the proximal stimulus of sight is electromagnetic waves of between 380 and 750 
nanometres, while the proximal stimulus of olfaction is volatile particles; (d) the relevant 
sense organs being the eye and the nose respectively. Each of these approaches seems to 
capture an intuitive difference between the senses.  
However, each strategy may run into issues in accounting for certain problem cases such 
as non-human animal senses. For example, the vision (or at least what we think of as being 
vision) of non-human animals can involve receptivity to different wavelengths from 
human vision. Birds and bees are sensitive to UV light, so restricting the proximal stimuli 
for vision to only electromagnetic energy between 380 and 750 nanometres does not 
allow for types of non-human vision. But defining vision in terms of receptivity to all types 
of electromagnetic energy would include senses that do not appear to be visual. For 
example, pit vipers possess small pits below their eyes, which allow them to detect 
infrared electromagnetic radiation. Although both the pits and their eyes detect 
electromagnetic energy, neuroethologists generally take the pits to be involved in thermal 
imaging rather than vision (see Gray, 2005 for discussion of this case). Approaches that 
rely on differences between sense organs face similar issues (do the pit vipers’ pits count 
as eyes?). It is difficult to specify precisely what ought to count as the relevant organs for 
each sense, and plausibly creatures that are very different physiologically from humans 
can still see, smell, hear, etc. A bee seems to be able to see, but its compound eyes are 
very different from human eyes.  
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These approaches all shift the taxonomic debate from the question of how the senses 
should be individuated to questions of how other phenomena should be individuated. 
What counts as the proximal stimulus of each sense? What counts as the unique smell-
like phenomenal character distinctive of olfaction? What constitutes the relevant sense 
organs? What are the perceptual contents distinctive of each sense? At some point, it 
seems, an answer to these questions must be stipulated, but ideally, they should be 
stipulated in a non-arbitrary way that accords with our everyday understanding of the 
senses and serves one’s explanatory interests.  
One approach, which seems to do good job of capturing both everyday intuitions and a 
scientific understanding of the senses, is to treat flavour and smell as unified perceptual 
systems that can cut across different receptor types. With this approach, the emphasis is 
shifted towards how the senses are used in our engagement with the world. This kind of 
understanding of the chemical senses is in line with the sensorimotor approach, as well 
as other active accounts such as, for example, Gibson’s (1966/1983) ecological approach 
and Matthen’s (2014) account,66 and is the approach I follow throughout this chapter. 
Such approaches take the senses to be essentially active and allow for individuation of the 
senses on the basis of particular types of bodily engagement with the world. For Gibson, 
 
66 For my purposes here, nothing hinges on the specifics of how these active approaches to individuating 
the senses differ from one another since they arrive at the same answers about how we should individuate 
the chemical senses. The sensorimotor approach is broadly Gibsonian in its approach for individuating the 
senses (e.g. see Noë, 2002). Sensorimotor theorists generally advocate distinguishing them according to the 
different patterns of sensorimotor contingency associated with each sense (e.g. O'Regan & Noë, 2001a, p. 




‘The active senses cannot simply be the initiator of signals in nerve fibers or messages to 
the brain; instead they are analogous to tentacles and feelers’ (1966/1983, p. 5). Noë 
asserts that ‘what differentiates the sensory modalities are the different patterns of 
activity that constitutes [sic] their exercise’ (2002, p. 65).67 We see by moving our eyes 
and heads, we touch by running our hands over surfaces, we smell through sniffing and 
moving our heads and bodies in response to odours, we actively taste through jaw, cheek 
and tongue movements, etc; we use the senses to explore the environment; they aren’t 
mere recipients of information.  
These approaches appear to do a good job of accounting for the differences between the 
senses that the traditional approaches focused on. According to the sensorimotor 
account, our attunement to the (counterfactual) sensory effects of interactions with the 
world can explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience (e.g. see Hurley & 
Noë, 2003). However, even if one does not agree with the claim that phenomenal 
character is constituted by sensorimotor engagement, it is hard to deny that one’s 
engagement with the world at least causally impacts phenomenal character in important 
ways. Types of bodily interaction with the world are also informative with regard to the 
content of perceptual experience, since perceptual content is at least partially explained 
by those features of the world that we perceptually engage with. If olfaction represents 
 
67 Noë also argues that this amounts to the same thing as individuating them on the basis of each sense’s 
‘corresponding appearance-structures’ (p. 65) but this claim adds unneeded controversy for this chapter’s 
purposes, so I shall not discuss this idea further.  
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odours, this is presumably because we engage with odours through the sense of smell. 
Our bodily engagement with the world crucially involves us making use of the sense 
organs related to each sense, and the proximal stimuli that are associated with each sense 
are induced by our bodily interaction with the environment. 
With this method for individuating the chemical senses, flavour perception can be treated 
as a unified sense modality, distinguished from other senses because of the patterns of 
bodily activity involved in tasting. All of the distinct types of stimulation are induced 
through the unified activity of tasting. As Matthen says of flavour perception, activities 
like chewing, savouring, moving food around, swallowing constitute a system (2014, p. 
11). Orthonasal olfaction too is to be understood as a single sense modality because it is 
to be individuated on the basis of smelling activity rather than types of stimulus/receptor. 
Retronasal olfaction would most likely be considered merely a part of the sense of flavour 
rather than its own sense modality, since (to the best of my knowledge) we don’t engage 
in any kind of distinctive retronasal smelling activity that isn’t simply a part of tasting. It is 
through the processes of chewing, savouring, swallowing, etc. that retronasal olfaction 
occurs.68 Similarly, with this kind of approach it appears that taste doesn’t constitute 
 
68 One potential problem with taking retronasal olfaction to simply be an aspect of flavour is that in certain 
experimental conditions, we can be made to experience retronasal olfactory stimulation as being of a smell 
rather than a flavour (e.g. see Smith, 2015a for discussion of this). These are artificial conditions involving 
pumping an odour to the olfactory epithelium using a specially made device, rather than normal olfactory 
conditions. This is akin to how in certain experimental conditions it may be possible to experience something 
approaching basic tastes (sweet, sour, etc.) in isolation, but this doesn’t generally occur in natural tasting 
conditions (if at all) (see e.g. Spence, Smith, & Auvray, 2014). Usually these tastes are experienced simply 
as aspects of flavours. I don’t think we ought to individuate the senses on the basis of these unusual lab-
based sensory experiences, but the fact that in experimental conditions retronasal olfaction can be 
experienced in this way does highlight the important connections between flavour and smell. 
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separate sense modality to flavour because it doesn’t involve its own types of bodily 
engagment with the world.  
Treating the senses as perceptual systems, individuated on the basis of bodily activity, 
need not be assumed to be the sole, true method of individuating the senses. There may 
be multiple useful methods for doing this depending upon one’s explanatory interests 
(see Fulkerson, 2014). It may be helpful to sometimes examine underlying stimuli involved 
in flavour (i.e., gustatory, retronasal olfactory, tactile, trigeminal) or smell, while at other 
times it may be more helpful to look at the way we engage with the world through tasting 
and smelling. Matthen (2014), for example, argues that there are two key ways to look at 
the senses, one of which emphasises the ‘carriers and recipients of information’, while 
the other understands the senses as perceptual systems (p. 24). Treating the senses as 
perceptual systems will serve our interests here.  
It is trivially true that if all the sensory processes (retronasal olfactory, gustatory, tactile 
and trigeminal) that underlie flavour and smell experiences are taken to be individual 
senses, then all flavour and olfactory objects are multisensory. A more interesting 
question is whether flavour and smell could still be involved in the experience of 
multisensory objects if we understand the senses as perceptual systems, and whether 
flavour and (orthonasal) olfaction could together be involved in the perception of unified 
flavour-odour objects. Thus, for the purposes of the rest of this chapter, I take the senses 
to be these kinds of perceptual systems.  
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5.2 From unisensory to multisensory perceptual objects 
As argued in the previous chapters, we experience a world of discrete particulars referred 
to as ‘perceptual objects’. Both odours (chapter 3) and flavours (chapter 4) can be 
experienced as perceptual objects. They are perceived as individuated items that 
instantiate properties such as smokiness and pungency, sweetness and creaminess, and 
are able to survive perspectival shifts. The individuation of these objects is understood 
through the notion of figure-ground segregation — the way we pick out an object as a 
unified figure against everything else around it. Figure-ground segregation appears to 
apply across the senses, with evidence of it applying to smell (chapter 3), flavour (chapter 
4), audition (Bregman, 1990), and touch (Gallace & Spence, 2011; Mac Cumhaill, 2017), 
as well as in the paradigmatic case of vision. As we have also seen, different senses involve 
different types of grouping and figure-ground segregation, but all appear to be governed 
by the Gestalt principles first set out by Wertheimer (1923/1938). These principles offer 
insights into the ways we spontaneously perceive certain environmental features as 
unified into structured wholes, individuated from everything else in the environment.  
There has been an increase of interest into whether perceptual objects can be 
multisensory (recent examples include Kubovy & Schutz, 2010; Deroy, Chen, & Spence, 
2014; Green, 2018; and O’Callaghan’s body of work, including 2008, 2014, 2016, 2017). 
The type of multisensory object under discussion here are perceptual objects that are 
perceived in a unified manner by multiple senses. This captures an intuitive understanding 
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of what it means for an experience of an object to be multisensory, but as we shall see, 
surprisingly few types of perception meet this criterion. For an object to be perceived 
through more than one sense modality, these senses ought to concur with one another 
about the identity of the object (object recognition) and about where the boundaries of 
the object lie (object individuation). If they do not concur with regard to the boundaries 
of the object, there must be multiple sets of perceived boundaries, and thus multiple 
perceptual objects (since, with the notion of objecthood we are working with, it is the 
boundaries of objects that individuate them from one another). More generally, if 
contradictory properties are attributed to objects by different senses, they cannot be 
involved in the perception of a single, unified object.  
There are prima facie reasons to endorse multisensory perceptual objects. First, it might 
seem phenomenologically evident that we can in fact perceive objects in a multisensory 
way. Consider the experience of eating a freshly cooked veggie burger. Ostensibly, when 
someone eats the burger, they hear it sizzling, and see, touch, taste and smell it. The 
experience does not feel disjointed; it seems quite plausible that the senses are jointly 
engaged in perceiving something. Perhaps then, there is phenomenological reason to 
endorse a notion of multisensory objecthood. 
Secondly, the senses interact with each other, and these interactions often produce 
interesting cross-modal effects. Perhaps the best-known examples of this are audio-visual 
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cases like the McGurk and ventriloquism effects,69 but such phenomena occur across the 
senses. Vision and audition are known to interact with our experiences in the chemical 
senses. For example, whether or not we experience congruent colour cues70 can 
profoundly alter our ability to recognise odours and flavours (DuBose, Cardello, & Maller, 
1980; see Spence, Levitan, Shanker, & Zamprini, 2010 for a review), as well as impacting 
the perceived intensity of flavour and the enjoyment we derive from food (Wheatley, 
1973).  
Audition plays an important role too. Whether it is the ‘snap, crackle and pop’ of breakfast 
cereal, the sizzling of a burger, the fizz of a carbonated drink, or the satisfying ‘glou-glou’ 
sound of wine being poured or swallowed,71 sound seems integral to the experience of 
these foods and beverages. Studies show that auditory feedback can modulate our flavour 
experiences. Zampini and Spence (2004) conducted an experiment in which participants 
were asked to eat Pringles while being played real-time auditory feedback of their own 
 
69 The McGurk effect involves visual dominance over auditory information: visual perception of lip 
movements can alter one’s auditory perception of phonemes. When dubbed over a video of a speaker 
making the lip movements associated with the phoneme /ga/, the sound /ba/ is heard instead as /da/ by 
most subjects (McGurk & Macdonald, 1976). Similarly, in the case of the ventriloquism effect precise 
covariation of visual and auditory stimuli result in the auditory stimuli being perceived as located closer to 
the visual stimuli. Seeing movement of the ventriloquist’s dummy’s mouth results in a perception of the 
sound as emanating from the dummy’s mouth rather than that of the ventriloquist.  
70 What counts as being a ‘congruent’ colour depends upon which products we are exposed to. A study, 
which asked subjects to predict the flavours of different coloured liquids, found that young adults in the UK 
associated bright blue drinks with a raspberry flavour (Shankar, Levitan, & Spence, 2010), probably due to 
products such as Gatorade using the blue-raspberry flavour. Young people in Taiwan instead associated the 
colour with a mint flavour. See chapter 6 for discussion of how prior experience shapes perceptual 
organisation.  
71 The term ‘glou-glou’ is attributed to Molière’s 1966 play The Doctor in Spite of Himself (see Shepherd, 
2012 for discussion.) 
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crunching sounds through headphones. Altering the volume/frequency composition of 
these sounds modified the participants’ perceptions of how stale or fresh the crisps 
tasted. The Pringles were perceived as ‘both crisper and fresher when either the overall 
sound level was increased, or when just the high frequency sounds… were selectively 
amplified’ (p. 1). More recently, similar results have been found in a study looking at the 
perceived hardness and crispness of apples (Demattè, et al., 2014). Cross-modal 
associations between odour quality and auditory pitch have also been documented. In 
studies of cross-modal matching, subjects arranged fragrances in sequence to match 
various sounds of different pitches. Subjects shared a common interpretation of which 
odours ‘matched’ a particular pitch, suggesting that they drew interesting associations 
between smells and sounds (Belkin, Martin, Kemp, & Gilbert, 1997). Are experiences of, 
say, seeing and smelling something or tasting and hearing crunchy food instances of 
multisensory object perception? 
Prima facie, these kinds of effects may be thought to serve as empirical evidence for 
multisensory perceptual objecthood. The fact that visual feedback influences auditory 
perception (as in the McGurk and ventriloquism cases) may be suggestive of multisensory 
audio-visual objecthood. If this is so, then the fact that senses like audition and vision can 
influence our flavour perceptions is also suggestive of multisensory objecthood, allowing 
for, say, audition and flavour to engage in jointly perceiving a crunchy apple. However, 
there is also an important challenge for multisensory objecthood known as the ‘diversity 
problem’. 
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5.2.1 A challenge: The diversity problem 
Despite the apparent reasons for endorsing various instances of multisensory objecthood, 
there is an immediate challenge for putative multisensory objects. Namely, there are 
important differences in what we can perceive via each of the sense modalities. The 
different senses allow us to perceive a very diverse range of properties and objects, and 
the objects accessible by each sense are not necessarily accessible by the others. For 
example, odours cannot be seen and are very different from the sources of these odours 
that are often visible. A rose odour is a molecular cloud of volatile particles; the rose itself 
is, of course, a physical, everyday object that one can see and touch. Some further hold 
that odours should be understood as ‘sensibilia’ — ephemeral non-ordinary entities that 
are only perceptible through a single sense modality (Richardson, 2018). Similar issues 
apply to flavours and sound streams. Auditory objects in the form of sound streams are 
of a very different kind to the visible objects that give rise to the sounds (violins, bells, 
radios). These facts about what we perceive through each sense modality present a 
challenge for multisensory objecthood known as the ‘diversity’ problem (see O’Callaghan, 
2016; Green, 2018). There is such variation between what each of the senses allows us to 
perceive that it is difficult to see how they could work together to pick out a unified 
multisensory object.  
Moreover, we have seen that it is through figure-ground segregation that we experience 
objects as unified particulars, separated from their fields. Different sense-modalities, such 
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as flavour, smell, vision and audition, segregate their respective objects in different ways 
from their grounds, which adds further difficulty for notions of multisensory objecthood. 
For example, whereas vision uses primarily spatial properties, audition uses frequency, 
timbre, and temporal properties. Flavour and smell involve groupings and segregation on 
the basis of properties of the relevant chemical substances. Because of such differences, 
these senses appear to all specify different types of object boundaries, and 
correspondingly, the perceptual objects of each of these senses differ. In the case of the 
chemical senses, as we have seen, the immediate objects of these senses are not ordinary 
physical objects but rather flavours and odours. Since it is through figure-ground 
segregation that objects are perceived as distinct from one another, unless the very same 
figures are picked out by multiple senses, there cannot be a single, unified multisensory 
perceptual object. 
This seems relatively unproblematic for certain instances of putative multisensory 
objecthood. For example, visuo-tactile cases of objecthood seem quite plausible because 
the perceived objects of both of these senses are ordinary, physical objects. Moreover, 
the boundaries of these objects are plausibly specified in a spatial manner through both 
vision and touch.72 As we shall see in section 5.3.2, these kinds of multisensory visuo-
tactile objects can also remain unified amid shifts and changes in one’s interpretation of 
the stimulus. However, the diversity problem presents a serious difficulty for other 
 
72 Though, see Richardson (2014) for discussion of a view according to which vision and touch do not 
converge even on spatial properties.  
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putative types of multisensory object. The perceptual objects perceived through the 
chemical senses are flavours and odours, which are not accessible through other senses 
such as vision, and they are individuated in different ways to, say, physical objects.  
One potential solution, allowing for a kind of multisensory objecthood, is that there can 
be overarching perceptual objects that group together discrete unisensory perceptual 
objects. This overarching object may exhibit figure-ground effects that are specified in a 
multisensory manner. For example, consider O’Callaghan’s (2016) approach, according to 
which events experienced through multiple senses can constitute extended event-like 
perceptual objects. He argues that ‘one can bimodally perceive a common whole with 
some parts accessible to one but not both senses’ (2016, p. 1271) and ‘[f]or instance, just 
as something may visually appear at once to be both red and round, or to have a red part 
and a green part, something may multimodally perceptually appear at once to be both 
bright and loud, or to have a red part and a rough part’ (2014, p. 73). Focusing largely on 
audio-visual cases, he argues that sounds aren’t perceptually distinct from events such as 
wheels screeching, hands clapping and so forth. Through hearing sounds, you can hear 
their sources. Auditory objects are individual parts of broader, mereologically complex, 
event-like objects, which include both sounds and ordinary objects such as wheels: 
Audio-visual perception sometimes not only converges upon a common object but 
also identifies a shared perceptible object as such… Audio-visual perception thus 
reveals a temporally extended, event-like individual with visible bodies as 
participants and sound streams as parts. The multisensory perceptual object is the 
broader, encompassing happening—the hands’ clapping, the wheels’ screeching, 
the tuba’s soloing—that you perceive audio-visually (2016, pp. 1283–1284). 
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This suggestion has prima facie phenomenological appeal: watching and hearing wheels 
screeching doesn’t seem disjointed. We perceive the sounds as emanating from the 
visible wheels on the tarmac, and we might therefore take this experience to be of a 
unified perceptual object, which has the auditory stream as one part. When we see and 
hear wheels screeching, we see the movement of the wheels, which results in the sound-
stream emanating from them. This chapter does not discuss whether this approach 
ultimately succeeds in accounting for audio-visual perception. However, I assess whether 
it allows other kinds of multisensory objecthood involving the chemical senses, such as 
olfactory-visual objects. In what follows I argue that even with this kind of overarching 
objecthood, the constituent unisensory objects must be closely connected enough that 
they allow for unified figure-ground segregation. 
O’Callaghan’s suggested approach opens the possibility that odours emanating from a 
source object could constitute an extended event-like object that includes both the 
visually perceived physical object and the olfactorily perceived odour. When we see garlic 
being fried, we are seeing the event that results in the odour emanating from the garlic. 
Initial intuitions are likely to clash about whether seeing garlic frying in a pan and smelling 
its odour should count as a multisensory perceptual object. Perhaps this approach would 
also allow for perceptual grouping together of flavours and odours, where we engage in 
a temporally extended tasting and smelling activities.  
For these kinds of events to constitute perceptual objects (in the sense I have argued for), 
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they must fulfil certain criteria. As we saw in chapter 3, such happenings must be 
experienced as unified and individuated from everything else (i.e. they must exhibit figure-
ground segregation) and must exhibit constancies, surviving perceptual shifts and 
changes. The constituent unisensory objects must be sufficiently closely connected to 
count as being involved in a kind of overarching object. It isn’t immediately clear whether 
happenings like garlic odours emanating from a pan (or cases like both seeing and hearing 
wheels screeching) could jointly exhibit figure-ground segregation. If they do not, these 
happenings cannot be considered multisensory perceptual objects. 
5.3 Two types of evidence for multisensory objecthood 
To aid us in uncovering whether various perceptual episodes involve multisensory 
perceptual objects, in 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 I outline two kinds of evidence for multisensory 
objecthood. As we saw in the previous chapters, the operation of Gestalt grouping 
principles provides a source of evidence for figure-ground segregation. In section 5.3.1 I 
look at whether such principles could also provide evidence for multisensory figure-
ground assignments (and ipso facto, multisensory objecthood). In section 5.3.2 I argue 
that there is another potential source of evidence for multisensory objects in the form of 
multisensory Gestalt shifts. This sort of evidence spans the requirement for unified figure-
ground segregation and for constancies, depending upon the kind of Gestalt shift at hand. 
Either way, a unified multisensory object perception ought not to allow contradictory 
properties to be attributed to the object. If contradictory properties (whether these 
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properties relate to the boundaries of the object, or to the overall identity of the object) 
are attributed, there are multiple perceptual objects rather than a single unified 
multisensory object. It is a necessary condition on multisensory objecthood that the 
different senses do not attribute contradictory properties to the putative object. 
Whereas, if multiple senses are involved jointly in Gestalt shifts, this demonstrates that 
the senses are concurring with one another about an object’s boundaries (as specified 
through object individuation) and/or identity (object recognition). The senses being jointly 
susceptible to Gestalt shifts is sufficient (but not necessary) for objecthood.  
As we shall see, these kinds of evidence provide support for multisensory flavour-smell 
objects. However, they do not provide support for other types of putative multisensory 
objecthood, such as olfactory-visual or auditory-flavour objects.  
5.3.1 The grouping principles  
The Gestalt grouping principles can provide evidence of figure-ground effects and 
perceptual objecthood, and are especially useful in cases where we lack the kinds of clear 
intuitions we have in, say, the visual case.73 If we could show that Gestalt grouping 
principles also apply in a multisensory manner, this would provide evidence for 
multisensory figure-ground segregation and multisensory perceptual objects. These 
principles describe the situations in which it is more likely that features of the 
 
73 See also Green (2018), who has recently presented an approach to perceptual objecthood that draws 
heavily upon these grouping principles. 
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environment will be grouped together, but individually each of these principles is 
defeasible. Each of these principles exemplifies an aspect of the overarching law of 
Prägnanz; overall, perceptual organisation tends to towards that which is most simple, 
harmonious, etc. Grouping and segregation operate differently (albeit utilising analogous 
Gestalt principles) in different senses. The features of the environment upon which these 
groupings are based, and the structure of perceptual objects differ greatly in different 
sense modalities. 
We have seen that the principle of similarity plausibly applies to flavour and smell 
perception, as well as other senses such as vision and audition. There are, however, issues 
with the idea that properties perceived through one sense could be similar to properties 
perceived through another sense.74 We may visually group features together because of 
their similar colours, or auditorily group together sounds with similar frequencies, but 
could we also group visual and auditory properties on the basis of similarity? Is the sound 
of a guitar phenomenally similar to the sight of a guitar? Intuitively, it doesn’t make much 
sense to talk about an auditory property being similar to a visual property. Likewise, it 
doesn’t seem prima facie plausible that, say, visually perceived colours can be similar to 
flavours or odours (even if they impact our olfactory/gustatory experience in interesting 
ways, as highlighted in Spence, Levitan, Shanker, & Zamprini, 2010). Nor, intuitively, can 
 
74 Well-known philosophical issues with the concept of similarity (e.g. Goodman, 1972) are beyond the 
scope of my discussion here. This thesis assumes we have an intuitive grasp of certain things being more 
similar to one another than other things. 
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auditorily perceived sounds be similar to flavours or odours.  
One possibility is that we draw synaesthetic-type associations between such properties, 
and perhaps this constitutes a kind of cross-modal similarity. There is evidence of implicit 
associations between flavours/tastes and pitch. Sweet and sour tastes are associated with 
high-pitched sounds, while umami and bitter tastes are associated with low-pitched 
sounds (Crisinel & Spence, 2010). Such associations are also evident in other senses, such 
as audio-visual cases. Pitch and visually perceived size are implicitly associated, with high-
pitched sounds associated with smallness and low-pitched sounds associated with 
largeness (e.g. Gallace & Spence, 2006). However, whether these kinds of associations 
can be considered evidence of similarity between the properties perceived through 
different senses is unclear. Moreover, even if they did suggest a kind of similarity between 
such properties, evidence would also be required that these properties are grouped 
together on the basis of this perceived similarity. Although this may be an interesting 
question for further research, I am inclined to find it implausible that such properties can 
really be similar to one another, and we currently lack empirical evidence in favour of such 
a view. In fact, as we saw in 5.1, the intuitive dissimilarities between our experiences in 
different senses forms the basis of various approaches to individuating the senses (e.g. 
see Grice’s, 1962/2011 approach).  
A notable exception to the intuitive dissimilarities between our experiences across the 
senses is provided by the flavour-smell case (and this is reflected in it being less obvious 
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how these senses should be individuated). There is research suggesting that we can find 
odours and flavours to be similar to one another. In the last chapter, I highlighted 
empirical evidence of similarity-based grouping in flavour perception. Much of this 
research turns out to also be applicable here because not only does such grouping occur 
when retronasal olfactory stimulation occurs alongside tasting (i.e. components of 
unisensory flavour), but also when orthonasal olfaction is combined with tasting. 
Orthonasal olfaction (as we saw 5.1) is a separate sense modality from taste/flavour, even 
if retronasal olfaction is taken to simply be an aspect of flavour perception.  
Subjects are inclined to describe certain odours using terms such as ‘sweet’ and ‘sour’ 
that are generally attributed to the gustatory systems (e.g. Harper, Land, Griffiths, & Bate-
Smith, 1968; Burdach, Kroeze, & Koster, 1984). For example, strawberry and vanilla 
odours are consistently described as ‘sweet’. Related research shows that we have a 
tendency to conflate these kinds of ‘sweet’ odours and sweet tastes in our memory 
(Stevenson & Oaten, 2010), further evidencing genuine phenomenological similarities 
between odours and flavours. Studies have also uncovered the phenomenon of sweetness 
enhancement (Frank & Byram, 1988; Frank, Shaffer, & Smith, 1991). Combining ‘sweet’ 
smells with a sweet tastant (sucrose solution), enhance the perceived sweetness of the 
tastant as compared to the experience of the tastant alone. Sweetness enhancement 
occurs whether the odours are presented retronasally or orthonasally, and thus serves as 
evidence for similarity-based grouping both in unisensory flavour perception and 
multisensory flavour-smell perception. The fact that sweet smells have an additive effect 
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on the perceived sweetness of the tastant again supports a phenomenological similarity 
between the olfactory and gustatory properties and suggests a kind of perceptual 
grouping. The sweetness of the smell seems to be combined perceptually with the 
sweetness of the tastant. This evidence in combination suggests that the connections 
between taste and smell go beyond mere synaesthetic associations. Although it is 
ultimately an empirical question, it seems unlikely that a high-pitched sound would be 
conflated in memory with a sour taste, for example. The links between taste and smell are 
tighter.  
As we saw in the flavour case, looking to the thresholds for perceiving stimuli also provides 
evidence of perceptual groupings on the basis of similarity. Weak tastes and smells may 
individually be subthreshold for detection but jointly detectable if they are congruent 
(Dalton, Doolittle, Nagata, & Breslin, 2000; Breslin, Doolittle, & Dalton, 2001).75 The 
‘congruent’ tastes and odours are again combinations like strawberry and sucrose, and 
given the evidence presented above (and discussed in the previous chapter), we can 
understand this congruence in terms of perceived similarity.76 People are inclined to 
describe these sorts of stimuli in the same way and even conflate them in their memory. 
The fact that individually sub-threshold stimuli can be experienced together if they are 
 
75 Though see also Delwiche & Heffelfinger (2005), which provides conflicting results. 
76 This differs from other types of ‘congruent’ properties, such as the way that congruent colour cues can 
help us to identify odours flavours and alter our enjoyment of the food (Spence, Levitan, Shanker, & 
Zamprini, 2010). In the colour case, we lack evidence suggesting the colours are similar to the 
odours/flavours. 
         183 
 
perceptually similar again suggests a kind of grouping together of the similar tastes and 
smells. They are only detectable at all if experienced together.  
Using the same paradigm of looking to whether stimuli are sub-threshold individually but 
perceptible together, there is also evidence of grouping by (temporal) proximity. 
Simultaneous onset — as well as the aforementioned congruence — of these taste and 
smell stimuli makes it more likely that sub-threshold stimuli will become perceptible 
(Pfeiffer, Hollowood, Hort, & Taylor, 2005; Stevenson, 2014). Simultaneous onset can be 
construed as a temporal analogue of the principle of proximity. It plays a role, for example, 
in auditory groupings (see O'Callaghan, 2008, p. 822). It seems Gestalt grouping principles 
can operate across flavour and smell experience, evidencing a kind of multisensory figure-
ground segregation. Plausibly, the temporally extended experience of tasting and smelling 
can at times constitute the experience of a unified multisensory object, which has the 
unisensory olfactory and flavour objects as closely connected parts. This is to say that, 
although odours and flavours are distinct (with different spatial boundaries, etc.) it may 
be that they are sometimes sufficiently phenomenologically connected to allow for an 
overarching unified perceptual object.  
One might worry here that the fact that odours are experienced as existing in external 
space while flavours are experienced in the mouth is a problem for the idea that they can, 
at times, be experienced as unified. Their different spatial characters might seem counter 
to them exhibiting unified boundaries. However, as argued in 3.3.1, the operation of the 
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Gestalt principles need not be based upon spatial properties, and odours can be picked 
out in a non-spatial manner. In the same way, plausibly odours and flavours can be 
grouped together into an overarching flavour-smell object on the basis of non-spatial 
forms of similarity, proximity and so forth (while perhaps the component unisensory 
objects are still individuated from one another in another sense, in part, on the basis of 
their spatial properties). 
Looking towards the other senses, it might initially seem that the principle of proximity 
could also apply to cases such as visual interactions with smell or flavour. For example, 
perhaps the proximity of odours to their visually perceived source objects might allow for 
some kind of proximity-based multisensory grouping. If I see and smell garlic frying in a 
pan, the garlic odour may be in close proximity to the pieces of garlic from which the 
odour emanates. However, much of the time odours simply aren’t near to their source 
objects. As we have seen, odours are able to persist even if the source object has been 
moved or destroyed, and this was one of the motivations for taking odours, and not 
source objects, to be the immediate objects of olfactory experience. More generally, it is 
hard to see how perceptual objects that are segregated from their grounds in extremely 
different ways could also involve a kind of overarching figure-ground segregation that 
unites the two sets of very different boundaries. It is often difficult to discern the spatial 
properties of odours, and usually they are instead individuated on the basis of non-spatial 
properties, unlike vision. It doesn’t appear that these grouping principles are applicable 
to interactions between vision and olfaction.  
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It is perhaps more plausible that auditory interactions with flavour allow for a kind of 
grouping by temporal variants of the principles of proximity or common fate (things that 
follow the same trajectory are likely to be grouped). As we saw in 5.2, real-time auditory 
feedback of subjects’ own crunching sounds through headphones can alter one’s flavour 
experiences, making Pringles taste more fresh or more stale (Zampini & Spence, 2004). 
The way these sounds unfold at the same time as the flavour could conceivably allow for 
grouping by proximity/common fate. Both flavour and sound unfold over time, making 
temporal variants of the grouping principles more likely. However, it’s not clear that the 
way flavour unfolds really maps onto the way that the sounds unfold. Much of the flavour 
unfolds after the period of audible crunching, for example. After swallowing, there is an 
aroma burst where volatile molecules arrive at the olfactory epithelium retronasally (e.g. 
see Shepherd, 2016). 
Again, the operation of other Gestalt grouping principles is simply implausible in the 
auditory-flavour case. These auditory and flavour properties aren’t perceived as similar to 
one another, for example. The grouping principles are all supposed to work together in 
order to attain the maximally prägnant interpretation of the scene/stimulus (see also 
Green, 2018), and thus it seems unlikely that the mere fact these phenomena occur in 
close temporal proximity and that both unfold over time would be sufficient to override 
the notable dissimilarities between the properties perceived.  
Unlike in the flavour-smell case, it seems we currently lack robust evidence to suggest 
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that episodes of perception such as both seeing and smelling frying garlic, or hearing and 
tasting the crunchy Pringles, involve multisensory grouping. The fact that an experience 
in one sense is modulated by an experience in another is insufficient for grouping between 
these senses.77 I now move onto a second type of evidence for multisensory 
grouping/segregation: multisensory Gestalt shifts.  
5.3.2 Multisensory Gestalt shifts 
The senses involved in multisensory object perception ought not to attribute 
contradictory properties to the object perceived. If they are involved in the multisensory 
perception of the same unified object, the senses ought to concur with one another about 
the identity of the object (since, as seen in chapter 3, object recognition is a key aspect of 
perceptual objecthood) and the boundaries of the object (object individuation). If they 
attribute contradictory properties to the object, it doesn’t look like these senses are really 
involved in the perception of a single, unified object at all. This section proposes that 
Gestalt shifts can provide additional evidence for multisensory object perception, 
demonstrating that multiple senses are concurring with one another in their 
interpretation of an object. I argue that they provide robust evidence for multisensory 
objecthood in the case of visuo-tactile perception and provide some further minimal 
 
77 There may be borderline cases where it isn’t clear if they should be classified as instances of grouping and 
figure-ground effects. For example, there may be cases where there are multiple equally prägnant 
interpretations of a scene. In such cases, whether there is a unified overarching perceptual object tying 
together unisensory objects may simply be indeterminate. 
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evidence for objecthood in the flavour-smell case. 
One way to assess whether object perception is occurring in a multisensory way is to look 
at whether the senses involved concur with one another the about the identity and the 
boundaries of the object. It can be difficult to assess whether this is the case, but it 
becomes clearer if the perceived boundaries/properties of the object suddenly and 
dramatically change. If the senses remain in agreement with one another amid such shifts 
and changes, this is good evidence for multisensory object perception. A particularly clear 
example of changing object boundaries and/or changing object identities comes from 
cases of bistable (or multistable) ambiguous figures, where one’s interpretation of the 
stimulus spontaneously shifts. An example of such multistability targeting the boundaries 
(as specified by figure-ground assignments) of the object is the Necker Cube (Fig. 5.1); 
interpretations of the object boundaries flip back and forth. An example of the identity of 
the object changing is the duck-rabbit (Fig. 5.2); the same stimulus is perceived variously 
as two different types of object. Although the most well-known examples of multistability 
are visual cases, similar effects have been observed in audition (Warren & Gregory, 1958; 
Bregman & Campbell, 1971; O'Leary & Rhodes, 1984; Bregman, 1990) and touch (e.g. 
Harrar and Harris, 2007; Carter, Konkle, Wang, Hayward, & Moore, 2008). As we shall see 
below, there is more limited evidence for multistability in the chemical senses. 
The above cases are unisensory but let us now consider whether they could occur in a 
multisensory case. If a perceived object is subject to this kind of ‘Gestalt shift’ in one sense 
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modality but not the other(s), then the senses must be dividing up the world in differing 
ways. If multisensory objecthood involves perceptually picking out a single, unified figure 
in the environment, the object’s key traits (its boundaries, identity, etc.) ought to be 
interpreted in a unified way. Where there is an ambiguity about the interpretation of the 
object, this ambiguity should subsist in all the senses involved, and when interpretations 
of the object change, these changes should occur across the senses.  
While there has been little research looking at whether Gestalt shifts can be multisensory, 
there have been a few studies into bimodal versions of ambiguous figures like the Necker 
cube. Research into the bimodal Necker Cube involves giving subjects a three-dimensional 
wire cube, rather than the familiar two-dimensional picture of a cube’s frame (Shopland 
& Gregory, 1964; Purves & Andrews, 1997; Ando & Ashida, 2003; Bruno, Jacomuzzi, 
Bertamini, & Meyer, 2006; Bertamini, Masala, Meyer, & Bruno, 2010; Bruno, 2017). 
Fig. 5.1. Necker Cube 
Interpretations of which is the 
cube’s facing side spontaneously 
change. 
Fig. 5.2. Duck-rabbit (Jastrow, 1899) 
The stimulus can be interpreted 
either as a duck or a rabbit. 
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Surprisingly, visual reversals can still occur when viewing these three-dimensional cubes, 
even when subjects are also exploring the cubes haptically. With the three-dimensional 
version of the Necker cube, when a subject makes figure-ground assignments in a veridical 
manner, the shape is accurately perceived as a cube. However, when figure-ground 
reversals occur the shape instead appears to be a ‘truncated pyramid’ — a pyramid with 
the top sliced off — pointing towards the viewer. This is because, when the Gestalt shift 
occurs, the viewer’s perception of depth is non-veridical. The distal faces of the cube 
instead appear to be proximal and thus look smaller than the faces that appear 
(incorrectly) to be further away.  
One fascinating observation from these studies is that when a perceiver experiences the 
‘truncated pyramid’ interpretation, this generally results in them feeling as though their 
wrists are pointing at impossible angles or that the cube has somehow lost its rigidity 
(Bruno, Jacomuzzi, Bertamini, & Meyer, 2006, p. 2; Bruno, 2017). Bruno (2017) asserts:  
The resulting experience is striking: at times, the object will seem to undergo 
nonrigid deformations; at other times, we will have the impression that our wrists 
are bent at impossible angles, consistent with the visually reversed shape instead 
of the haptically felt one (p. 784, emphasis mine).  
The perceiver’s tactile experience somehow conforms to the illusory ‘truncated pyramid’ 
interpretation of the object. This suggests that the haptic and visual stimulation are 
unified into a single multisensory percept exhibiting a unified interpretation of the object. 
The senses concur with one another about whether the perception is of a cube or a 
truncated pyramid, even if this results in the feeling that one’s hands are in an impossible 
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position. Thus, it is very plausible that touch and vision can engage in unified object 
perceptions. This should be unsurprising since both senses appear to give us access to 
everyday physical objects, and they both engage in a spatial variant of figure-ground 
segregation.78  
Gestalt shifts may serve as a useful test for multisensory objecthood, but they aren’t 
necessary for multisensory objecthood. This is because most perception is not ambiguous 
in the way that the Necker cube is. Most of the time, there is a veridical way to perceive 
the world, and we are generally successful in this. Suppose we see and touch a normal 
solid cube. Generally, a question will not arise about the correct way to interpret the 
shape of the object. This lack of perceptual ambiguity should not affect whether the object 
is perceived in a multisensory manner. Thus, while Gestalt shifts can be a useful test for 
whether a perceived object should be considered multisensory, they are not a necessary 
condition on multisensory objecthood. 
 
78 Another possible case of multisensory Gestalt switches comes from the Rubber Hand illusion. The rubber 
hand illusion most commonly involves occluding the subject’s hand from view and stroking it, while a visible 
rubber hand is stroked in synchrony with the real hand (Botvinik & Cohen, 1998). According to a popular 
interpretation of the phenomenon, subjects begin to incorporate the rubber hand into their own body-
image and start to feel that the rubber hand is their own — an effect that seems to be simultaneously visual 
and proproprioceptive/tactile. The shift in one’s proprioceptive and tactile experience is in accordance with 
the visual experience of seeing the rubber hand being stroked. Plausibly, there is a kind of figure-ground 
segregation occurring here where subjects visually experience the non-occluded (rubber) hand as a figure 
with a particular spatial location and the proprioceptively felt hand is picked out at the same location. The 
proprioceptively and tactually felt location of the hand accord with the visual experience. Interestingly, the 
visual experience is so dominant in rubber-hand effects, most subjects experience a proprioceptive shift 
even when the rubber hand is stroked out of sync with the real hand, and some experience it without any 
stroking at all (Valenzuela Moguillansky, O’Regan, & Petitmengin, 2013). This is another good candidate for 
multisensory objecthood. 
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Do analogous Gestalt shifts occur in olfaction and/or flavour perception? In a recent 
review article Spence and Youssef (2016) consider the (at present, rather limited) 
evidence for this multistability in the chemical senses. One case that they discuss relates 
to a dish — beetroot and orange jelly — created by renowned chef Heston Blumenthal to 
be served at his Fat Duck restaurant. Half of the jelly is purple and half is orange, which 
leads diners to suppose that the purple half will be beetroot flavoured and the orange half 
will be orange flavoured. In fact, the colours are reversed. Often, when diners first taste 
the jelly, they do not notice the discrepancy and perceive the orange half as orange 
flavoured and the purple half as beetroot. After multiple tastes, or after a hint from the 
waiter, they experience a perceptual shift towards the veridical flavours of the jelly. 
Blumenthal (2008, p. 237) states of the jelly, ‘I had always hoped to create a dish that 
didn’t just surprise diners but made them flip between different sensory perceptions, 
jogging the brain into new attractor states.’ Neither Spence and Youssef nor Blumenthal 
state whether this flip also occurs in one’s olfactory experience of the jelly. However, 
presumably if the diner veridically perceived the orange smell of the purple jelly and 
beetroot smell of the orange jelly, they would be alerted to the trickery before even 
tasting the dish. Thus, plausibly the switch occurs across flavour and smell. This could 
constitute a Gestalt shift that occurs in a multisensory manner across flavour and smell. If 
it did turn out that, counter-intuitively, the perceiver veridically perceived the orange and 
the beetroot through the sense of smell, but still muddled up the two through tasting, this 
would suggest a lack of multisensory unity. This is because they would seemingly be 
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attributing contradictory properties to the putative flavour-smell object.  
Even if one agrees with my suspicion that the shift would occur in both flavour and smell, 
one might object to the claim that this experience is a kind of Gestalt shift. This is because, 
as Spence and Youssef (p. 4) point out, it isn’t clear that the beetroot and orange jelly 
allows the taster to flip back to the original interpretation of the food once they have 
uncovered the discrepancy between the colour and the flavour. Thus, this case doesn’t 
seem analogous to the examples of multistability discussed above. The evidence for 
multisensory objecthood is stronger in cases where the senses’ interpretation of an object 
jointly flips back and forth. This is because if the Gestalt shifts keep occurring, there is less 
of a chance that the joint interpretative shift was just a coincidence or simply down to 
something (e.g. a piece of information) happening to alter our unisensory perceptions 
across multiple senses. A singular interpretative shift serves as more minimal evidence in 
favour of multisensory objecthood. What would be required for more robust evidence 
here would be a substance with ambiguous olfactory and gustatory interpretations. If our 
interpretation of the stimuli flipped back and forth together through both flavour and 
smell, this would provide strong evidence of multisensory grouping.  
Unfortunately, there may not be examples of flavours and smells that continue to evoke 
spontaneous shifts in interpretation like the Necker cube. There are cases of ambiguous 
odours, such as benzaldehyde — a scent that smells like almond or cherry. However, 
according to Spence and Youseff (2016, p. 4), while subjects are generally able to 
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recognise both interpretations of the benzaldehyde odour, they tend to settle on one 
interpretation and don’t experience spontaneous shifts in their perception. Thus, we lack 
evidence that these ambiguous odours result in multistability. Spence and Youseff suggest 
that the chemical senses may not allow for multistable perceptual shifts because they 
provide less rich bottom-up contributions to perception or because our flavour and smell 
perceptions involve slower attentional shifts than in the other senses (p. 4). They also note 
that the lack of evidence for multistability in flavour and smell perception may simply be 
down to a dearth of research into the chemical senses. Further studies are needed, but 
for now at least, this line of evidence only provides minimal support for flavour-smell 
objects.  
Nevertheless, based on the minimal suggestive evidence from the jelly case and the more 
robust evidence from Gestalt grouping principles, there are plausible grounds to think 
flavour and smell can be involved in the unified perception of multisensory flavour-odour 
objects. Although flavours are distinct from odours, there still seems to be a continuity 
between the chemical substances experienced through each of these senses (see Mizrahi, 
2014 for an approach that emphasises this kind of continuity), and that this can be 
reflected in a kind of multisensory perceptual objecthood. Flavour perception involves 
odours perceived retronasally, and thus a similar kind of stimulus is involved in both 
flavour and smell. There are grounds for thinking that at least sometimes these senses 
jointly pick out a single odorous, flavoursome chemical substance. On the other hand, we 
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lack good grounds for taking visual and auditory interactions with the chemical senses to 
be constitutive of multisensory objects.  
5.4 A chemical variant of Molyneux’s question  
The issues so far discussed in this chapter are closely related to Molyneux’s question — a 
long-standing problem of perception, referenced by John Locke (1689/1979, book 2, 
chapter ix). Molyneux’s question is the question of whether one born blind but who had 
regained their vision might be able to visually recognise a cube, which they had only 
identified through touch previously. Many people find it quite plausible that they could 
do so. Studies looking at congenital cataract patients find that, in fact, such subjects 
cannot recognise a cube that had previously only been perceived through touch (Held, et 
al., 2011). However, this may not be due to a lack of connection between vision and touch, 
but rather because such patients only have a limited capacity for visual 3D form 
perception immediately following surgery (Schwenkler, 2012). Moreover, the sensory 
deprivation involved in blindness from birth may cause perceptual deficits even following 
the removal of the cataracts.79 And so the debate continues.  
Regardless, there is a question as to why it even seems plausible that Molyneux’s question 
could be answered in the affirmative, whereas similar scenarios involving the other senses 
 
79 And with a sensorimotor approach, the subject must master new sensorimotor contingencies to perceive 
via a new sense modality, regardless of any connection between the objects picked out by each sense. Noë 
(2004) has argued that congenital cataract patients are ‘experientially blind’ (pp. 3–11) following the 
removal of cataracts because they haven’t yet developed the requisite sensorimotor understanding. 
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do not. The reason that one might think a previously blind subject could recognise the 
cube is because features such as the shape and size of the cube (which specify the object’s 
boundaries) can be recognised through both vision and touch.80 It seems highly unlikely, 
on the other hand, that one could visually recognise a lemon, which one had only smelled 
or tasted before. This is precisely because olfactory and flavour objects are picked out in 
different ways than visual objects, and the perceptual objects themselves are different 
from the visually perceived objects (odours and flavours rather than lemons). We 
currently also seem to lack evidence for an overarching perceptual object that combines 
the unisensory visual and olfactory/flavour objects. The different object types don’t seem 
to bear sufficient connection to one another in how they are individuated to exhibit a 
unified kind of figure-ground segregation.  
What ought we say about a chemical variant of the question, where we ask whether 
someone could recognise by taste something only ever smelled before, or by smell 
something only ever tasted before? Plausibly, they could successfully recognise the 
flavour or smell. Often things do taste how you would expect them to taste based on their 
smell. There is empirical evidence to vindicate this suspicion. A study by Pierce and 
Halpern (1996) shows people are good at identifying odorants retronasally, when they 
 
80 It is controversial whether vision and touch do converge on such properties. For example, see Richardson 
(2014) for discussion of a view she attributes to Berkeley and Broad (‘the Berkeley-Broad view’), which takes 
the spatial fields of vision and touch to be importantly and wholly distinct. Although a full exploration of 
such views is beyond the scope of this chapter, the evidence from three-dimensional Necker cubes may go 
some way to counteract this kind of position.  
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have only been trained to recognise them orthonasally.81 This supports a positive answer 
to a flavour/smell version of Molyneux’ question: a subject who had only ever smelled 
something’s odour before would be likely to also recognise its flavour. And these two 
unisensory types of perceptual object (flavours and smells) can be experienced together 
as a kind of multisensory flavour-smell object. 
In some instances, things don’t taste as we would expect from their smell. People 
sometimes express surprise that something doesn’t taste how they would expect from its 
smell. Some people profess to enjoy the taste of certain types of cheese but to dislike the 
smell, and to like the smell of coffee but not the taste. These kinds of instances might 
constitute examples of a failure of perceptual grouping. But the fact that such failures 
occur further serves to highlight that there are also successes: often our flavour and smell 
experiences are unified.82 
More work is required to determine how pervasive this kind of unification is. Although 
this thesis will not explore this issue further, the foregoing discussion may have 
implications for debates that take odours to be sensibilia — ephemeral entities that are 
 
81 However, it isn’t clear from this study whether the participants had ever had any prior retronasal exposure 
to such stimuli, so this evidence does not conclusively show that we can recognise through flavour things 
only previously experienced through smell. 
82 This is analogous to various audio-visual cases highlighted by O’Callaghan (2017, p. 163). He has argued 
that a source of support for putative cases of multisensory grouping is to look at the phenomenological 
distinction between cases where the grouping succeeds and where it fails. Badly dubbed films are jarring 
and seem to result in wholly separate auditory and visual experiences, and a bad ventriloquist will result in 
our seeing the dummy’s mouth moving as separate from the sound stream (and we might instead perceive 
the sound stream as being intimately connected with the ventriloquist’s own mouth movements). According 
to O’Callaghan, what accounts for these phenomenological differences is the shift from a single 
multisensory object to multiple unisensory objects. 
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not ordinary objects and are only perceptible through a single sense modality (Richardson, 
2018; see also Mac Cumhaill, 2018) — or more broadly take odours to be the ‘proper 
objects’ of olfaction. Odours are, according to such accounts, only perceptible through 
the sense of smell. Physical three-dimensional objects, on the other hand, do not appear 
to bear this kind of intimate connection with a single modality, since they are perceptible 
through both vision and touch, for example. However, if we are sometimes able to 
perceive a joint perceptual object through both flavour and smell, this may make their 
object more akin to the physical objects jointly detectable through vision and touch. 
Odorous, flavoursome substances may sometimes be experienced as a unified, single 
worldly entity. Whether this kind of joint perception challenges — or at least softens — 
notions of odours (and flavours) as sensibilia/proper objects would be worthwhile avenue 
for future investigation.  
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that with some approaches to individuating the senses is it 
trivially true that flavour and smell objects are multisensory, but with another method of 
individuating them (whereby we treat the senses as perceptual systems), things are not 
so obvious. To help determine whether multiple senses are jointly involved in picking out 
a unified perceptual object, I proposed two different types of evidence: the application of 
the Gestalt grouping principles and multisensory Gestalt shifts. We saw that the first type 
of evidence, based on Gestalt grouping principles, supports unified multisensory flavour-
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smell objects. Certain grouping principles seem to apply across flavours and smells. For 
example, I argued that there are genuine phenomenological similarities across odours and 
flavours (odours may be perceived as similarly ‘sweet’ or ‘sour’ to a flavour, for example), 
and there appears to be grouping in accordance with such similarities. Although further 
research about multistability in the chemical senses is needed, this chapter also outlined 
some suggestive evidence of multisensory Gestalt shifts across the flavour and smell. Such 
shifts indicate that these senses can engage in a unified interpretation of a perceptual 
object’s identity and/or boundaries.  
The evidence discussed in this chapter provides good reason to endorse the idea that, at 
least sometimes, there can be unified flavour-smell objects. Although generally the spatial 
boundaries of odours and flavours differ, in some instances because of the 
phenomenological similarities and close connections between these senses and their 
objects, flavour and smell can jointly pick out a unified flavour-smell object. This reflects 
the non-spatial manner in which the Gestalt principles can apply. However, we currently 
lack good evidence for certain other kinds of multisensory perceptual objecthood, such 
as single objects picked out by vision or audition in conjunction with flavour or smell.  
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6. Memory and the chemical senses 
6.0 Introduction  
In the previous chapters, through the application of aspects of Gestalt psychology, we 
have seen how we ought to understand the perceptual objects that we access through 
our sensorimotor engagement. The sensorimotor approach set out in this thesis also 
emphasises the developmental nature of perception. Perception is a skill to be learned, 
involving a kind of embodied know-how, which enables us to pick out unified perceptual 
objects segregated from their backgrounds. However, thus far we haven’t explored in any 
detail how, in the course of this perceptual learning, prior experience shapes perceptual 
consciousness. This chapter will take a closer look at the role of previous experience and 
memory in perception, examining how familiarity with object-types impacts flavour and 
smell experiences. 
This chapter has two distinct but thematically related objectives. First, I explore the 
relationship between two central components of perceptual object experiences: object 
individuation and (an aspect of) object recognition. The element of object recognition that 
I discuss here is known as implicit object memory. Drawing on empirical evidence relating 
to both vision and chemical senses, I argue that this form of memory can impact object 
individuation (understood through figure-ground segregation), which is generally 
considered to be a very early aspect of perceptual processing. I further argue that the 
sensorimotor approach to perception can help to defuse an a priori argument against the 
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claim that object memories can influence object individuation. According to this 
argument, it is logically required that to implicitly recognise an object, we must first be 
able to discern which parts of the visual field belong together as figures and which bits 
are background. Such an argument, however, relies on assumptions about implicit object 
memory that need not be endorsed.  
Second, I explore another kind of memory involved in flavour and smell experiences — 
autobiographical memory. Flavours and smells tend to give rise to especially rich and 
emotional memories of one’s past. This is known as the ‘Proust Phenomenon’. The 
autobiographical memories of the Proust phenomenon are a narrative variety of memory; 
they involve the construction and reconstruction of personally significant stories. I draw 
on Velleman’s (2003) account of narrative explanation here, according to which the 
intelligibility distinctive of narratives derives from the emotional trajectories (or 
‘cadences’) central to them. I argue that the especially affective nature of olfactory and 
gustatory objects makes them particularly well-placed to serve as catalysts for these 
emotional trajectories at the heart of autobiographical memory. Just as certain triggers 
can reactivate procedural skills, certain triggers can reactivate emotional, interoceptive 
patterns. The arguments of this chapter suggest that the line between procedural 
memory and ‘cognitive’ forms of memory can be softened.  
6.1 Does prior experience play a role in object individuation? 
To what extent does prior experience of perceptual objects shape our future encounters 
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with such items? I argued in chapter 3 that perceptual constancies underpin various 
object recognition abilities (such as tracking, perceiving an object as persistent, and 
amodal completion), which are to be understood in terms of one’s sensorimotor 
understanding. Here I focus on a different aspect of object recognition: implicit object 
memory, which is a familiarity with an object/object-type, without the requirement that 
the subject consciously remembers the object.83 As we shall see, evidence suggests 
implicit object memories often influence figure-ground assignments. This is especially 
pertinent in flavour and smell perception, where it is hard to make figure-ground 
distinctions without familiarity with the relevant odours/flavours. 
Two opposing approaches to the role of object memories in perception have emerged. 
Each is supported by differing empirical evidence and assumptions about perception. The 
first has been referred to as the ‘figure-ground first’ (FGF) approach (I follow Peterson & 
Skow Grant’s, 2003 terminology here), according to which object memories cannot play 
a role in figure-ground assignments. With this approach, figure-ground segregation must 
precede higher level processing, occurring in a serial, feedforward manner (e.g., Marr, 
1982; Kosslyn, 1987; Craft, Schütze, Niebur, & von der Heydt, 2007; Palmer & Rock, 1994). 
This has been the dominant approach in cognitive science. Kosslyn (1987, p. 148) says: 
‘[H]igh-level visual processing in perception occurs after bottom-up figure/ ground 
 
83 As we shall see in the following discussion, the motivation for focusing on implicit object memories rather 
than conscious object memories is that exposure to particular object types can impact perceptual abilities 
even without any conscious recognition of the object. 
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segregation and parsing (which is done purely on the basis of stimulus properties)’. 
Stimulus properties alone, such as those upon which the classical Gestalt grouping 
principles are based, are said to be responsible for our figure-ground assignments. There 
are empirical reasons (to be discussed below) that Marr and others assumed that figure-
ground segregation occurs early and access to object memories only occurs at a later 
stage. As section 6.1.2 will discuss, there is also an argument that takes the FGF approach 
to be true a priori.  
The other approach — which I shall call the ‘memory affects figure-ground’ (MAFG) 
approach — instead argues that implicit object memory (or ‘familiarity’)84 can affect 
figure-ground segregation. This second approach has been notably defended by Peterson 
and colleagues (Peterson, Harvey, & Weidenbacher, 1991; Peterson & Gibson, 1994; 
Peterson, de Gelder, Rapcsak, Gerhardstein, & Bachoud-Lévi, 2000; Peterson & Skow 
Grant, 2003). However, this idea that familiarity affects perceptual organisation isn’t new. 
Rubin found that when viewers of an ambiguous figure-ground display (such as his famous 
vase, Fig. 6.1) look at the same display again, they have a tendency to perceive the same 
region as a figure again — a phenomenon he referred to as ‘figural after-effects’ (Rubin, 
1915, Section 2; see also Peterson, 1999 for discussion).85 Moreover, Wertheimer — who 
 
84 I use the terms ‘implicit object memory’ and ‘familiarity’ with objects interchangeably here. However, the 
term ‘familiarity’ shouldn’t be taken to imply a conscious feeling of familiarity (see the distinction between 
explicit and object recognition below).  
85 Rubin’s findings were criticised and various subsequent studies failed to replicate them (e.g. see Rock & 
Kremen, 1957) but as Peterson (1999) points out, such studies greatly differed in their design from Rubin’s 
original study. Moreover, other research did replicate Rubin’s findings (e.g. Gottschaldt, 1929/1938). 
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first set out the Gestalt grouping principles — suggested that past experience is one of the 
factors in perceptual grouping: 
Another factor affecting whether a certain grouping and segregation will result is 
familiarity or ‘past experience.’ In its simplest formulation, this principle asserts that 
if AB is familiar, and C is familiar, but BC is not; if they happen to be associated with 
something else (spoken names, etc.); or if AB/C is familiar, but A/BC is not; then there 
is the tendency for ABC to result in the familiar, frequently experienced, learned, 
trained pattern AB/C. (Wertheimer, 1923/1938, p. 160) 
However, despite Rubin’s and Wertheimer’s observations, evidence taken from Gestalt 
psychology might also appear to reinforce the FGF approach. Typically, the Gestalt 
approach has emphasised the role of the classical grouping principles without 
consideration of past experience (see Wagemans, et al., 2012 for discussion). This is 
Fig. 6.1. Rubin’s Vase (adapted from Rubin, 1915, 
image 3) 
Depending on one’s figure-ground assignments, this 
image can be interpreted either as a white vase or 
as two black faces.  
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because, in the case of novel shapes, figure-ground assignments can seemingly be 
explained through these classical Gestalt cues alone. The Gestalt psychologists found that 
regions that were symmetrical, enclosed, convex, etc. are more likely to be perceived as 
figures, and are more likely to be grouped together with aspects of the scene that are 
similar to them, in close proximity, exhibit common motion, etc. Moreover, familiar 
figures can often be hidden within images (much like those in fig 1.1.a that hide a 
hexagon), and they will not be picked out over novel figures that conform to a more 
prägnant organisation (see Metzger, 1936/2006, p. 17, fig. 20, where the familiar numeral 
4 is hidden within an image). The Gestalt principles can be understood as providing 
bottom-up heuristics for organising the perceptual field.  
More contemporary studies have also been taken to favour the FGF approach (by Marr, 
1982, for example). Warrington and Taylor (1973) found that a patient with a form of 
‘apperceptive’ visual agnosia performed poorly at object and shape identification tasks 
(thus, seemingly lacking object memory), but was still able to segregate figure and ground 
correctly. This was taken as evidence in favour of the assumption that vision operates in 
a serial hierarchical manner, with figure-ground segregation occurring at an early stage 
prior to the accessing of object memories (Marr, 1982). According to the FGF approach, 
figure-ground assignments are not penetrable by ‘higher’ processes such as memory, and 
memories of objects are only accessed after figure-ground segregation has occurred. This 
has been the dominant approach in cognitive science.  
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The trouble with this kind of evidence for the FGF approach is that it stems from the faulty 
assumption that since there are some instances in which figure-ground segregation occurs 
without being influenced by object memory, it must always do so (see Peterson’s 1999 
critique of Marr). Taking the Gestalt principles to favour the FGF approach requires a jump 
from the claim that Gestalt principles can (sometimes) explain figure-ground effects 
without object memories playing a role, to the claim that object memories can never play 
a role in figure-ground segregation. Likewise, the evidence from Warrington and Taylor 
can on its own, at best, only show that in a particular case involving a subject with visual 
agnosia, object memory isn’t playing a role in figure-ground assignments. 
The MAFG approach is consistent with there being some cases where object memory 
plays no role in object individuation. Since the FGF approach says that it is impossible for 
object memory to play a role in figure-ground assignments, an alternative view need only 
argue that in some cases memory plays a role. This is the approach of Peterson and 
colleagues. In keeping with Wertheimer’s original statements about the role of familiarity 
in perceptual organisation, they argue that object memory acts only as another defeasible 
cue for figure-ground assignment (Peterson & Gibson, 1994; Peterson & Skow Grant, 
2003). Like the other cues, it can (ceteris paribus) make it more likely that certain aspects 
of the world will be grouped together as a unified figure, but it need not always be in 
operation. It neither dominates nor is dominated by the classical grouping principles of 
Gestalt psychology, and in the case of novel shapes where the subject does not have prior 
experience with that object-type, the classical cues alone can plausibly explain figure-
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ground assignments (although, as 6.1.1 discusses, object memory is an especially 
important cue in the case of the chemical senses).  
However, Peterson and colleagues don’t merely wish to show that the evidence from 
agnosia and Gestalt psychology (which had been taken to support FGF) is consistent with 
MAFG. They wish to further demonstrate that in many cases, even those involving agnosia 
like the case highlighted by Warrington and Taylor, implicit object memory actually does 
play a role. Thus, they take a different line of enquiry and tease apart the notions of explicit 
and implicit object memories. Their research provides evidence of implicit object 
memories influencing figure-ground assignments even where the subject lacks explicit 
object memories. 
Peterson and Skow Grant (2003) point out that Warrington and Taylor’s study relied on 
naming tasks, which tested explicit object memory, rather than implicit familiarity. What 
was shown was that agnosic subjects didn’t consciously recognise the objects and they 
were unable to successfully name them, i.e. involving ‘conscious recognition and 
identification’ (ibid., p. 3), but they could still separate figure from ground in a normal 
manner. They argue that the kind of explicit object memory tested by the naming task 
differs from implicit object memory, which does not require a conscious awareness of 
one’s familiarity with an object-type. The distinction between these forms of memory is 
vindicated elsewhere, for example in studies showing that conscious familiarity is 
impacted by medication that does not generally affect implicit perceptual memory 
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(Weingartner, Eckardt, Molchan, & Sunderland, 1992; see also Yonelinas, 2002, pp. 482–
484 for discussion of other functional distinctions between these forms of memory). 
In behavioural studies, it was shown that subjects are more likely to perceive familiar 
regions as being figures (Peterson, Harvey, & Weidenbacher, 1991). Importantly, Peterson 
and colleagues (2000) highlight cases where this holds even though subjects lack explicit 
object recognition abilities. They developed a study involving displays, similar to Rubin 
vases (Fig. 6.1), with a black shape in the centre and white shapes at the sides. The white 
shapes at the side depicted parts of well-known objects, such as face profiles or guitars, 
but they presented these displays at differing orientations (normal orientation or upside-
down). They tested a visual agnosic, A.D., and discovered that although she was unable to 
consciously identify the well-known shapes presented, she (like non-agnosic subjects) was 
still more likely to perceive these ‘familiar’ shapes as figures when presented at their 
usual, more recognisable orientation. This occurred even though the traditional Gestalt 
cues such as convexity, symmetry, similarity and proximity remained the same whether 
the displays were in an upright or upside-down orientation. This suggests implicit object 
memories can play a role in perceptual grouping, even if the subject does not explicitly 
remember having encountered the object-type before. Regardless of conscious 
recognition, subjects’ figure-ground assignments can be affected by implicit familiarity.  
Peterson and colleagues’ (2000) research appears to show that familiarity with objects at 
least sometimes plays a role in figure-ground assignments, contra the FGF approach. 
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Moreover, it suggests the relevant sort of memory involved in figure-ground assignments 
is — or at least can be — of an implicit non-declarative form.86  
Moving beyond the simple shapes used in Peterson’s research towards more complex 
ambiguous images provides more obvious cases where familiarity influences figure-
ground segregation. Consider the famous Dalmatian image by R. C. James (Fig. 6.2). To 
see the dog in the image in the first instance, plausibly one must have encountered dogs 
 
86 There is also evidence suggesting that conscious declarative memory of shapes is not sufficient for this 
pattern of figure-ground effects. Telling a subject that the orientation of the display has changed — and the 
subject being well-aware of what the upside-down shape depicts — does not increase the likelihood of 
them perceiving this region as a figure (Peterson, Harvey, & Weidenbacher, 1991; Peterson & Gibson, 1994). 
Fig. 6.2. The Dalmatian 
The well-known photograph of a Dalmatian by R. C. 
James. It is very difficult to locate the dog on first viewing 
of the image. 
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before (without some level of familiarity with dogs it is unlikely one would be able to see 
the hidden figure), and even then, it is difficult to pick out the Dalmatian initially. And 
when one has seen this figure once, it is almost impossible not to pick it out again in future 
encounters, thus suggesting that one develops a memory of this specific stimulus. This 
effect appears to hold even in cases where subjects deny conscious recollection of their 
prior experience with such an image, suggesting again that implicit object memory is 
playing the crucial role here (Mitchell, 2006). This is a clear instance where figure-ground 
assignments are influenced by prior experience.87 
Proponents of FGF may deny that our interpretation of such images is a purely visual 
activity. Marr (1982, p. 101) says that the Dalmatian image relies upon complex top-down 
factors (such as memory) rather than just ‘straightforward visual skills’. However, the 
assumption that such instances of perception — confounded by top-down influences — 
are clearly separable from those cases that only involve straightforward visual skills 
already requires a reliance upon the kind of serial model of vision advocated by Marr. 
 
87 As an addendum to this, certain cross-cultural studies provide additional support for the MAFG approach. 
Such research provides support for the claim that familiarity (or lack thereof) can play a role in whether 
perceptual grouping is successful and can alter the kinds of figure-ground assignments that are made. The 
Pirahã, a remote Amazonian tribe with limited access to modern media, are less able to recognise two-
toned images reduced to just black and white (akin to the Dalmatian image, fig 6.2) than English-speaking 
controls, even in the presence of the original photo from which the two-tone image was adapted (Yoon, et 
al., 2014). Subjects are unable to perceptually group the images into meaningful figures, perhaps because 
of their lack of familiarity with these types of black and white photographic images. Thus, in this case, lack 
of familiarity results in a failure to segregate into meaningful figure and ground. See also Stachoň and 
colleagues (2019) for discussion of how cultural differences impact figure-ground assignments in the 
reading of reference maps. Other research suggests that figure-ground assignments can be treated as a skill 
built on prior experience. For example, video game players are better at picking out visual targets in a 
cluttered field than non-gamers (Achtman, Green, & Bavelier, 2008) 
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Without this assumption (and in light of the evidence from Peterson suggesting that 
implicit object memory can influence figure-ground assignments even in the ‘simple’ 
cases), it doesn’t appear than the Dalmatian case can simply be dismissed as not 
straightforwardly visual. In previous chapters I advocated extending object concepts to 
the chemical senses, and here we will see that the FGF approach is especially empirically 
implausible as an account of such non-visual perceptual objects.  
6.1.1 Further support for MAFG: familiarity and the chemical senses 
Consideration of the chemical senses provides support for the MAFG approach (or at least 
suggests that it is the correct approach for the chemical senses). Familiarity plays an 
especially important role in our figure-ground assignments in these senses. While there 
may be some limited cases where a perceiver does not have prior experience with an 
object in these senses, it is difficult to individuate wholly novel flavour and smell objects. 
Most of the empirical research surveyed in this section relates to olfaction, but because 
of the close connections between olfaction and flavour perception (see chapter 5), much 
of it plausibly also applies to flavour.  
Implicit (rather than explicit) object memory is the norm in olfactory experience as often 
odours aren’t explicitly noticed in the first place, and there are relatively few instances 
where explicit object memory is required. For those who don’t regularly engage in 
activities like wine-tasting, explicit olfactory object memory is likely to be largely restricted 
to cases such as cooking and gas leak detection (Köster, Møller, & Mojet, 2014). Yet 
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implicit familiarity with odours has a dramatic impact on our abilities to individuate them. 
For example, subjects who work at perfume retail outlets (Hummel, Guel, & Delank, 2004) 
perform better than controls in odour discrimination tasks. Moreover, subjects are poor 
at distinguishing novel odours from one another (i.e. olfactory object individuation). 
However, they quickly improve after repeated exposure to these odours (Jehl, Royet, & 
Holley, 1995). Thus, we can see that olfactory familiarity greatly improves individuation 
abilities, presenting a challenge for FGF approaches. It is particularly difficult to 
individuate odours on the basis of stimulus properties alone (which is not to say it is 
impossible, as discussed in chapter 3). Thus, prior experience seems to play a particularly 
important role for olfaction.  
Although prior experience generally makes us better at olfactory figure-ground 
segregation, it can also make certain figure-ground distinctions more challenging or alter 
how odours and flavours are individuated in interesting ways. This is evidenced by the 
effects of odour-pairings. Studies show that if subjects are presented with combinations 
of novel odours, the individual odours subsequently often seem more similar to one 
another (and, thus, harder to discriminate). If cherry and mushroom odours are paired, 
mushrooms are subsequently experienced as smelling more like cherries, and vice versa. 
And it becomes harder to discriminate between these odours (Stevenson, 2001; Case, 
Stevenson, & Dempsey, 2004; Wilson & Stevenson, 2007). This suggests that prior 
experiences can make it harder to individuate perceptual objects and/or alter the figure-
ground assignments that one makes.  
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Olfactory experience is often more analogous to difficult-to-segregate, ambiguous visual 
cases like the Dalmatian dog image (Fig. 6.2; see Wilson & Stevenson, 2006, pp. 113–114, 
who draw this kind of comparison) than it is to perceptions of simpler visual images. The 
Dalmatian image involves a lot of confusing background ‘noise’ and the Dalmatian doesn’t 
have clearly demarcated edges. Thus, seeing the dog as a figure segregated from the 
background in the first place requires a degree of understanding about the shape of a 
dog, how it would look across different perspectives and so forth. Similarly, olfaction 
usually involves picking figures out from a background of wide-ranging odours and the 
edges of odours are not clearly specified. Plausibly experience of odours in different 
contexts, against different background odorants etc., enables us to develop the ability to 
segregate them efficiently and consistently. Similarly, once we have mastered the skills 
relevant in allowing us to individuate and recognise odour objects, we become much more 
adept at perceiving these objects again. 
Object memory thus plays an especially important role in successful figure-ground 
segregation in the chemical senses. It is harder to individuate olfactory objects on the 
basis of stimulus properties alone and individuation is often facilitated by acquired 
familiarity. The classical Gestalt cues do at times allow for novel figure-ground 
assignments. Through extended smelling and savouring activity, we can individuate 
flavour and smell objects through classical Gestalt principles (see chapters 3 and 4 for 
further discussion). However, in comparison to visual perception of novel objects, this 
environmental exploration is likely to be even more protracted. While the presence and 
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strength of odours can often be determined in a single sniff, perceptual grouping and 
object individuation often requires multiple sniffs (see Mainland & Sobel, 2006), which 
occur about 1.6 seconds apart. We can perceive odours as spatially extended and located 
(allowing for spatial figure-ground segregation), but this is a time-consuming process. We 
generally don’t synchronically (i.e. at a single time) experience odours being at a 
determinable distal location but can do so diachronically (across time) as we engage with 
the perceptual landscape (see Young, 2016).88 Successfully perceiving novel odours as 
individuated objects is often rather difficult and slow. Plausibly, the same holds in the case 
of flavour perception. As argued in chapter 2, flavours often follow temporally extended 
trajectories and seem equally elusive (see also Smith, 2015b). 
Implicit object memory is required for quick and easy olfactory figure-ground segregation 
(and likely this applies to flavour perception too). There thus appears to be an especially 
tight link between object memories and the chemical senses. Olfactory figure-ground 
segregation is hard to achieve without prior experience and thus looking to the chemical 
senses seems to lend further support to the MAFG approach.  
6.1.2 Defusing the a priori argument  
However, even though the evidence surveyed above makes the FGF approach empirically 
implausible, especially when applied to the chemical senses, there remains another kind 
 
88 Although see Aasen, 2018 for phenomenological reasons to think we can sometimes experience the 
spatial extension of odours, and their being at a distance, even synchronically. 
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of argument in favour of this approach. There is an a priori worry about object memory 
influencing figure-ground assignments. According to this argument, to recognise an 
object, we must first be able to discern which parts of the visual field belong together as 
figures and which bits are background. Rock and co-authors have expressed such a worry. 
Rock and Kremen (1957, p. 23) state:  
There is a logical reason, however, why past experience should not determine 
form perception as here defined. Insofar as past experience with specific shapes 
is preserved via memory traces, to say that such past experience can determine 
form is to say that the relevant trace can enter into the process which organizes 
the percept. But we assume that ordinarily the relevant trace is aroused after the 
form is perceived, that it is selected in some way by virtue of the similarity of the 
present perceptual process to the trace and that this leads to recognition. 
And more recently Palmer and Rock (1994, p. 517) similarly argue:  
The major difficulty we see … is that object recognition seems logically to imply a 
comparison between the shape of the object candidate and the shapes of known 
object types. This, in turn, seems logically to require that figure-ground 
organization occur prior to object recognition, because a contour imparts shape 
only to the region on its figural side; the ground is seen to extend uniformly behind 
the figural region. Such considerations lead us to believe that some distinction 
between figure and ground processing must occur prior to object recognition. The 
logic appears airtight.  
This kind of argument is premised on the idea that object memory involves matching up 
a current target object (i.e. already picked out as a segregated individual) with object-
representations stored as memories. For a current object to be subject to comparison, it 
must have undergone figure-ground segregation (otherwise it would not be a discrete 
perceptual object in the first place). Thus, according to Rock and colleagues’ line of 
argument, the MAFG approach is false since it says that, at least in some cases, the target 
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object is not segregated prior to the operation of object memory. 
Peterson and Gibson’s (1994) solution to this kind of worry is to take there to be some 
early partial edge detection (which does not constitute full-blown figure-ground 
segregation) that allows for the accessing of object memories. Such a solution concedes 
that there is initial perceptual organisation prior to the activation of implicit object 
memories but alleges that this organisation does not count as figure-ground segregation. 
This kind of approach allows one to hold onto the premise that implicit object recognition 
requires a comparison between something currently represented and stored object 
memories. Yet, it says that the items that are subject to comparison are not individuated 
figures but merely partial edges. The applicability of such a suggestion to the chemical 
senses is unknown (especially since it’s unclear whether the notion of ‘partial edges’ 
makes sense in these domains). However, regardless of this, one could perhaps avoid the 
a priori worry in a similar way by simply arguing that some kind of rudimentary chemical 
information (which does not itself constitute figure-ground segregation) can be compared 
with stored flavour and smell object representations.  
It is unclear, though, whether Peterson’s approach really succeeds in avoiding reliance 
upon figure-ground segregation prior to object recognition. Palmer and Rock (1994) find 
Peterson and Gibson’s solution to be inadequate because they think that if edges are to 
serve the role required by the proposed solution, they must actually be the boundaries of 
a figure. This is because edges alone do not have shape: ‘they merely impart shape to the 
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regions they bound.’ (p. 517) Edges alone are shapeless and thus don’t impart sufficient 
information to allow for comparison with remembered objects. They thus think that 
Peterson and Gibson are sneaking the notion of figure-ground segregation back into their 
account. The challenge is to find early perceptual information that is sufficiently 
informative to allow for matching up with object-representations, but which is also 
sufficiently uninformative that it doesn’t yet involve figure-ground segregation. Although 
this thesis does not offer a full investigation of whether such an approach can succeed, I 
agree with Palmer and Rock that there is a tension within this strategy. 
Regardless of whether Peterson and Gibson’s proposed solution can succeed, there is a 
different kind of response available to the proponent of MAFG. With this suggested 
approach, the a priori worry does not arise. Rather than searching for a kind of early 
perceptual information that treads the delicate line between too informative (i.e. already 
involving figure-ground segregation) and not informative enough (to allow for matching 
up with object representations), one can instead question the notion of implicit object 
memory that the a priori argument is premised upon. Rock and colleagues take object 
recognition to be a process of comparing current perceptual representations with those 
stored in memory. This idea follows the traditional hierarchical representation-based 
models of researchers such as Marr (1982) and Biederman (1987). According to such 
approaches, context-neutral representations of objects are stored in the brain and when 
one encounters further objects, the current perceptual representation is matched up to 
those stored in memory. 
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As we have seen, the kind of memory of interest to MAFG is an implicit form of object 
memory. It thus requires no conscious awareness of one’s own familiarity with an object-
type; it need not be accompanied by conscious episodic memory (recollection of events 
of the personal past) or semantic memory (recollection of facts or propositions). This 
implicit form of memory is generally evidenced simply by alterations to behavioural and 
perceptual engagement with the world owing to prior experience (as in priming tasks, for 
example).89 Much like the other well-known form of implicit memory, procedural memory 
(the type of long-term memory responsible for bodily skills such as riding a bike and 
playing the piano, i.e. know-how), a subject’s prior experience shapes their future 
behaviours and/or perceptions. As with procedural memory, it isn’t clear that implicit 
object memory constitutes know-that. It may instead be explicable in terms of a kind of 
bodily know-how. Subjects learn how to perceptually engage with certain object-types, 
without necessarily remembering any prior encounters with such objects.  
Many researchers have taken there to be no explanatory need to understand procedural 
memory in terms of the retrieval of stored contents (e.g. Schacter & Tulving, 1994; 
Tulving, 2000; Sutton & Williamson, 2014; Michaelian, 2015). Tulving (2000) takes the 
application of such concepts to procedural skills to be ‘awkward at best and silly at worst’ 
(2000, p. 38). However, usually these researchers draw a sharp distinction between such 
 
89 The orthodoxy is to treat priming as non-declarative, but as still a cognitive form of memory based on the 
retrieval of stored contents (Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Tulving, 2000; Michaelian, 2015). The view expressed 
here can be seen as diverging from this assumption. 
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behavioural skills and ‘cognitive’ forms of memory, which are to be understood in terms 
of the retrieval of stored contents (e.g. Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Tulving, 2000; 
Michaelian, 2015). Meanwhile, other researchers have questioned the notion of memory 
traces and/or rejected memory as grounded in stored internal representations altogether 
(e.g. see Moyal-Sharrock, 2013; Myin & Zahidi, 2015; Hutto & Myin, 2017; Hutto & 
Peeters, 2018), instead advocating that we treat memories as embodied capacities. 
Although here I do not commit to a wholesale rejection of internal representations in 
memory, implicit object memories are a good candidate for a more embodied treatment. 
With the developmental style of sensorimotor approach set out in this thesis (see 
chapters 1 and 2), prior experience allows for mastery of the relevant sensorimotor 
contingencies and hones worldly interaction. Through these modifications to a subject’s 
perceptual engagement with the world, their figure-ground assignments can plausibly be 
altered (as per the MAFG approach). There need not be a comparison between a target 
object and remembered object for this to occur (which is not to claim that the relevant 
worldly interactions are not guided by neural representations). 
This approach can defuse the a priori argument. If perception is treated as a bodily skill 
that can be refined through prior experience, there is no logical problem stemming from 
a need to match current perceptual representations with stored object representations. 
Comparison between perceptual representations is not how implicit object memory is to 
be understood. It is instead to be understood in terms of a subject’s mastery of the 
relevant object-related sensorimotor contingencies. Prior experience with objects allows 
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for this mastery, honing one’s perceptual engagement with the world.  
This approach not only allows for the defusal of the a priori argument but is also 
empirically tractable. Empirical support for such an approach to implicit object memory 
includes studies in both robotic systems and humans. Such research has suggested that 
object recognition can be understood in terms of the mastery of object-related 
sensorimotor contingencies (see Engel, Maye, Kurthen, & König, 2013 for a review of 
relevant empirical evidence). For example, researchers have developed models in robotic 
systems, where the activation of sensorimotor contingencies allows the system to 
recognise and distinguish object-classes (Maye & Engel, 2011).90  
With the sensorimotor framework set out in this thesis and with the preceding discussion 
in mind, plausibly the form of implicit object memory discussed here consists in 
sensorimotor understanding. This is consonant with the emphasis on familiarity and prior 
experience by sensorimotor theorists (see chapter 2’s discussion of the developmental 
type of sensorimotor account, especially section 2.3). For example, Noë asserts:  
…we can only expand our experiential repertoire piecemeal, by nudging forward 
holding hands with what is familiar. For the most part, we are simply incapable of 
new sights, new sounds, new experiences. What we can perceive is limited to what 
we understand. (2006a, p. 31) 
The preceding discussion supports this kind of assertion and allows for the added claim 
 
90 See also Kietzmann, Geuter, & König (2011) for research into the role of eye movement in conscious 
object recognition.  
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from MAFG that familiarity is often involved even in supposedly simple perceptual 
processes like figure-ground segregation.91 With this suggested approach, the distinction 
is softened between this implicit form of object memory and so-called procedural memory 
— the form of long-term memory, responsible for bodily skills such as riding a bike and 
playing the piano. Both can be understood as bodily skills shaped by prior experience. It 
also suggests that Gestalt principles are particularly important for the perception of novel 
objects, which involves more protracted sensorimotor engagement with the 
environment. Based on this discussion, it appears that Gestalt principles may serve as 
heuristics for guiding this initial sensorimotor engagement. As the subject begins their 
perceptual engagement with the environment, stimulus features (that are, for example, 
similar and proximal/dissimilar and far apart) allow for initial expectations about which 
parts of the world belong together and which are distinct.  
6.2 Familiarity and affect in the chemical senses 
Along with prior experience come affective associations. The chemical senses are often 
taken to be especially affective, which may be related to the particularly important role 
that object memory plays in flavour and smell. Having looked at how prior experience can 
 
91 It shouldn’t, however, be inferred from this that with the sensorimotor approach it is impossible to 
perceive novel objects. As argued in chapter 2, the exercise of sensorimotor understanding either involves 
current bodily coupling with the environment or an attunement to how counterfactual bodily interaction 
with the world would induce sensory changes. Some types of perception — such as some types of 
temporally extended perception — appear to require the former, involving protracted engagement with 
the environment. Perceiving novel objects plausibly also requires this kind of more extended coupling with 
the environment to allow for the development of new sensorimotor understanding. 
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influence the way the perceptual field is parcelled up into discrete entities, here I shall 
explore how familiarity also shapes the affective valence of perceptual objects. This in 
turn will help to explain the so-called ‘Proust phenomenon’ — the capacity of flavours and 
smells to induce particularly rich autobiographical memories, which will be the topic of 
discussion in subsection 6.2.1.  
Flavour and smell experiences have a pronounced hedonic character and are closely 
connected to emotion and mood. The chemical senses generally give rise to more visceral 
affective reactions than the other senses, often provoking an ‘escape response’ (i.e. a 
heightened motivation to escape the situation), rather than just a negative affective 
experience (Asmus & Bell, 1999). Moreover, hedonic valence (pleasantness/ 
unpleasantness) tends to dominate olfactory experiences (e.g. Zald and Pardo, 1997; Khan 
et al., 2007). These aspects of the chemical senses are so pronounced that some take 
flavour and smell to be intrinsically valenced (e.g. Todd, 2018). With Todd’s approach, the 
affective aspects of flavour and smell experiences cannot be phenomenologically 
separated out from an objective flavour. This, he argues, is not the case in other 
perceptual experiences such as auditory experience of sound, where the unpleasantness 
of a sound is largely determined by factors such as volume, timbre and pitch (p. 287). The 
valence of flavours and smells, on the other hand, are not reducible to such dimensions. 
This conclusion may also be supported by multidimensional scaling techniques, which 
have been used to argue that valence is the most important factor in odour assessment 
(Haddad, et al., 2008). When rating similarity, sounds are likely to be ordered from low to 
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high pitch, smells are likely to be ordered (at least in part) in accordance with their 
pleasantness or unpleasantness.  
The significance of valence in the chemical senses is reflected in brain structures common 
to emotion and odour processing (for a review see Soudry, et al., 2011). Much of our 
emotional and olfactory processing occurs in limbic brain regions, such as the amygdala 
and hippocampus. The amygdala is crucial for emotional processing and is known to be 
especially involved in the detection of threat (Whalen, et al., 2004). It receives strong 
input from the primary olfactory cortex, and the connections between the amygdala and 
the primary olfactory cortex are bidirectional (Zald & Pardo, 1997). No other sensory 
system is so directly and dynamically connected with the parts of the brain responsible 
for emotional processing.  
There is reason to believe that implicit object memories of the sort set out in the previous 
sections play an important role in the highly valenced nature of flavours and smells. 
Plausibly, prior experience results in various affective associations, which impact future 
perceptual experience. This is supported by research showing that subjects tend to rate 
unfamiliar odours as neither pleasant nor unpleasant (Keller & Vosshall, 2016), suggesting 
that prior experience plays a role in the affective value of olfactory perceptions. Thus, 
one’s previous encounters can play a role in not only the successful individuation of 
flavours and smells (as argued in the previous section) but also in their affective valence.  
Further evidence shows that in the case of the chemical senses, we not only associate 
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perceptual objects with connected scenarios, contexts and feelings, but also the common 
sources of those odours and flavours. This is reflected in people’s preferences. One’s like 
or dislike of a particular odour appears to be predicted by the average preferences for all 
of the source-objects associated with that odour, weighted by how closely these 
associated objects match the relevant test odours (Schloss, Goldberger, Palmer, & 
Levitan, 2015).92 An apple odour is not just associated with apples, but also scented soap, 
sweets, etc., and according to this research, how positively valenced an apple-odour 
perception is will depend upon how positive or negative all these associations are. These 
associations will vary greatly between individuals. The smell of burning wood may be 
associated with campfires, but could also be associated with burning buildings, and the 
valenced nature of the percept is correlated with the weighted average of these positive 
and negative associations. Again, this would appear to support the idea that the 
associations based on prior experience play a role in the valenced nature of olfactory 
perceptions. Subjects’ preferences for certain odours are based upon the valences of prior 
odour-related experiences. Although humans tend to rely most heavily on visual and 
verbal communication as we navigate throughout the world, the chemical senses remain 
associated with our survival. The perceptual objects of the chemical senses are highly 
linked with things such as food consumption (Fallon & Rozin, 1983), disease and hazard 
avoidance (Curtis & Biran, 2001), reproduction, and social preferences (Li, Moallem, 
 
92 The idea that preferences for stimuli are predicted by one’s preferences for the things associated with 
those stimuli has also been shown to apply for colour preferences (Palmer & Schloss, 2010) and the model 
has had reasonable success in predicting visual texture preferences (Stephens & Hoffman, 2016). 
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Paller, & Gottfried, 2007). Such factors, along with the difficulty in perceiving individuated 
flavours and smells without prior experience (and the consequent affective associations), 
may go some way to explaining why they are so affectively charged.  
One way to cash out the idea that prior experience results in the affective valence of a 
perceived object is provided by Barrett and Bar (2009) and Lebrecht and colleagues 
(2012). According to such an approach, prior reactions to perceptual objects allow for 
implicit expectations regarding the value of objects when we encounter them again. It is 
plausible in the case of the chemical senses that the highly valenced nature of these 
perceptions is (at least in part) due to the kinds of associations we have with tastes and 
smells. The affective value of objects is understood in an embodied manner consistent 
with the sensorimotor approach. When faced with a pleasant or unpleasant sight, smell, 
taste, texture or sound we undergo a range of interoceptive, affective sensations such as 
changes to muscle tension, stomach motility, breathing, heart rate, etc. (Barrett & Bar, 
2009). The sensorimotor approach encourages us to view these bodily changes as parts 
of sensorimotor loops. A mastery of object-related sensorimotor contingencies may also 
involve an attunement to the kinds of interoceptive sensations these objects may induce. 
Objects may be perceptibly valenced in virtue of such expectancies.93  
 
93 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, this can plausibly help to explain the motivational character of 
our perceptions — because of the affective valence of perceptual objects, they are able to solicit various 
actions from us. For example, if a flavour is perceived as disgusting it will likely result in very different action 
tendencies (spitting out, throwing food away, etc.) than flavour perceived as delicious (eating more, 
savouring, etc.).  
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With this understanding of the affective valence of perceptual objects, connections can 
also be drawn between such perceptual experiences and the memories that are 
sometimes triggered by such perceptions. It is a well-known piece of folk wisdom that the 
chemical senses are especially effective at prompting rich and emotional memories of the 
past, as was famously described by Marcel Proust.94 Many people find the ability of the 
chemical senses to induce memories to be a very salient aspect of the phenomenology 
surrounding tasting and smelling. Thus, it is worth considering whether the approach set 
out in this thesis can offer something of value to our understanding of this phenomenon. 
In the final section of this chapter I shall offer a discussion of how an embodied 
sensorimotor approach can be informative about the links between the chemical senses 
and emotional autobiographical memories.  
6.2.1 The Proust phenomenon 
We have seen that flavours and smells are often especially strongly valenced, carrying a 
range of affective associations. Moreover, we have seen that with the suggested 
sensorimotor approach, the distinction between some forms of cognitive memory and 
procedural memory can be softened. Here, with both of these ideas in mind, I shall argue 
that even a seemingly paradigmatic example of declarative (expressible verbally), 
cognitive memory — autobiographical memory — may also not be so sharply 
 
94 The phenomenon has been depicted more recently in the popular 2007 Pixar film Ratatouille, where the 
taste of ratatouille mentally transported an unsentimental restaurant critic back to his childhood.  
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distinguishable from procedural forms of memory. This reframing of autobiographical 
memories can help to explain the phenomenology of the so-called ‘Proust phenomenon 
— the capacity of the chemical senses to trigger particularly rich autobiographical 
memories.  
In his novel In Search of Lost Time, Marcel Proust describes a character recalling highly 
vivid and emotional childhood memories after smelling and tasting a madeleine biscuit 
soaked in tea. 
No sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my palate than a 
shudder ran through me and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary thing that 
was happening to me. An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, something 
isolated, detached, with no suggestion of its origin. And at once the vicissitudes of 
life had become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory — 
this new sensation having had on me the effect which love has of filling me with a 
precious essence; or rather this essence was not in me it was me. ... Whence did 
it come? What did it mean? How could I seize and apprehend it? ... And suddenly 
the memory revealed itself. The taste was that of the little piece of madeleine 
which on Sunday mornings at Combray (because on those mornings I did not go 
out before mass), when I went to say good morning to her in her bedroom, my 
aunt Léonie used to give me, dipping it first in her own cup of tea or tisane. The 
sight of the little madeleine had recalled nothing to my mind before I tasted it… 
(Proust, 1913/1992, pp. 60–63) 
This literary work has attracted the interest of psychologists and neuroscientists as it 
seems to capture a special link that the chemical senses have with autobiographical, 
affective memories, which has been dubbed the Proust phenomenon. Autobiographical 
memory is most commonly taken to involve a combination of episodic and semantic forms 
of memory (both themselves generally taken to be cognitive, declarative forms of 
memory, involving the retrieval of stored contents), and involves a recollection of events 
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from one’s own life or has some kind of personal significance.95 Unlike the implicit forms 
of memory discussed in 6.1, autobiographical memory is considered a type of explicit 
declarative memory. Consistent with Proust’s descriptions, empirical research shows that 
the chemical senses are especially effective triggers for vivid autobiographical memories 
(de Bruijn & Bender, 2018). Such memories are significantly more likely to involve a feeling 
of being ‘brought back’ in time than those that are prompted visually (Herz & Schooler, 
2002, p. 30) and they are particularly emotional, as measured both by self-reports and 
heart-rate responses (Herz & Cupchik, 1992; Herz & Cupchik, 1995; Chu & Downes, 2001; 
Herz & Schooler, 2002; Willander & Larsson, 2007). They also tend to relate to earlier 
experiences, often involving the first decade of one’s life (Chu & Downes, 2001).96  
Not only are the memories of the Proust phenomenon markedly vivid and emotional, but 
they are importantly narrative-involving. One reason for treating such memories as 
inherently narrative-involving is that phenomenologically, autobiographical memories do 
usually appear to take the form of words or stories, as is exemplified by Proust’s narrator. 
They involve reliving or recounting stories from one’s life. A number of researchers (e.g. 
Nelson, 1988; Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Hoerl, 2007; Fivush, 2011; Hutto, 2017; Hutto & 
Myin, 2017) have also offered good empirical reasons to take autobiographical memory 
 
95 Autobiographical memory has been defined in different ways. Some take it to include all types of self-
related information (e.g. Brewer, 1986), while others restrict it to memories with particular significance (e.g. 
Nelson, 1993). I shall not adjudicate the merits of each definition here. 
96 More generally, smells serve as particularly effective memory prompts after long delays. This was 
highlighted by a study of how the distinctive smell of the Jorvik Viking Centre in York, UK can (more 




to be a kind of socio-culturally acquired narrative skill, involving a learned ability to 
reconstruct stories from one’s past.97 With such a view, narratives provide a kind of 
cognitive framework for autobiographical memory, and this is something that is 
developed in childhood and further refined through our lives (for detailed discussion see 
Hoerl, 2007; Hutto & Myin, 2017). 
Why should the chemical senses be so well-suited for triggering emotional narrative 
memories of this sort? A phenomenologically satisfying account of why this should be the 
case requires some exploration of the connections between affective perceptions and the 
dynamics of emotional autobiographical memories. Proust-style memories feel as though 
they follow quite naturally from the affective nature of the percepts that trigger them, 
which I shall suggest can be explained with an embodied approach to emotional 
memories. 
An account that accurately captures the phenomenology of how Proustian memories 
unfold is provided by Velleman’s (2003) approach to narrative understanding. For 
Velleman, narrative understanding is emotional understanding. It is assumed that 
emotions exhibit intentionality — a directedness at objects, events or states of affairs — 
and because of this they are capable of imparting meaning. Our understanding of stories 
 
97 Although narratives can purport to convey the truth, they need not actually do so and may be more 
closely related to — for example — our sense of self and our well-being. This approach coheres with the 
growing consensus that memory is not simply stored in a relatively inactive form in the brain before being 
retrieved, but inherently involves construction and reconstruction (e.g. see Nelson, 1993; Schacter, 1996; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Sutton & Williamson, 2014). 
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(including, he thinks, those by which we understand our own lives) comes from the 
emotional cadences to which they give rise — their distinctive patterns of emotional 
arousal and resolution. Stories can be analysed as having beginnings, middles and ends 
and each of these stages, and their relationship to one another, are intelligible in virtue 
of their emotional structure. The ups and downs of narratives are felt. For example, 
Velleman (ibid., p. 16) suggests that a horror story might be understood emotionally in 
terms of initial puzzlement that gives way to horror, which finally gives way to relief. Such 
cadences are not just random emotions pieced together, but instead follow distinctive 
trajectories that we learn through our own engagement with the world and through the 
stories that we become familiar with.  
Since William James (1884) proposed that emotions can be understood in terms of 
perceptions of physiological changes, many researchers have taken emotions to be 
importantly embodied, crucially involving an affective bodily component. Along these 
lines, Velleman takes emotional cadences to be visceral and embodied, stored ‘in 
experiential, proprioceptive, and kinesthetic memory–as we might say, in the muscle-
memory of the heart’ (p. 19). Thus, they can be understood, at least in part, in an 
embodied, enactive way consonant with the sensorimotor approach (particularly where 
sensorimotor loops are taken to extend to interoceptive sensations as suggested in 6.2). 
Moreover, as we saw in chapter 2, sensorimotor understanding can extend to the grasp 
of trajectories. We can be attuned to the way that flavours and smells (and pieces of 
music, etc.) unfold over time in accordance with definite patterns. By the same token, our 
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skilful sensorimotor engagement with the world is likely continuous with related tools we 
use to understand the world, such as our grasp of how narratives unfold. While there is 
not scope in this chapter to explore the viability of Velleman’s approach to narratives 
more generally,98 the account seems apt as a description of how Proustian memories feel. 
Thus, there are phenomenological reasons for thinking Velleman’s account can assist us 
in our understanding of how the chemical senses trigger memories. 
The emotional manner in which memories triggered by flavours and smells unfold does 
appear to be characterised by distinctive emotional patterns. When we have a sense of 
being teleported back in time, remembering various events of our lives (which may or may 
not be directly and saliently causally related to one another), these events seem 
connected to one another emotionally. In In Search of Lost Time, there is not an obvious 
causal link (at best, there are only complex and tangential causal connections) between 
the narrator’s Aunt Léonie dipping a madeleine in lime-flower tea and the subsequently 
recounted events, places and people in Combray, but there are salient emotional links 
between such events for Proust’s narrator. Moreover, Velleman highlights that certain 
emotional happenings seem to naturally follow from others: ‘some episodes set off an 
emotional tick to which subsequent episodes can provide the answering tock’ (p. 20), 
capturing the way a remembered event seems to naturally give way to another. If 
 
98 For critiques of such an approach as definitional of narrative understanding, see Carroll, 2007; Currie, 
2008. For discussions of how this approach can inform us about agency and mental time travel, see Hardt, 
2017; Ward, 2019.  
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autobiographical memories have this form, then percepts imbued with emotional or 
affective content would seem well-placed to serve as the initial ‘tick’ that then prompts 
the rest of an emotional trajectory. Since olfaction and flavour perception are especially 
affectively-charged they are likewise particularly powerful catalysts for instigating such 
trajectories. The experience of tasting a madeleine or a spoonful of ratatouille may be 
highly affectively valenced — perhaps inducing ‘an exquisite pleasure’ (Proust, 1913/1992, 
p. 60) — and this gives way to the unfolding of an emotional cadence.  
As discussed in 6.1, researchers have often drawn a clear divide between bodily 
procedural skills and ‘cognitive’ forms of memory involving the retrieval of stored 
contents (e.g. Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Tulving, 2000; Michaelian, 2015). However, taking 
there to be such a sharp distinction in the case of emotional autobiographical memories 
(a ‘cognitive’ type of memory) conflicts with the embodied manner in which these 
autobiographical memories unfold. If the suggested account is correct, 
emotional/affective experience can prime us to continue the rest of the embodied, 
affective cadence of an autobiographical memory. Familiar patterns of bodily response 
are initiated when prompted. With this approach to the Proust phenomenon, perceptions 
of odours and flavours can allow for a reinitiation of affective, interoceptive processes 
(giving rise to an emotional cadence) in a similar manner to how procedural memories 
allow for reinitiation of particular rehearsed bodily skills. Thus, as we saw with regards 
implict object memories above, there may again be scope to question the strict line drawn 
between cognitive and procedural forms of memory. 
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A piano player might implicitly know how to continue a piece of music after the first couple 
of notes. Or when someone remembers a speech, a sentence or two can serve as a 
prompt from which rest of the speech will flow. Similarly, a particular affective state 
induced by smelling or tasting may trigger the rest of a more extended affective cadence, 
which we implicitly recognise as following on naturally from this state. As noted above, 
Velleman (2003), describes our grasp of such trajectories in terms of the ‘muscle-memory 
of the heart’ (p. 19), and perhaps we ought to take his analogy with (a form of) procedural 
memory seriously.  
While much more work will be required to fully understand autobiographical memory and 
how it connects to perception and emotion, Velleman’s embodied approach to narrative 
understanding is helpful in capturing the phenomenology of Proustian memories. 
Moreover, although autobiographical memory is beyond the immediate purview of the 
sensorimotor approach, the preceding discussion shows how the sensorimotor approach 
to perceptual experience can be tied into broader discussions about the phenomenology 
of experience.  
6.3 Conclusion 
Perceptual experience (as understood through the proposed sensorimotor account) relies 
on past experience, which can shape perception through alterations to even supposedly 
early processes like object individuation as well as inducing affective associations. This can 
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in turn help us to understand why perceptual experience might trigger emotional 
memories.  
This chapter argued that familiarity with objects can influence the way the perceptual field 
is parcelled up into discrete entities. This is pertinent in the case of the chemical senses 
where individuating wholly novel objects is generally particularly tricky and time-
consuming. With the approach set out, the distinction between cognitive forms of 
memory and procedural bodily memories is softened: implicit object memories can be 
construed as part of our embodied attunement to sensorimotor contingencies. This 
chapter further argued that the kinds of prior experiences that allow for implicit object 
memories can also foster affective associations. Since prior experience is even more 
central to olfactory and flavour perception than it is to vision, we can expect fewer (if any) 
instances of hedonically neutral flavours and smells. Finally, I argued that treating flavours 
and smells as especially affectively valenced can help to explain why they serve as 
effective catalysts for emotional, narratively driven memories. Drawing on Velleman’s 
account of narrative understanding, I argued that the affective valence of perceptual 
objects can serve as a kind of prompt for the rest of an affective cadence characteristic of 
a narrative trajectory. This again suggests that the line between bodily procedural 











This thesis has explored whether the sensorimotor approach — supplemented by ideas 
from Gestalt psychology — can be extended to flavour and smell. I argued that flavour and 
smell do not present a problem for a sensorimotor approach and presented a positive 
account of how we should conceive of flavour and smell experiences within this 
framework. The main amendment to the sensorimotor approach throughout the thesis 
was to argue that it is perceptual objects, understood as discrete particulars involving 
figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies, rather than just ordinary physical 
objects that we gain access to through sensorimotor engagement. Sensorimotor skills 
allow perceivers to gain access to these perceptual objects, which not only include three-
dimensional physical objects but more diffuse entities like odours and flavours. This helps 
sensorimotor enactivism to achieve its aim of offering a general account of perception 
across the senses. 
The previous chapters have provided reason to both question the orthodoxy about the 
chemical senses and to rethink what kind of sensorimotor approach (if any) should be 
endorsed. If these senses allow for the experience of discrete perceptual objects, 
involving figure-ground assignments and perceptual constancies, this challenges the 
notions of flavour and smell as primitive and informationally impoverished. I also 
challenged the pervasive assumption that olfaction is aspatial; once we take into account 
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the role of bodily movement over time, it is clear that odours are experienced as 
spatiotemporally extended entities. Considerations of the chemical senses also helps to 
shape the sensorimotor approach: it lends weight to the conception of sensorimotor 
understanding as a kind of know-how rather than a cognitive know-that. There is reason 
to think that even babies may have primitive olfactory and gustatory abilities, and thus, 
sensorimotor understanding cannot be an intellectual skill. The shift to perceptual objects 
also alters how we are to conceive of our engagement with the world (see discussion in 
7.2.2).  
Chapter 1 introduced the sensorimotor framework and the Gestalt grouping principles. 
The grouping principles, and the notion of perceptual objecthood developed in 
subsequent chapters, offer a framework for understanding perception in a modality-
neutral manner. The distinctions between visual objects tend to map onto the well-
understood divisions between ordinary three-dimensional objects. This is not the case for 
the chemical senses. Thus, grasping the perceptual organisation afforded by these senses 
requires a more careful phenomenological investigation. Through the subsequent 
chapters we found that, like vision, the chemical senses partition the world into discrete 
entities that exhibit constancies, but unlike with vision, these entities are not ordinary 
physical objects. If sensorimotor enactivism is to be extended to the chemical senses, 
sensorimotor engagement must not only allow for access to physical objects and their 
properties.  
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Chapter 2 tackled two arguments against the extension of the sensorimotor approach to 
flavour and smell. These arguments were (1) that flavour and smell experiences are 
possible without bodily activity and (2) these experiences lack the perceptual duality 
proposed by the sensorimotor approach. We saw that the first argument only targets a 
specific interpretation of the sensorimotor account. To avoid this worry, the sensorimotor 
theorist can advocate a (developmental) notion of sensorimotor skill whereby the subject 
is attuned to how bodily movements would counterfactually induce sensory changes. I 
argued that the second argument is false because flavour and smell perceptions do allow 
for the kind of perceptual duality proposed by sensorimotor theorists. This provides 
support for the claim that perception is based on an attunement to sensory change.  
Chapters 3 and 4 drew upon Gestalt psychology to offer a novel account of the notion of 
perceptual objecthood, allowing for a more modality-neutral construal of sensorimotor 
enactivism. I argued that figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for perceptual objects. Smell and flavour 
experiences fulfil these criteria. Through sensorimotor engagement we perceive odours 
and flavours as individuated perceptual objects that survive shifts and change. With the 
suggested approach, sensorimotor enactivism involves access to perceptual objects rather 
than just ordinary physical objects. It is these perceptual objects that exhibit ‘perceptual 




Chapter 5 asked whether flavour and smell can be involved in multisensory perceptual 
objects. There is reason to think these senses can perceptually combine with one another 
into unified flavour-smell objects, but that it is implausible that they can combine with the 
perceptions of other senses in this way. I offered two different ways of assessing whether 
multiple senses are jointly picking out a unified object: (1) we can look at the application 
of the Gestalt grouping principles across the senses, and (2) look at whether the different 
senses concur with one another about the putative multisensory object’s properties. If 
they attribute contradictory properties to the object, these senses are not really involved 
in the perception of a single object, whereas if the senses interpret an object in the same 
way across shifts and changes, this provides evidence that they are jointly picking out a 
single perceptual object. 
Finally, chapter 6 looked at the role of prior experience and memory in flavour and smell 
perception, focusing on implicit object memory and autobiographical memory. I argued 
that implicit object memory can impact figure-ground assignments — a claim that has 
been opposed in traditional approaches to cognitive science. While recent empirical 
evidence has supported this approach (particularly when looking beyond vision towards 
the chemical senses), there is an argument that it is logically impossible for object 
memories to precede figure-ground segregation. Cashing out implicit object memory in 
an embodied manner, whereby it is treated as a mastery of object-related sensorimotor 
contingencies, offers a solution to this challenge. We also saw how prior experience can 
result in an object-type carrying affective associations, which may play a role in the 
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notably affective nature of the chemical senses. Flavours and smell perceptions are more 
dependent on prior experience than, say, vision, and thus they are likely to carry affective 
associations on this basis. Drawing upon the valenced nature of flavour and smell, I finally 
offered an approach to the ‘Proust phenomenon’ — their ability to trigger rich 
autobiographical memories. 
Chapter 6 also offered some clarification on the relationship between sensorimotor skills 
and Gestalt principles. In cases where one has not already developed an attunement to 
the relevant sensorimotor contingencies, perception involves a more protracted 
sensorimotor interaction with the environment. The Gestalt principles are particularly 
important in these instances of novel object perception, and plausibly act as heuristics for 
guiding this initial sensorimotor interaction. As one engages with the world, these 
principles are informative about which parts of the environment belong together and 
which are separate entities.  
The discussions in this thesis have further implications and open a number of different 
avenues for research. Here I shall highlight two areas worthy of future investigation.  
7.2 Areas for development and future enquiry 
7.2.1 Illusions in the chemical senses 
While some take olfactory illusions to be pervasive (Stevenson, 2011), others argue that 
they are not possible at all (Batty, 2014b). Traditionally, illusions are taken to be cases 
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where we are perceptually mistaken with regard to some property of an existent object, 
whereas hallucinations are cases where one perceives something that is not really there. 
An example of a visual illusion is a blue sweatshirt appearing green in certain lighting 
conditions. An example of a hallucination is the experience of a sweatshirt that isn’t really 
there. The approach set out in this thesis can inform us about the possibility of illusions in 
the chemical senses and may be informative about the sorts of illusions that can be 
expected. 
Accounts that deny the perception of discrete perceptual objects through the chemical 
senses cannot allow for illusions or hallucinations, as traditionally understood. This is 
because these types of non-veridical experience are defined in terms of objects: illusions 
are misperceptions of an object’s properties and hallucinations are experiences of non-
existent objects. Thus, feature-based approaches (e.g. Matthen, 2005) and weaker object-
based accounts (e.g. Batty, 2010a; 2010c; 2011; 2014a; 2014b) do not allow for these 
types of non-veridical experiences (as traditionally construed) in the chemical senses. 
According to Batty’s ‘abstract’ account, olfactory experience only ever involves the 
representation that there is something or other in one’s vicinity (an existentially quantified 
type of object), instantiating olfactory properties. Consequently, she denies the possibility 
of olfactory illusions; we cannot misperceive a particular object’s properties through the 
sense of smell since we don’t experience discrete property-bearing objects at all (Batty, 
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2010c; 2014b).99 She thinks this accords with our pre-philosophical understanding of 
olfaction because ‘[t]he notion of an olfactory illusion is not something that resonates 
with us’ (2010c, p. 12). However, contra Batty, I have argued that we perceive discrete 
property-bearing particulars through flavour and smell. With this approach, the possibility 
remains open of illusions and hallucinations in flavour and smell. There is no immediate 
reason to assume we cannot misperceive properties of existing perceptual objects in 
olfaction and flavour and/or hallucinate flavour and smell objects. 
As a starting point for investigating this issue, Stevenson (2011) presents a useful review 
of the empirical literature regarding putative olfactory illusions. However, while Batty 
rules out olfactory illusions altogether, Stevenson is too permissive. He argues that there 
are two categories of olfactory illusions: ‘same stimulus – different percept’ and ‘different 
stimulus – same percept’. As an example of the former, he talks about how odours can be 
perceived differently through the orthonasal and retronasal routes (p. 1890) and the 
latter encompasses cases such as intensity constancy, where taking a bigger sniff of an 
odour does not induce a more intense percept despite a difference to the stimulation of 
 
99 However, as Batty (2014b) and Macpherson and Batty (2016) point out, by tweaking the traditional 
definitions of hallucinations and illusions, different kinds of non-veridical experiences can be acknowledged. 
Although Batty (2014b) rules out olfactory illusions, she does suggest that smell could allow for a kind of 
property hallucination (2014b). We might perceive properties — not instantiated by anything in particular 
— that aren’t really there. Elsewhere Macpherson and Batty (2016) propose a new taxonomy of 
hallucinations and illusions to accommodate ‘pure property’ experiences. They suggest there may be 
property illusions as well as hallucinations. For example, one might misperceive an olfactory property (e.g. 
smokiness), as more intense than it really is. While there may be benefits to a new taxonomy of illusions 
and hallucinations, an implication of the approach in this thesis is that we need not redefine illusion and 
hallucination to accommodate the chemical senses. Even within the constraints of traditional accounts of 
non-veridical experiences, flavour and smell illusions and hallucinations are possible. 
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the olfactory epithelium (p. 1892). He gives a number of further examples of each alleged 
type of olfactory illusion. However, not all the cases can rightly be classified as illusions. 
Although as I shall discuss below, constancies when misapplied (or applied atypically) can 
result in illusions, intensity constancy appears to be a case of perceptual constancies 
operating correctly. It informs us about the properties of the odour. Changing one’s bodily 
behaviour should not change the perceived properties of the distal object itself. Just as 
moving one’s head towards a sound source doesn’t make it seem that the sound itself has 
become louder, or moving toward a visually perceived object doesn’t make it seem that 
the object itself is getting bigger, taking a bigger sniff of an odour doesn’t make it seem 
that the smell has become stronger. It also isn’t clear that differences in how odours are 
experienced through orthonasal and retronasal routes should be considered illusory, 
since retronasal olfaction may be best understood as a part of flavour perception rather 
than smell perception (see discussion in 5.1). Thus, more work is needed to determine 
which of the examples highlighted by Stevenson should count as illusions.  
The account of perceptual objecthood set out in this thesis may prove informative about 
the kinds of illusions that could occur in flavour and smell. I have argued that perceptual 
objects crucially involve constancies and figure-ground assignments and across the other 
senses, there are illusions that relate to these features of objecthood. So, examining these 
aspects of perception might provide some examples of illusions in the chemical senses. 
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According to a popular account (e.g. see Gregory, 1963; Day, 1972; Ramachandran & 
Rogers-Ramachandran, 2006), a large class of illusions are based upon perceptual 
constancy mechanisms. Such illusions involve a misapplication (or atypical/surprising 
application) of these constancies. Consider the Ponzo illusion (Fig. 7.1). To most observers, 
the two horizontal lines appear to be different sizes despite being of equal length. A 
prominent explanation says this is due to a misapplication of size constancy due to depth 
cues stemming from the converging lines (Gregory, 1963; Ramachandran & Rogers-
Ramachandran, 2006). The Müller-Lyer effect is also often taken to be based (at least in 
part) upon a misapplication of constancies, whether size constancy (Gregory, 1963) or 
shape constancy (Nanay, 2009). Other visual illusions rely upon the application of colour 
constancy in atypical settings (i.e. when looking at a picture of an object rather than a real 
three-dimensional object). It is taken to be surprising that two patches of an image are 
the same colour when they appear different due to the apparent lighting conditions 
within the picture. 
Fig. 7.1. The Ponzo illusion 
The upper horizontal line 
appears larger than the lower 
line, but they are the same size. 
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There are also illusions based upon atypical figure-ground segregation and perceptual 
groupings. For example, the double beep experiment provides a multisensory example of 
such figure-ground assignments. Auditory stimuli can influence the amount of flashes that 
one visually perceives (Shams, Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2000), and thus the figure-ground 
assignments that are visually made. Hearing two beeps in quick succession often causes 
the perceiver to report seeing two flashes, rather than the single flash that actually 
occurred. The auditory stimuli result in altered visual figure-ground effects: the subject 
perceives two successive figures rather than a single unified figure. Another example is 
provided by an illusion known as the ‘auditory gap transfer’ illusion (see Nakajima, 2006 
for review). In this illusion an ascending-frequency auditory glide of 1,500 milliseconds 
with a brief temporal gap in the middle is crossed with a shorter (500 millisecond) 
descending-frequency glide. The gap is misperceived as occurring in the shorter, 
descending glide. Nakajima (2006, p. 323) suggests that ‘if an onset and an offset are close 
to each other in a subjective space corresponding to time and frequency, they are likely 
to be connected.’ The shorter glide begins later than the longer glide, and so its onset is 
more temporally proximate to the gap. This application of the Gestalt principle of 
proximity here results in a non-veridical experience.  
Flavour and smell perceptions exhibit constancies and figure-ground segregation. It is thus 
prima facie possible for these features of objecthood to occur in atypical or surprising 
ways in these senses, as in the visual and auditory examples above. Looking for such 
applications of constancies and grouping/segregations may help to reveal illusions in 
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these senses. Revisiting studies discussed in the previous chapters provides a couple of 
initial plausible examples.  
The first candidate illusion is provided by the study by Woods and colleagues (2010), 
which was discussed in chapters 2 and 4. In this study, subjects perceived drink samples 
as being more similar to one another than they really were. Their expectations were 
manipulated by the two distinct drink samples appearing to be poured from the same jug. 
This may be a case of a misapplied constancies allowing for the misperception of a 
perceptual object’s properties. Secondly, we have seen that perceiving novel odours 
paired together can impact one’s subsequent perceptions of the individual component 
odours. They tend to appear more similar to one another than is typical and subjects’ 
abilities to distinguish the odours are impaired. For example, as discussed in chapter 6, 
when cherry and mushroom odours are paired, mushrooms are subsequently 
experienced as smelling more like cherries (Wilson & Stevenson, 2007). This effect is 
plausibly related to perceptual constancies, but it also makes it harder to segregate the 
odours, thus impacting figure-ground assignments. If the odours are experienced as 
grouped together rather than two separate odour objects, this may constitute an illusion 
due to atypical grouping/segregation. 
While I have only provided a couple of brief examples of potential flavour and smell 
illusions here, this would appear to be a fruitful avenue for further investigation. More 
work is needed to provide suitable constraints on what should count as illusions and 
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hallucinations in these senses. An additional question is why, if there are flavour and smell 
illusions, they are not usually phenomenologically obvious to us.  
7.2.2 Direct realism 
The sensorimotor approach is often construed as a kind of direct realism; through 
sensorimotor engagement, we gain direct and unmediated access worldly objects (e.g. 
Noë, 2004, p. 163; 2008; 2009; Beaton, 2016). That it plausibly offers an empirically 
tractable type of direct realism may be taken as an advantage of the approach. In the 
foregoing chapters, I shifted the emphasis from physical objects to perceptual objects, 
which better encompasses perceptions across the non-visual modalities. This may impact 
claims about direct realism because perceptual objects are individuated according to the 
subject’s own figure-ground assignments. Endorsing this notion of perceptual objecthood 
may thus give the impression that we do not directly perceive the mind-independent 
world, but instead only experience perceiver-dependent entities. Moreover, the focus on 
the chemical senses puts further pressure on a direct realist interpretation of the 
sensorimotor approach because there is wide-ranging variation in what people can detect 
through these senses. Here I can only offer some initial remarks about these issues. 
However, with further research, the approach in this thesis may prove informative about 
whether direct realism is viable and, if so, which kind should be endorsed.  
Perceptual objects are parts of the world, as experienced by a subject. The perceiver 
parses the world into distinct figures and as we have seen at various junctures, perceptual 
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organisation can vary among perceivers. Perceptual organisation tends towards the most 
prägnant interpretation, but this can be influenced by one’s prior experiences (see 
chapter 6) and one’s cultural background (see 4.2). For example, which flavour 
combinations are considered congruent varies in different cultures. In Western countries, 
almond is usually considered congruent with sweet tastes, whereas in Japan it is instead 
most associated with umami (Breslin, Doolittle, & Dalton, 2001). As argued in chapter 4, 
such differences plausibly reflect differences in what flavour combinations are considered 
to exhibit the most harmonious, prägnant form. And this has implications for perceptual 
organisation. Two perceivers could in principle organise the same stimuli in highly 
divergent ways, putting tension on the claim that we directly perceive a mind-
independent world.  
I think that one can (and should) hold that the perceiver is still gaining direct access to an 
observer-independent world, but that exactly how the world is parcelled up is to some 
extent perceiver-dependent. Through the sense of smell, we access odours — real 
environmental entities — but which collections of molecules are grouped together is, in 
part, dependent upon the interests and prior experiences of the perceiver. Someone who 
has only ever experienced cherries and mushrooms in combination will be less likely to 
experience them as discrete perceptual objects (see discussion in 6.1.1; also Wilson & 
Stevenson, 2007). Likewise, we might, in some sense, access the same world as a cat or 
an ant, but the way this world is perceptually divided into meaningful entities will differ 
greatly. This conflicts with one kind of direct realism that says that perceptual 
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phenomenology is constitutively and completely determined by the mind-independent 
world (see Beck, 2019 for discussion and critique of this kind of approach). However, other 
types of direct realism can allow certain perceiver-dependent factors (along with the 
perceiver-independent ones) to play a role in perceptual phenomenology. Thus, 
perceiver-dependent variations in figure-ground assignments need not be taken to 
conflict with the direct perception of a perceiver-independent world.100 This suggestion 
does, however, require more investigation.  
Direct realism about flavour and smell is put under particular pressure due to variation in 
what individuals experience through these senses. It is well known that so-called 
‘supertasters’ are genetically disposed to perceive certain foods, such as Brussel Sprouts 
and some artificial sweeteners, to be unacceptably bitter.101 There is also variation in the 
abilities to detect many other tastes, such as umami and sourness, and smells (for reviews 
see Garcia-Bailo, Toguri, Eny, & El-Sohemy, 2009; Spence, 2019). Moreover, various 
flavours seem qualitatively different to different people. Coriander, for example, is 
notoriously polarising. It tastes soapy or dirty to a portion of the population and fragrantly 
herbal to others, which is said to be based, at least in part, on genetic variation in olfactory 
 
100 If fleshed out in a suitable manner, this approach could also help to offer a direct-realism-friendly account 
of the kinds of illusions discussed in 7.1. The perceiver-independent world can sometimes be perceptually 
parcelled up in atypical and surprising ways. For example, the auditory gap transfer illusion discussed in 7.1 
can be understood in terms of directly accessing real, mind-independent sounds, but which are grouped 
together in an atypical manner.  
101 Variations in bitter taste detection have long been established through research into compounds such 
as phenylthiocarbamide (PTC). Such variations were first discovered in 1931 when researcher Arthur Fox 
was pouring PTC, a powder, into a bottle and some of it flew into the air of the lab. His colleague complained 
about its bitter taste, but Fox was unable to detect it, prompting him to research responses to the chemical 
(Fox, 1932).  
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receptors (Eriksson, et al., 2012). Such individual differences in flavour and smell 
perception may present a problem for the idea that we are accessing objective parts of 
the world through these senses. 
As an initial response, where the differences are solely down to different thresholds for 
detection of taste or smells, this is not particularly threatening for the direct realist. In 
these cases, subjects who do not detect the properties can be construed as simply failing 
to perceptually access an existent property. Cases where there are substantial qualitative 
differences to the experiences of different perceivers may be more challenging. One 
response is to downplay such variation. Notable defender of taste realism Barry Smith 
argues that talk of individual variation in tastes is overblown: ‘Milk that has soured tastes 
disgusting to all, and a banana could not taste like an orange to some people without 
there being something wrong with such people or with the banana’ (2013a, p. 734). 
Another kind of response to these kinds of differences would be emphasise that there are 
multiple real flavours and smells and/or flavour and smell properties, and only some of 
which are experienced by any one perceiver. Speaking of wine, Smith says: 
Of course, you cannot be sure that someone else will detect the same tastes you 
do. But there is every reason to think tastes are there to be detected. We draw 
each other’s attention to what we have noticed in a wine. ‘Do you get the pear?’ 
we may say when tasting a white Burgundy, or ‘Fig?’ when tasting a Rhône (2007, 
p. 45). 
Perhaps something similar can be said of the coriander case. Unlike the wine case, it 
doesn’t seem that one can draw attention to the soapy taste if the perceiver is not 
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genetically disposed to perceive it as such. Nevertheless, it may be that both the soapy 
and herbal coriander flavours are really there. The soapy flavour of coriander is simply not 
detectable by some perceivers and the fragrant herbal flavour is perhaps not detectable 
to others, just as the bitter taste of sweeteners may not be perceptible to non-super-
tasters. Allen (2016) offers a direct realist account of colour perception and argues that 
the same object can have multiple mind-independent colours. Future research should 
further explore whether this kind of argument is satisfactory when applied to the chemical 
senses.  
The chemical senses remain under-explored and there is still much work to be done in 
exploring how what is empirically known about them impacts philosophical debates about 
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